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Risk Distance: The Loss of Strength Gradient and Colombia‟s Geography of Impunity 
 
Abstract 
 
Geoffrey Demarest 
Department of Geography, 2013 
University of Kansas 
 
The dissertation proposes a theoretical category of distance, risk distance, as a prompt for 
understanding outcomes in internal armed struggles.  Geographers are familiar with cost distance 
-- conceiving distance according to the time or material resources needed to move people and 
things.  Risk distance is closer conceptually to what strategists might recognize as the distance to 
the „culminating point‟, which is a theoretical point in space and time beyond which an armed 
force would run an imprudent risk to its survival (if it were to continue to pursue, attack, or 
remain in the same position, etc.).  Combat leaders seek to lengthen the distances to their 
culminating points and shorten those of their opponents.  Cost and risk distances are generally 
related inversely: risk distances can shorten as cost distances increase.  In Colombia‟s internal 
conflict, a variety of geographic phenomena (rugged upslopes, international borders, urban 
slums, jungles) share effect on risk distance -- favoring a fugitive entity by disproportionately 
shortening the risk distances of its pursuers. 
Risk distance also applies to civilian activity.  If the Euclidean distance from a rural 
community to a hospital maternity ward were 70 kilometers, the cost distance might be six hours 
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and four thousand pesos.  The rough ride or danger of attack along the way could lead expecting 
parents to perceive the risk distance as only thirty kilometers down the road or two hours of 
travel time.  The distance to the feared point of too much risk makes their attempt to go to that 
hospital untenable. 
In Colombia, violent armed groups escape to areas beyond their rivals‟ reach, seeking 
routes (typically long-established smuggling routes) that help shorten the pursuers‟ risk 
distances.  These routes and sanctuaries, created within armed rivalry, are often spatially 
coincident with rural population centers that also appear remote, that is, beyond many quotidian 
risk distances.  This spatial coincidence (of conditions involving certain prosaic and violent 
rivalry risk distances) contributes to causing some rural communities to fall victim to or 
collaborate in organized violence; but the differential in rivals‟ risk distances is by itself more 
significant to the prolongation or outcome of internal conflict. 
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Section I. Introduction 
Risk distance is the distance to a theoretical point in space and time beyond which it 
would be imprudent to continue to conduct an activity or to remain in a place.  In the context of 
internal armed conflicts, certain geographic phenomena favor persons attempting to escape by 
disproportionately decreasing the risk distances of their pursuers.  Meanwhile, the same 
phenomena endanger civilian populations located on or near the routes of escape. 
 
Significance of the Research 
Using a highly Geography-centric theoretical approach, I considered the spatial record of 
a long, complex armed struggle.  Not discarded are other approaches that focus on insurgent or 
government intentions, or which launch their analyses from Marxist assumptions regarding class 
liberation and competition (revolutionary war), or calculate the influence of underlying socio-
economic conditions -- but I relegate them to background narrative of secondary significance.  I 
considered the Colombian record of organized violence in light of a theory about distance, and 
simultaneously tested the theory using the Colombian record.  Colombian expressions of spatial 
correlations related to the conflict are compellingly consistent with the proposed theory. 
The existence of remote areas (especially those from which there are multiple routes of egress) 
appears to be a more influential factor for the success or prolongation of a revolutionary or 
organized criminal effort than is any political, social or economic factor or set of factors.  That 
said, admittedly dulling the incisiveness of the overall assertion, the geographic cost distances 
that define remoteness are dependent in part on specific attitudinal conditions that we describe as 
political or social.  It appears incontrovertible that informational, ideological, or attitudinal 
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conditions at larger scales (of, say, the country, region and world) bear on relevant local 
competitive distances as I define them.  As an example, Plan Colombia began in the late 1990s 
during the administrations of Andrés Pastrana in Colombia and William Clinton in the United 
States.  The written trace of Plan Colombia leads back to a white paper released by the 
Colombian Government in May, 1999. (Ramsey 2009, p. 56).  The Pastrana administration did 
not raise sufficient funds for what it proposed as the Colombian share of the six billion dollar 
plan, and did little better with foreign governments other than the United States.  As a result, the 
United States provided most of the money for implementing the plan.  On July 13 of the same 
year, President Clinton signed into law an aid package that authorized 768.5 million dollars in 
assistance over amounts previously authorized.  I cannot determine the exact amount of funding 
that ultimately reached Colombia as a direct outgrowth of the plan, but by all estimates, it 
exceeded a billion dollars within the first several years.  United States funding of the plan aimed 
mostly at counternarcotics efforts.  After 2002, the funding broadened into counterinsurgency 
support.  The phases of the plan called for a first concentration of effort in Putumayo 
Department, then a broadening of effort to south-eastern Colombia generally, then a further 
expansion to encompass the entire country.  “The “basic elements” for the COLMIL–CNP 
[Colombian Military-National Police] counterdrug efforts were human rights, air interdiction, 
interdiction of precursor chemicals, COLMIL support of CNP counterdrug operations, 
destruction of drug processing laboratories and stockpiles, and coca eradication.” (Ramsey  
2009, p. 58).  A significant portion of the plan‟s US funding went toward helicopters. 
The flow of material support under Plan Colombia suffered some delay.  However, not 
long after Al Qaeda‟s attack against the United States on Sptember 11, 2000, the United States 
dropped insistence on supporting only counternarcotics operations and not to counterinsurgency.  
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The changed expanded the geographic logic of operations supportable by Plan Colombia funding 
beyond coca growing regions.  (Clinton 2000; Arms Control Today March 2002; Ramsey 2009, 
pp. 55-58).  Not long after the „9/11‟ attacks in the United States, the peace process between the 
Pastrana Administration and the FARC began to deteriorate precipitously.  By late 2002, Plan 
Colombia was in full swing, restrictions against counterinsurgency use of the funding 
disappeared, and the peace process was ended.  Geostrategic events, in this case the attack of Al 
Qaeda against the United States, helped put the technological instrument that could most change 
tactical risk distances (the helicopter) into use during military pursuits in Colombia. 
While the research does not directly address causes of conflict, the findings do appear to 
unbalance prevailing theory regarding the causes of violent social discontent, especially in rural 
areas.  I make observations regarding the influence of distance without presuming an ideological 
preference regarding optimal distribution of power, where responsibility to provide economic 
necessities resides, what the proper degree of autonomy for local cultures ought to be, and so on.  
Nevertheless, I make some collateral observations in light of the dissertation‟s theoretical 
propositions about the effect of risk distance.  It appears, for instance, that remoteness from 
services such as modern obstetrics, sewer systems, property courts, higher education or even 
electricity is in Colombia not a root cause of the violence or social conflict.  Substandard 
economic performance („unsatisfied basic needs‟ as described and measured in Colombia) in 
remote regions correlates to their transportation remoteness.  Violence over time has also been 
correlated to transportation remoteness.  However, I cannot find that those two correlations are 
evidence of a causal relationship from the former to the latter -- between material under-
performance and organized violence.  The opposite certainly appears true; close proximity of a 
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group of violent armed men can quickly diminish the material well-being of a geographically 
isolated community. 
Trying to paint, adjust, or even understand the entire complex algorithm of factors said to 
bear on internal conflicts such as the one ongoing in Colombia is not a purpose of the research.  
It occurs, however, that the findings of the research call into doubt some often repeated or even 
assumed elements of that algorithm.  For instance, the percentage of the overall population that 
might own agricultural land may be relatively inconsequential.  That argument (that the 
percentage of the population owning agricultural land is inadequate and that said inadequacy is a 
root cause of social conflict) does not appear to be supported by correlation between the internal 
spatial distribution of violence in Colombia and the spatial distribution of types of land tenancy, 
repartition of holdings, demographic density or economic performance.  On the other hand, a 
careful consideration of distances may help to explain the spatial distribution of violence, and 
therefore may serve to displace such agrarian justice explanations of internal violence generally.  
Additionally, the various forms of communally owned property in Colombia confound 
arguments that invoke numbers of owner-individuals versus extent of agricultural land holdings.  
There exists no single or even generally accepted logic as to how one might count the acreage 
share of an individual within the various forms of Colombian communal lands.  The logic of 
ownership is as varied and convoluted as are the differing legal, bureaucratic and ideological 
lexicons used to promote that logic.  A theory which focuses on more enduring phenoma (in this 
case a few standard geographic elements), and that exposes a clear correlation between those 
phenomena and a condition of moral concern (mortal organized violence), is likely to gain at 
least some space in the narrative of explanations. 
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Even among those who are insistent that the underlying cause of the conflict is socio-
economic injustice, (including those who take as axiomatic that part of the injustice is an 
imbalance in agricultural land ownership) Colombia‟s physical geography has been an 
unavoidable mention.  Gary Leech, a Marxist-leaning author and commentator on Colombia and 
guerrilla apologist, states, for instance, “Colombia‟s rugged mountains and vast expanses of 
jungle make the country an ideal place for waging guerrilla warfare.” (Leech 2011, p. 152)  Like 
everyone else who has noted the same, he does not explain why, although a common assumption 
seems to be that it is simply easier to hide in those types of terrain.  I underline that the purpose 
of this research is not one of determining the causes of Colombia‟s or any other armed conflict.  
Nevertheless, if one of the services of new theory is to challenge prevailing and yet weakly 
founded notions of causation, or to help lend to common assumptions some greater amount of 
logic, then this research does that service to a degree.  By coincidence, as I am just finishing 
writing this dissertation, the Colombian Historical Memory Group published their „General 
Report‟ on the conflict. (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013)  Numerous governments 
and several international non-governmental organizations sponsored this long-awaited work.  I 
do not consider it the definitive writing on the nature or cause of the conflict, and it immediately 
attracted sharp criticism as being ideologically skewed. (Mackenzie 2013).  However, it carries 
an appreciable and apparently accurate if not complete historic record, including spatial 
renderings of the distribution and dynamics of the war‟s events and costs.  The group‟s report is 
not inconsistent with the theoretical findings of this dissertation.  
A geography-based approach to understanding the Colombian conflict contributes to the 
literature on that conflict, helping to test interpretations regarding the nature of the Colombian 
armed challenge to the state.  It discusses, at least partially, why policy makers ended up 
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focusing on certain locales within the country, and therefore might contribute to debate regarding 
prescriptions for change, either in the prosecution of the war as a competitive matter, or the 
construction of a more peaceable social compact.  Because the research is about spatial 
distribution of various phenomena from the point of view of Colombian representations of that 
spatial distribution, the dissertation also necessarily addresses the representations themselves – it 
considers Colombians‟ maps of Colombia. 
The research also helps test theoretical bases for an anticipated Conflict Geography sub-
discipline that will center, unlike classic military geography, on internal social struggles.  The 
traditional concentration of military geography has been quite exclusively on physical aspects of 
terrain.  See, for instance Military Geography for the Professional and Public (Collins 1998).  I 
take the approach that it is only a didactic convenience to distinguish between human and 
physical geography; and that it is better to imagine geography as an interaction, not a separation 
of human from surroundings. 
I also intend the dissertation as an intellectual springboard to a broader strategic 
understanding of the relationship of national strategic power to distance.  The dissertation title 
invokes a theory that addressed global coercive power in the era of two nuclear superpowers, but 
that I believe may be applicable today.  That said, I only make a half-hearted attempt within the 
four corners of the dissertation to generalize applicability beyond the Colombian experience. 
 
Theoretical Context 
I take as axiomatic that the competitive strength of armed elements diminishes in 
accordance with the distance they must travel away from their base or sanctuary.  This „law,‟ to 
which the dissertation title alludes, is known as the Loss of Strength Gradient, a term proposed 
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by economist Kenneth Boulding in 1962. (Boulding 1962).  Although Professor Boulding used 
the term in relation to global strategy, the loss of strength gradient applies equally well to 
internal armed conflict.  It is to be associated with Waldo Tobler‟s „first law of geography‟ that 
“everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related” (Tobler, 1970); as 
well as to the observation called „distance decay‟ in geography and economics.  As applied by 
Professor Boulding, the loss of strength (or influence) caused by increasing distance has a 
predictable and graphable geographic consequence or manifestation. 
As depicted in Figure 1, Professor Boulding imagined the geographic world simplified as 
the limitless line A-B, with point A being one country and point B another in a world of only two 
countries.  The line between points A and B represents the distance between the two countries. 
 
Figure 1: The Loss of Strength Gradient in a single-line world.  Adapted from Boulding (Boulding 1962, p. 162). 
 
Lines A-H and B-K represent each country‟s amount of military coercive power.  The slope of 
the lines H-L, H-E, or K-M  represent the loss of effective military power as distance increases – 
the loss of strength gradient.  Point D is derived as the geographic point in the world at which the 
two countries, although unequal in overall military capacity, have equal strength.  An increase in 
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coercive power by country B, represented by the line K-K‟ might move the geographic point of 
equality to point D‟ and so on logically.  The graphic suggests that country A could achieve 
enough military power such that country B would have no place in the A-B world where B 
would enjoy military strength equal to that of A.  Part of the suggestion is that a modest increase 
in coercive power on the part of B could greatly ameliorate even a great effort on the part of A to 
increase its coercive power, even moving the point of equal power closer to A. 
In Figure 2, the world becomes a circle wherein the two countries A and B (points A and 
B) have equal military power at two points in the world, D.  The smaller of the D-D arcs depicts 
the part of the world in which country B enjoys superior military strength. 
 
Figure 2: The Loss of Strength Gradient in a circular world. 
In Figure 3, the world becomes a sphere, but if we continue to consider the strict 
competition of only the two countries A and B, then the line of equal power (Circle D) makes a 
parallel around the world.  It creates a surface area in the shape of a beanie or simple yarmulke 
wherein country B still enjoys greater military power. 
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Figure 3: The Loss of Strength Gradient in a spherical world. 
Figure 3: The Loss of Strength Gradient in a spherical world. 
Depicting the points of equal power would become quite an intellectual and artistic chore 
if we equipped our imagined world with several countries of differing amounts of military 
power, each with varying national sizes and shapes.  If we were to imagine many dozens of 
countries, all conspiring alliances and constantly evolving in coercive power, the depiction 
would be all but impossible to create.  Perhaps because of that impossibility, writers on strategy 
who have gone about comparing countries‟ military power tend to overlook the effect of distance 
entirely.  They concentrate instead on all the direct factors of competitive strength such as 
population, economic performance, diplomatic acumen, cyber power, and so on.  None of the 
entries in a recent bibliography (prepared by the library of one of the US national strategy 
colleges) on the elements of national power discusses distance.  (Ike Skelton Library 2011).  This 
oblivion to the effect of distance on power does not make the influence of distance go away, 
however. 
 There exists another theoretical axiom, necessary as context for this dissertation‟s 
argument, and that relates directly to armed competitions.  It is a sort of geographic equation for 
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the prudent application of armed force.  It is also a core dynamic of classic military theory.  
Below is one expression of that dynamic, made by British lawyer and geographer T. Miller 
Maguire just before the age of the airplane began. 
“Before entering into battle a general must be most careful to secure his line or 
lines of retreat...a general whose road homeward or to his base is threatened or cut 
by a superior force must, if he loses a decisive battle, be ruined as well as 
defeated; while a general who has secured his line of communication will not be 
ruined even if defeated, but can fall back, procure recruits, replenish his waggons, 
and begin to fight again with a fair prospect of success.” (Maguire, 1899, pp. 21-
22). 
 The assertion has two parts.  The first is about movement.  Before an action or a contact, 
someone is going to travel.  The second part of Maguire‟s assertion depends on the first, but is 
the more consequential point for understanding the equation of coercive competition.  The 
careful leader anticipates contacts, and will make sure his line of withdrawal is secure in case he 
attacks or is attacked by a stronger force.  About the only terminal mistake an insurgent or 
criminal leader can make is to get trapped.  He can recover from everything else.  Like so much 
else that is true, this truth reigns in both the palpable world and the solipsistic one.  The 
competitive leader wants to correctly interpret and shape physical reality in order to act prudently 
and to affect the perceptions and mindset of the opposing leader.  Another expression from 
Miller‟s Outlines of Military Geography: 
“The object of the strategist in drawing up his plan is so to arrange his marches 
and his lines of operations that, on the one hand, if he wins the battle he will not 
only defeat the enemy on the field but place him in a situation of much perplexity 
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as to his future action, his line of retreat, and his supplies; and, on the other hand, 
if the battle be lost, he will have secured for himself a safe line of retreat, and an 
opportunity of recuperating his strength.” (Maguire 1899, p. 30). 
Again, there are two parts ˗˗ movement and secured options.  Maguire emphasizes that contacts 
do not just happen; someone makes decisions to be somewhere.  He also notes that competent 
strategy implies the constant measurement of relative power, but with prudence to know that 
those measurements will often be wrong.  Maguire‟s statements make the line of retreat a central 
geographic concept in armed competition.  He does not diminish the importance of the battles or 
contacts.  Actually, he was emphatic about the primacy of those contacts.  Without armed action, 
an insurgent is just a lawyer or a politician.  Without robbery, the thief goes broke.  In addition, 
as far as the State might be concerned, if it does nothing to engage an armed insurgent or a 
criminal gang physically, the latter may continue to act and grow more powerful until the state 
appears completely complicit or those other organizations become the State.  Battle was to 
Maguire the ultimate military preoccupation, but he noted that it did not have to occur in order 
for it to be effective.  Potential battle, with its results and consequences as perceived in terms of 
fears or opportunities in the minds of the contending leaders could be enough to determine the 
results of competition.  That psychological quantity is similar to what I define a little further 
below as presence. 
 I adapt Boulding‟s reminder of the obvious, along with Maguire‟s simplification and 
synthesis of the equation of armed competition, and apply them anew to a reading of the 
Colombian internal conflict.  Internal conflicts generally involve politically motivated guerrillas, 
profit-seeking armed gangs, vigilantes, separatists, and/or combinations and hybrids of these.  
Usually, the competitive landscape in a given conflict features more than two such organizations, 
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which often find they are contending among themselves in addition to fighting against a 
government.  A government that finds it necessary to oppose these elements probably possesses 
greater military resources, at least at the outset of open hostilities.  In Colombia, all of the groups 
that the government opposes at some point face the necessity to escape physical pursuit.  Their 
success in escaping government pursuit, or for escaping from each other, depends on their being 
able to get beyond that point where the strength of the pursuing force is no greater than their 
own, or rather, the pursuing force perceives that it will be going beyond a point at which the risks 
it takes are imprudently great.  What might constitute the critical competitive test is rarely found 
in a measurement of the overall strength or coercive capacity of a rebellious or criminal 
organization versus the overall coercive capacity of the government, or of other rivals.  The 
dispositive balance (perhaps the determining balance) is more likely to be found in aggregate 
strength as measured where the coercive agents of competing organizations meet on the ground 
in real space.  The little parts of organizations -- the platoons, companies, squads, columns, 
gangs -- have to outdistance their immediate adversaries.  They must competently deal with what 
military theorists have called the culminating point.  Whether they are ostensibly in pursuit, 
trying to escape, or are in contact, all competitors have to sense at what point in space and time 
they will be taking an imprudent risk to proceed or to remain.  The kind of balance-of-strength 
point that Kenneth Boulding imagined in his single straight-line world can be depicted in the 
aggregate, or at least approximated.  The distances to the multiple points are risk distances and 
the space beyond the risk distances of the pursuers is the fugitives‟ sanctuary. 
 We can weigh coercive power in internal conflicts according to relative internal cost-
distances, and more especially by relative risk-distances.  Other influences of a geographical 
nature, such as the source locations of commercial export products (especially extractive or 
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agricultural); processing locations and transportation routes for these products; and the location 
of any required labor inputs for the extraction, cultivation, processing, or movement of these 
products can hardly be overstated.  I propose new concepts and definitions, including definitions 
of sanctuary, remoteness, and even stable governance.  I do not build from a presumption or 
argument favoring geographic determinism, however.  Rather, accepting that physical geography 
is never a stand-alone factor in human decision-making, I find it nevertheless to be a singularly 
influential constraint on human decision-making, a great fouler of ill-conceived action, and an 
indispensable factor in the explanation of competitive success or failure in internal armed 
struggles. 
 From a recent journalist‟s appraisal of the Colombian internal war, we read what has 
come to be a nearly axiomatic causal reasoning regarding their prolonged internal warfare: 
“Colombia in many ways is cursed by its own geography, since its mountainous 
terrain makes it almost ideal for guerrilla armies to operate in.  The country was 
originally settled by Spanish conquistadores who had their eye on the abundant 
gold reserves within it, more than they did the logistical problem of setting up a 
functioning state.  The logistical problems are clearly evident in the way that 
whole towns are often precariously linked up with each other by dirt roads 
snaking through mountain passes.  Consequently, while the presence of 
government is felt consistently in the cities, out in the country the government 
authority and any possible relief it can bring to Colombia‟s poor is left wanting.” 
(Barker, June 2012).  
 Colombia‟s mountainous terrain aids anti-government forces or other fugitive elements to 
elude government agents and units sent to capture or kill them.  The same mountains make it 
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more difficult for governments at all levels to provide basic services for citizens living uphill or 
in mountain confines.  Again, despite the spatial concurrence of escape-favoring terrain with a 
difficulty in providing centralized social services, there is little by way of logic or evidence 
implicating poor local economic performance as a cause of the organized violence. 
 
Structure of Dissertation 
I begin by defining several terms and surveying relevant Colombian history in order to 
orient the reader.  I then make a brief survey of Colombia‟s geography in order to highlight those 
regions to which the term „remote‟ has been attached with little debate.  I then display the 
location of the war within Colombia using observations of a variety of phenomena as depicted 
spatially by Colombians.  A striking spatial correlation of Colombian remoteness and costs of the 
war appears.  Nevertheless, I reject the correlation as modus ponens proof that Colombia‟s 
remoteness induces or allows the conflict.  Rather, using a number of anecdotes arranged in 
commonly recognizable categories, I examine and defend the concept of risk distance.  The 
anecdotes suggest the role of risk distance in determining why the war is where it is, as well as 
the influence of risk distance on competitive outcomes at various scales.  Following the 
anecdotal categories is a series of brief analyses of several of the remote and conflictive regional 
spaces.  The analyses focus less on the violent events and more on the broader interaction of 
violent organizations and populations within those conflictive regions.  Together, the 
correlations, events and region analyses form an argument for the significance and utility of risk 
distance as a geographic concept. 
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Section 2. Methodology 
Research activities 
I invested the single greatest amount of time to complete this research reading maps of 
Colombia and of places within and around Colombia.  Figure 4 shows perhaps the most 
consulted map. 
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Figure 4: Colombia Wall Map (Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi 2006). 
Almost all of the maps at which I looked were locally produced in Colombia by 
Colombians.  In drawing conclusions from the map reading, I tried to remain cognizant of the 
Colombian analyses that often accompanied them.  I read a great many accounts of the conflict, 
also mostly from Colombians, some of which showed an acute spatial awareness and many of 
which seemed oblivious to geography. 
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 The next greatest amount of research time I spent in direct travel and observation.  I did 
not visit all the places mentioned in the text.  Although Colombia appears to be healing, the 
physical threat posed by a variety of armed groups still constrains the conduct of direct 
geographic research.  Nevertheless, I traveled in and over most of the departments of Colombia 
and most of the conflictive regions mentioned in the text, and exploited opportunities to 
interview military, government, business, academic, opposition leaders, and ex-guerrillas. 
 Another considerable amount of time I spent simply looking for the locations of places 
named in reports of key events.  Colombia is highly subject to vagaries, variations, multiple uses, 
local custom, and political competition regarding place names, toponomy being an elaborate and 
sophisticated Colombian pastime as well as science (IGAC 2009; IGAC 1998; IGAC 1995).  
Colombians typically identify events (especially violent or forensic events) in public reports by 
the municipio (which I translate as county), but also often by the vereda (commonly the next 
administrative unit below the municipio) or a caserio (a small grouping of rural residences), but 
almost as often by a locally named feature such as a canyon, creek or pond.  Figure 5 shows 
Colombia‟s municipios.  Often these names skip the next larger administrative unit.  For 
instance, the name of a local feature might include the department name (failing to note the 
names of the municipio and vereda).  Place names may be associated with some less frequent 
and less formal corregimiento or with a provincia, which may be a formal, specialized 
administrative unit between the municipio and the department or a traditional spatial reference.  
There may also be references to an obsolete or rustic comarca or church parochia and quite often 
with informal regions of interest such as „Montes de Maria‟, „Medio Magdalena‟, or „Bota 
Caucana‟.  Popular writers and journalists often sprinkle their accounts with arcane place 
references to add a flavor of exactitude and local awareness, but they can detour the reader who 
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is not directly knowledgeable.  Sometimes this imprecision is an author‟s intent, the place 
references purposefully left incomplete to provide anonymity to sources.  In more exacting 
governmental reports or academic studies, uncommon administrative categories and localisms 
generally receive a more useable treatment.  Some place names are maddeningly ubiquitous.  It 
seems there is a Rio Sucio or Riosucio (translatable as dirty river) in every township of every 
county in Colombia.  El Tablón (a large board, probably crossing a creek) is popular, as is El 
Placer (meaning pleasure, probably a reference to an event, not because the place is especially 
attractive.).  In Colombia, Remedio and Cartagena de ... are common, along with many others.  
In smuggling zones, and more especially, where there has been a long leftist guerrilla presence, 
we find recurrent references to salient sites or personalities in the pantheon of revolutionary lore, 
such as Davis, Marquetalia, or Fidel, or of successful past smugglers.  In some zones where anti-
communist armed groups took over control in recent decades, some of those names changed to 
new iconography or reverted to colonial or indigenous tradition, leaving cartographers, historians 
and others with choices that they in turn might wed to their own ideological or academic 
preferences.  All this toponomic wealth of choice makes a time-consuming challenge out of 
finding the map location of some place referenced in a written report of an event.  On the other 
hand, it also helps test the spatial verity of the reports of many events.  One toponomic 
observation was of particular satisfaction.  In many of the geographic areas attracting my interest 
because of their notoriety as smuggling routes or safe havens, the place names often include 
Refugio, Santuario, Apartado, Honda, or something similar.  These can be translated as Refuge, 
Sanctuary, Isolated, and Deep (as „in the woods‟), respectively. 
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Figure 5: The Colombian Counties (municipios) (SIGOT, 2013). 
 Another time investment went in to identifying and correlating relevant GIS layers, some 
of which were available from existing Colombian sources online and some made available only 
through original research efforts.  The attempt to correlate various GIS data layers led naturally 
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to more map reading.  Some evidentiary value may be available through automated GIS 
experimenting with some correlations, such as transportation remoteness to armed encounters, 
but such mathematic proof seems unnecessary.  In the case of the correlation between landmine 
use and steeply sloped terrain heading toward crestlines, for instance, this phenomenon 
evidences itself readily, without applying a statistical technique. 
In the six or seven years since beginning research, the on-line availability of maps of all 
kinds coming out of Colombia and directly related to the conflict has greatly expanded, as is 
reflected in the number of online map references in the Works Consulted. 
 
The spatial and temporal extent 
Several individual years during the conflict are historically salient; 1965 is one, 1985 
another, as are 1998, 2002, and 2008.  Most of the events upon which the maps are drawn 
concern the period from 1985 to 2010.  In 2010, the election of President Manuel Santos appears 
to have taken the country on a distinct azimuth as to the internal conflict.  As of this writing in 
mid-2013, the war appears to be moving into a distinctly different, if not final, stage.  In 
obedience to the view that history does not begin or end, I include some descriptive historical 
lead-up. 
As territorial space, Colombia‟s physical extent has been and continues to be contested 
politically and intellectually; but for this dissertation, Colombia is, for the most part, as the Atlas 
of Colombia claims it to be.  Colombia is divided into 32 departamentos (departments) and the 
next-lower administrative unit of approximately 1,100 municipios, which from here forward I 
will refer to as counties. (See Figure 5).  For some cultural and political attributes, the counties 
are further broken down into veredas (townships perhaps).  A number of counties also have 
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within them corregimientos that are in some ways autonomous and often en route to becoming 
their own counties.  Within rural counties, police jurisdictions are called inspecciones, which 
may consume other administrative and spatial reference in the context of reports on the conflict.  
Much available statistical information supports a geographic specificity or resolution at the level 
of the county, so the default focal scale of the research is at that level.  Some of the existing 
arguments and observations, meanwhile, are oriented toward clusters of counties.  At times, 
commonalities within such clusters relate to the spatial distribution and extent of national parks 
and other features, which in turn relate to their remoteness.  The following quote from the 
encyclopedic and aptly named book, Dimensiones territoriales de la guerra y la paz (Territorial 
Dimensions of War and Peace). 
“the new counties can be classified into four categories: the counties controlled by 
the State; those controlled by the guerrilla; those managed by paramilitary groups; 
and those that are in dispute....Between 1991 and 2000, 31 new municipalities 
were created in the Caribbean region, which creation in greater measure obeyed 
an interest in increasing the bureaucracy and to strengthen local micro-power.  
The guerrilla and paramilitary groups act in the greater part of the new counties as 
power networks, imposing the rules of the game in terms of security, justice and 
taxes.  In the majority of the new counties there is evidence that their creation 
fundamentally obeyed the need of the armed groups to fix borders and to control 
important strategic zones as axis of land and river communications between the 
Caribbean region and the interior of the country.” (Montañez, p. 531). 
People throughout Colombia feel the emotional effect of violent encounters, but the 
violent actions themselves do not occur in all locales, in all counties evenly.  Even after 
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decades of diffusion of killing methods and refinements in the methods of extortionary 
influence of armed groups, the war remains concentrated in a limited number of places. 
“The geographic concentrations where elements of the guerrilla groups have been 
obligated to seek refuge and where they are generating the greater part of their 
criminal activity are being watched over by the National Army and Police in 
departments such as Cauca, Putumayo, Sucre, southern Valle del Cauca, Guajira, 
and Santander.  To wit, the Ministry of Defense informs that between January and 
May of this year, 50% of FARC terrorist acts were concentrated in 15 counties of 
6 departments where 1.1% of the national population lives.  Meanwhile, 79% of 
the 28 actions of the ELN were concentrated in 5 counties in 3 departments where 
.4% of the national population lives....” (LaTarde.com 2013). 
One of the first hypothetical proxies for the “geographic concentrations where elements 
of the guerrilla groups have been obligated to seek refuge is the extent of the national 
park system.  Figure 6 is a 1979 country map that includes a sketched estimate of the park 
system bounderies as of that time (Precise boundaries for many of the parks had yet to be 
surveyed, nor their legal foundations yet solidified.). 
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Figure 6: Colombia Map 1979 (Instituto Nacional de Geografía, 1979)  The shaded areas are Parques Nacionales 
Naturales (National Nature Parks) and the more darkly shaded areas are Santuarios de Fauna y Flora (Fauna and 
Flora Sanctuaries)  This is the earliest ma map I found that contained the national park system in more-or-less its 
current composition. 
 
Defining Key Concepts 
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Risk Distance 
Risk distance is the distance to a perceived, theoretical point in time and space beyond 
which it would be imprudent, irresponsible or self-destructive to proceed in some activity.  The 
longevity of the two principal armed insurgent groups -- The Army of National Liberation 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional; or ELN) and the larger Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces (Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) -- can be attributed to no one factor, 
and this dissertation does not argue that outcomes in the Colombian war have been 
predetermined by physical geography.  Rather, I assert only that the interaction of the parties, 
and especially their responses to environmental challenges, have significantly influenced 
outcomes.  That said, physical geography contributes so heavily to the creation of cost and risk 
distances in Colombia that although physical geography predetermines little, by the same logic it 
un-determines a great deal.  Given that competitive human decisions are so often constrained by 
the effects that physical geography has on cost and risk distances, the range of potential 
outcomes is constrained though not pre-ordained.  That range is still modifiable, however, by 
human innovation, most especially those innovations constructed to change cost and risk 
distances. 
 I put distance in three categories: Euclidean (unimpeded „normal‟ mathematical distance 
measured in established units such as meters or miles -- sometimes said, „as the crow flies‟); cost 
or friction; and risk.  Geographers are familiar with cost distance, and for most purposes, we 
measure cost distances as the time and money necessary to move people and things from one 
location to another.  Risk distance is known to military planners as the distance to the 
culminating point, a theoretical point in space and time beyond which a unit runs an imprudent 
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risk of some kind.  Military leaders seek to anticipate risk distance in the context of surviving 
armed encounters with opponents. 
 Cost and risk distance are inversely related: Increases in cost distances can shorten the 
predicted risk distance for military endeavors.  For instance, a supposed point of unacceptable 
risk might be closer to home or sooner in time if extreme weather compelled a unit to carry more 
water than it would normally need to reach a given location safely.  Risk distances shorten as 
cost distances increase.  Meanwhile, the likelihood of a deadly encounter with an armed enemy 
is itself a factor in the measurement of cost distances (endogeneity).  Measuring the relevant cost 
distances might involve little more than determining the time it takes to travel to the places 
where a fight might occur, perhaps to and from known guerrilla sanctuaries.  Citizens of the 
same rural zones contemplating travel to a hospital equipped to do a cesarean birth, a court to try 
a quiet-title action in land, a high school, or a police station will also measure distances 
according to time and other resources.  These dimensions may seem hypothetical and 
speculative, but were related by Colombians intimately familiar with rural life.  As with so much 
else, with careful hindsight we can see others‟ mistakes in their measurement of risk distances.  
If someone suffers a fatally unsuccessful movement, we can say that at the point of their death 
they had exceeded the risk distance. 
 
Remoteness 
Remoteness seems a ubiquitously mentioned quality in Colombian descriptions of their 
war, in their descriptions of rural poverty, and in many explanations causally tying poverty and 
the war or remoteness and the war together.  One can also find admiring references to Colombian 
remoteness with expressions of national pride and identity, since remote environments in 
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Colombia are so often home to curious, unique, antique, or spectacular phenomena including 
broken terrain, odd weather, flora, fauna, and humans.  Remoteness seems to influence 
competitive outcomes in the internal war, and it is understandable that observers would tie 
explanations of the conflict to the other geographic phenomena that correlate spatially to the 
remoteness. 
Remoteness is the „how-far-away-it-is-really‟ condition produced by an amount of 
distance.  Colombians often define remoteness according to quotidian economic cost distances 
between rural population centers and some basic public services.  One of the lines of effort taken 
by the Colombian military in recent years has been to involve other government agencies in 
“whole of government” efforts to decrease the cost distances to basic services.  (Centro de 
Coordinación de Acción Integral, CCAI 2010)  Communities are thus made less remote.  These 
efforts have been built upon the argument or supposition that if a local population does not have 
to travel as far to a gas station, or if it takes less time to travel to a school, court or hospital, then 
such a population is made less vulnerable to guerrilla or gangster exhortations and proselytizing.   
Perhaps the Colombian government has decreased the presence of Colombian insurgents in some 
conflictive locales by reducing the economic remoteness of those locales (Angarita 2006).  While 
efforts to assist rural communities may be worthwhile in and of themselves, I believe the premise 
that a community‟s economic remoteness is a central factor in its participation with or 
vulnerability to guerrilla or gangster presence is misplaced.  The fact that there are innumerable 
economically remote places in Colombia that are not victims or venues of the internal war is a 
clue.  We can attribute the involvement of many rural communities in the conflict to a separate 
set of factors.  That set of factors relates to the communities‟ remoteness, but is not the 
remoteness.  The relevant factors are geographic conditions that most affect a differential in risks 
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faced by pursuers versus fugitives in the act of escape.  While some of these same factors may 
affect the practical travel distances experienced by the local population, it is the effect of the 
geographic factors on risk distance in armed pursuit, not the effect on quotidian economic life, 
that matters in terms of the vulnerability of the population.  Therefore, improvements in those 
quotidian economic distances, as welcome as such improvement may be, are not likely to have 
the desired effect, and may even be counterproductive, if they do not change the risk distances of 
pursuit.  They may even provide the guerrilla or gangster organization with convenient services, 
or unburden those organizations from demands of the local population for assistance.  For 
purposes of understanding the conflict, we must conceptually separate remoteness as it relates to 
the travel cost distances of quotidian economic life from the risk distances during the existential 
challenges of armed pursuit and escape. 
 
Presence 
By presence, I refer not only to the location of persons, but also to a quality of 
inspiration.  As it pertains to the relationship between armed organizations and individual or 
collective audiences, there exists a corporeal presence and an incorporeal presence.  Guerrilla 
groups can use a small amount of corporeal presence to create an incorporeal presence, maybe in 
the form of admiration or hope, but often in the form of fear.  In places experiencing organized 
violence of some kind, the presence of armed groups is not only their physically being in a 
community or nearby, but a psychological presence they leave behind them or that precedes their 
arrival.  This kind of incorporeal presence can be coaxed, cultivated, and disseminated without 
much of a corporeal presence.  The following is from a renowned Colombian historian. 
28 
 
“When one talks of „presence‟ of this or that actor of the conflict in a „county‟, 
generally it indicates some place removed from the county seat, or better said, 
inaccessible, even to the most locally familiar.  So then, what is „presence?‟: that 
of an encampment (of varying size, placement and equipment) or that of a furtive 
passing, generally under the cover of night, by some armed band?  Moreover, 
when an illegal armed contingent announces its presence in a small town or 
inhabited place, or just passes by, they “take” the community by force of arms for 
hours or exceptionally days.  In such cases it is possible that the local inhabitants 
know approximately where they are camped or where they came from.  Nothing 
more.  It is exactly because the “locals” have to keep their affiliations a secret 
(they sympathize, are neutral, or are opposed to the armed groups, legal or not), 
the armed groups in turn keep the map of their route secret.  Their mobility, as 
this suggests, unfolds as “corridors” that are really a meticulously arranged string 
of points of support…” (Palacios, 2012, p. 53) (My translation). 
As to the relationship between presence and sanctuary, it appears that a great deal of time spent 
by contenders in the Colombian conflict is not in firefights, moving to and from some armed 
engagement between the FARC and the Army, for instance, or even in escape and pursuit after 
one of these engagements.  It appears that most of the time passed by armed actors is in activities 
we recognize as mundane if not banal.  They look for food, water, sex, entertainment, medical 
attention, or tend to other chores.  If news items revealing the vicissitudes of the guerrilla 
organizations‟ leaders are a guide, they spend some amount of their time and that of their 
underlings in activities intended to make themselves richer.  Nevertheless, preparation by 
guerrillas for safe movement and the improvement of the safety of their sanctuaries seems to be a 
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central vocational activity when not otherwise occupied.  That safety (of movement to sanctuary 
and of the sanctuary itself) may require efforts by the guerrilla to create a psychological presence 
in rural communities along the route to the sanctuaries. 
 A guerrilla might enjoy a distinct advantage in a local contest of presence in a remote 
community.  The guerrilla can make his communications existential.  He can explain to the 
community that while his band is only going to be around physically for a short time (having a 
face-to-face conversation with a town councilman or holding an organized harangue), the 
guerrillas are going to stay close enough to reinforce certain intended consequences of their 
physical presence.  The potential return visit is as significant as the current visit.  Perhaps 
conditions warrant a promise to protect the audience from harm, or perhaps the communication 
must be cruder -- that severe harm will come swiftly if submission is not forthcoming and silence 
regarding the guerrillas‟ whereabouts kept.  Public expectations or institutional behavioral norms 
might constrain a government force from making a similar message.  Even a gentle government 
instills some fear, or at least caution, by suggesting that it will eventually serve process to 
prosecute unacceptable conduct.  In Colombia, as most of the country strives in the direction of a 
more peaceable social environment, the police are becoming accustomed to increased restrictions 
and attempt to serve warrants for criminal conduct such as „accessory to conspiracy to rebel.‟  In 
other words, an imbalance appears to have been growing in the potential incorporeal presence 
available to the contenders as the government evolves in a direction to what we like to call the 
rule of law.  In the remote counties indicated as government security priorities, special legal 
exceptions give police more leeway, that is, a waiver for some of the civilities increasingly 
demanded in much of the country.  There in any case exists an imbalance in which the guerrillas 
can manifest a far greater ruthlessness. 
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 The imbalance in existential expression gives a competitive advantage to the fugitive 
over the pursuer in many remote areas.  Some remote Colombian towns are simultaneously close 
to guerrilla sanctuaries and at great cost-distances from a government police or military base.  
The guerrillas can come to town more easily.  Because their survival is in play, the fugitives 
readily justify their cruelty.  Remote space in Colombia, however, has been diminishing in 
overall geographic extent.  The advantage of existential ruthlessness (The capacity to sincerely 
communicate,“If you reveal to the police which direction we went, we will return and kill you.”) 
appears to be a short-term proposition.  The gentler (if ineffectual in the near-term) „police 
presence‟ has the long-term advantage -- what I believe to be the more hopeful residual of 
physical presence.  Perhaps the loss of public popularity of the FARC in Colombia relates to the 
excesses of the ruthlessly existential form of guerrilla presencia. 
The roles I just assigned above to negative versus positive presence and short-term versus 
long-term incorporeal presence -- in which I placed the government authorities as those 
attempting the incorporeal hope of the rule-of law and the FARC as the threateners of death -- 
has not been perfectly consistent historically or spatially.  The Colombian landscape is hardly a 
Manichean tabloid, either.  The competition over presence has had a dynamic in which both 
sides have tried various forms of inspiration and both have worked or failed in the context of too 
many other factors to mention.  Since the 1950s there have always been more than two sides to 
the conflict, with several significant armed organizations entering the competition at one moment 
or another overwrapping either the FARC or some institution of the government.  I perhaps strip 
away too many nuances of ideological cross- and counter-currents and hybridized familial 
interests.  Still, for the purpose of furthering the theoretical proposition regarding the effect of 
certain geographical phenomena (rugged terrain, jungle terrain, international borders, commodity 
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locations, and perhaps others) on a theoretical phenomenon (risk distance), the highlighting of 
presence is especially valuable.  Populations often suffer because of their being the target of 
presence operations whether those operations had the intended effect or not.  This is because the 
opposing force often cannot, or cannot be bothered, to tell what effect the opponent‟s presence 
operation might have had.  They simply decide to trump it.  I believe the spatial record in 
Colombia shows that the communities that have suffered the most in terms of grave human rights 
violations have mostly been guilty of being in the wrong place. 
 As a purely competitive matter, a force in pursuit will do better to recognize the 
correlations between physical and incorporeal presence, between the incorporeal presence and 
protection of movement routes and sanctuaries by fugitive elements, and between presence and 
risk distances.  In this, it becomes apparent why the „gentler way‟ of war is often that of position 
and movement.  If a force can truncate its enemy‟s ability to be physically present, it may be the 
cleanest check on his greater presence -- on his ability to generate fear. 
 If sanctuary is conceded to an armed enemy, victory is postponed if not forfeited.  
Conceding presence can lead to the concession of sanctuary.  To allow, say, territorial physical 
presence at nighttime to go unchallenged, then a great deal of potential incorporeal presence is 
probably conceded in the process.  It is not always possible to avoid this concession and 
forfeiture; it may be unavoidable in obedience to the honest calculation of relative power.  One 
side just might not be strong enough to shrink its opponents‟ spaces.  This lack of relative 
strength -- to overcome cost distances and risk distances, has been a significant reason why, 
when the FARC and other guerrillas organizations began to increase power on a wave of 
financial windfalls, the government simply did not have the wherewithal to be present 
everywhere. 
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Impunity 
In most if not all irregular wars, somebody organizes to defy a state, the state being or 
acting through a government.  Defiance can include not paying taxes, refusing to serve in the 
military, extorting, bribing, kidnapping, murder, theft, trespass, bombing, rape, pilfering, giving 
aid to foreign enemies, selling things the sale of which is illegal, acting untowardly and 
otherwise offending in the eyes of the relevant agents of the state.  When safe in their defiance, 
we say these defiant ones enjoy impunity, which is to say they are somehow resistant to state 
punishment.  The word carries a negative connotation distinct from its nicer cousin, immunity.  
We gain or convey immunity for many reasons and purposes, usually within an established 
system of laws.  When a person gets away with something they are not supposed to get away 
with, however, they enjoy impunity.  When impunity is provided to members of that „they‟ by a 
defiant leader (who might be a mobster, clergyman, union leader, insurgent, separatist, 
spymaster, or something else), a fundamental challenge to the state is put in motion.  When the 
state responds (attempting to discipline the transgressors and stop the impunity), but the 
transgressors resist violently, we might have the beginning of an insurgency.  If transgressors can 
build enough wealth and safe havens to survive for decades and provide impunity to thousands 
of pepetrator minions, it might be called Colombia.  
 A powerful organization can grant exemption or protection from punishment in advance 
of action.  Countries in the international system generally claim a thing called sovereign 
immunity, considered a legitimate expression of state power.  If a country can grant immunity for 
future acts of warfare that might be committed in other lands, we might say that country has 
strategic power to that extent.  However, if some organization can grant premeditated impunity 
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for illegal acts to be committed inside the territory of that same country, we might say that state 
is not completely healthy or fully sovereign.  Although strategically powerful, it might be failing. 
 Governments regularly abuse sovereign immunity.  If a government agent were to 
perpetrate corruption, or commit any act that most of us consider immoral or normally 
punishable, and yet is exempted or protected from punishment, we might agree that the operative 
word is impunity, not immunity.  Thus, how one labels protection from punishment may depend 
on whose side one is on.  
 Impunity has an associated geography.  That geography includes the places where the 
offenses occur, where the offenders go to be safe, and the routes they take to get there.  The more 
competitively valuable places, however, may be those locations where leaders (of whatever 
institution, group or collective) are able to grant or convey impunity.  If there are spaces inside a 
territory where perpetrators escape government punishment, the government fails to the extent of 
those spaces and those offenses. 
When leaders secure the capacity to grant impunity to their agents, knowing they have 
the power to absolve whomever they send out to express their dominating will, they have gained 
power.  To progress in their power, they concentrate on the management of anonymity, provide it 
to their people and their informants, and take it away from their enemies.  Thereby exposed, they 
then take their enemies‟ wealth, pursue them physically, shut off their routes of escape, close 
their sanctuaries, and maybe kill them. 
 
Sanctuary 
The concept of sanctuary can be broken into three categories, these being: 1) furtive or opaque 
sanctuary, 2) patent, or physical sanctuary, and 3) governmental or legitimatized sanctuary.  By 
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furtive sanctuary, I mean that the identity or whereabouts of a perpetrator (of acts that some 
authority would punish) remains unknown to the perpetrator‟s opponent.  Anonymity -- secrecy 
of identity and whereabouts, and secrecy regarding his or her wealth or other sources of power –
protects the perpetrator‟s impunity.  A place provides furtive sanctuary only to the extent that 
identity and whereabouts remain unrevealed to opponents.  In such a place, the physical 
distances between opponents might be minimal so long as anonymity is preserved.  By patent 
sanctuary, I mean a location or place in which a person or group can enjoy impunity without 
depending on anonymity.  Within the patent sanctuary, a person or group has sufficient territorial 
control that secrecy of their identity is unnecessary.  To create and preserve a patent sanctuary, 
one must maintain a safe distance from those authorities who would impose some form of 
punishment on them.  Perpetrators achieve the third kind of impunity to the extent they can enter 
government or become government.  If at some point, perpetrators gain sufficient power within 
an area to punish the would-be punishers, that is, to deny others‟ impunity within a geographical 
area, then the perpetrators are well on their way to governance and even sovereignty. 
 The culminating point mentioned above is a theoretical point which is related to the 
perception of risk, a perception which is in turn influenced (among many factors) by physical 
geography.  Entrance into the natural forest preserves in Colombia allowed guerrilla elements to 
reach safe practical distances from pursuing units of the public armed forces.  There was little 
need for anonymity inside those forest preserves, distance providing the safety.  However, the 
same remoteness that provides security from punishment correlates strongly with an absence of 
local human population.  Open demonstration of defiance against government authority is 
unsatisfying to the revolutionary if there is no audience for the demonstration.  Part of the effect 
in Colombia has been guerrilla preparation (combinations of political indoctrination, threats and 
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demonstrations, and provision of services such as conflict resolution) of the populated areas 
between and adjacent to the preserves.  It is in these adjacent areas that the ELN and the FARC 
meld the types of sanctuary.  This dissertation, then, especially focuses on some of those 
Colombian counties (municipios) that are adjacent to remote areas of the Colombian nature 
preserves. 
 Two Colombian Army officers inspired the theoretical approach I take in this dissertation 
by suggesting to me that a map of the Colombian national park system could serve as a close 
proxy for geographic presentation of FARC and ELN guerrilla sanctuaries over time.  I consider 
the term sanctuary to be synonymous with a place of impunity, or perhaps a space of impunity.  
In other words, a sanctuary, for the purposes of this dissertation, is a geographic area inside of 
which a person or group cannot be punished by their opponents.  That is to say, someone can „get 
away‟ with behavior his or her opponents would punish.  The national parks of Colombia are 
logical places of guerrilla sanctuary from government repression because their designations as 
parks or their availability for legislative proposal as such, are related to their quotidian 
remoteness. 
 
Culminating point 
The culminating point is a theoretical point in time and space beyond which it would be 
unwise to proceed with an initiative, such as an offensive, an attack or a pursuit.  The term 
„culminating point‟ dates back at least to Carl von Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era, and classic 
strategy. (Howard and Paret 1976, pp. 528, 566).  Aggressive commanders counsel aggressive 
pursuit because an inferior force that cannot escape can be destroyed.  However, if the pursuing 
force presses beyond its culminating point, the pursued may turn and counterattack, effect an 
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ambush, or maneuver to cut off the pursuer from the erstwhile pursuer‟s own line of retreat.  
Hence, positional, movement warfare revolves in part around the leaders‟ analyses and intuitions 
regarding culminating points. 
 As a matter of after-the-fact military critique, leaders are discredited who purportedly fail 
to press an opportunity to finish off a weaker force.  Some will argue that Meade should have 
pursued Lee after Gettysburg, for instance. (Center of Military History 1989, p. 253)  These 
critiques are always speculative observations of a victory that might have been greater.  On the 
other hand, when it is clear that a leader did in fact pass that point of too much risk, it is usually 
because the enemy defeated him, often by counterattack. 
 Culminating points are especially relevant to escape and pursuit.   After the leader of 
force A decides for whatever reason that it is time to break or avoid contact with an enemy force 
B (maybe because he thinks A has been or is about to be beaten by B), force B may press the 
confrontation in order to prevent A‟s escape.  That is when the pursuit begins.  Knowing when to 
withdraw, and securing a path to do so, is part of the essence of good guerrilla leadership.  
Knowing whether to pursue is also important, and so the decision to pursue or not pursue is 
integral to an understanding of the culminating point.  The culminating point for a squad in the 
attack depends in part on the amount of water it carries or if it can be easily resupplied with 
water.  A squad leader would at some point be taking too much risk if he were to make his squad 
continue to move forward beyond its water supply.  In a severely dehydrated state, the fighters 
might be subject to heatstroke or to an effective counterattack from a well-watered enemy.  If 
this were to happen, if an enemy were to turn and defeat the squad due to its dehydration, we 
could say that the squad had passed its culminating point. 
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 The distance to the squad‟s culminating point depends on many other variables.  The 
availability and weight of ammunition and food are other common factors contributing to 
establish the culminating point.  Military expressions like „fire discipline‟ and „rationing‟ attest 
to this.  The quality of weaponry, training, morale, and leadership also contribute to the amount 
of time and distance before the squad might reach its culminating point.  Transportation options 
also influence the culminating point.  A helicopter, for instance, can change the time-distance 
equation like few other machines.  Finally, and this is no small point, initial location on the 
ground affects the culminating point. 
“There can be no doubt that Plan Colombia represented a fundamental, positive 
turning point in the fight against drug trafficking and terrorism, among other 
reasons because of the improvement and increase in the air fleets of the Military 
Forces and Police.  The air power of the Armed Forces has become the guerrilla‟s 
worst nightmare, given that it cannot count, as was occurring in the last years of 
the twentieth century, on attacking a population and the troops of the Army taking 
several hours, sometimes days, to arrive, due to the difficulties of the terrain and 
the anti-personnel mines they planted.  Now, with the important fleet of 
helicopters and combat transport planes, with the most modern characteristics, the 
Army gets to them in a question of minutes.” (Santos 2009, p. 179). 
 In many situations, the landmine can drastically shorten distance to the culminating point.  
If a fighter steps on a mine during pursuit of an enemy unit up a mountain trail, not only does the 
mine immediately weaken the unit by the loss of a soldier, resources will be allocated to caring 
for and evacuating the wounded soldier, further weakening the unit.  The leader will feel he must 
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take more precautions and move more slowly.  Just the fear of landmines reduces a unit‟s 
theoretical point in time and space beyond which it seems too risky to proceed. 
 An army or a guerrilla can design a strategy in such a way as to decrease its own units‟ 
risk distances taken together, and to increase the aggregate of its enemies‟ risk distances.  This 
allows better comparisons of the contributions of various seemingly disparate inputs.  For the 
Colombian Army, acquisition of additional helicopters immediately lengthened the risk distances 
of many of their pursuit units.  The guerrillas had adopted the use of mules in the organization‟s 
infancy, learned the use of landmines later on, and determined to do as much community 
socializing along strategic corridors as resources and safety allowed.  The relative increase in the 
distances to their own units‟ culminating points, as opposed to the risk distances of their 
pursuers, provided a common measure of incremental benefit across a disparate range of inputs. 
 Getting somewhere is not the same as getting back.  Aircraft, when combined with faulty 
planning, can take a unit well beyond its culminating point.  The French garrison at Dien Bien 
Phu in French Indochina is an historical example of a violation of classic principles.  The French 
did not assure that (were they to confront an enemy force with greater strength) their route to 
sanctuary was secure.  When a superior force confronted them, it became clear that the French 
had placed themselves beyond their culminating point ab-initio.  This happened partly because 
they measured comparative strength poorly.  Several of the blows absorbed by the Colombian 
Army during the height of FARC success in the late 1990s (Las Delicias, Billar, Miraflores are 
the names of a few such blows.) were due to an undervaluing by the Colombian Army of the 
FARC‟s ability to marshal combat strength, which led to a series of mini-Dien Bien Phu defeats.  
The Colombian Army placed units beyond their risk distances, beyond the distance of military 
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prudence.  The hierarchy could not support those units in a timely fashion if confronted by a 
superior force.  
Risk distance is the distance to the culminating point.   Thinking in terms of risk 
distances can aid in understanding why certain places are better for placing outposts or 
establishing encampments and sanctuaries.  Besides the relative advantage of fixed positions, it 
can also help weigh the reasonableness of an operational strategy and provide a rough measure 
of relative success. 
 
Successful versus unsuccessful outcomes 
We are free to measure success in internal armed struggles on the philosophical plane, in 
mirror fashion depending on who we deem to be seeking impunity and who we deem to be 
applying justice by seeking to crack that impunity.  The outcome of a physical pursuit can be 
obvious, perhaps entailing countable injuries, imprisonments or deaths of those trying to evade 
such fate.  Conversely, the outcome may be obvious because the fugitives elude both capture and 
harm.  If only for the temporary purposes of logical traction, I assert, as to physical acts of 
pursuit, that if the pursuers let the fugitives „get away‟, the pursuers are unsuccessful.  The 
fugitive (the pursued) retains impunity to the extent he or she eludes harm or capture.  The chase 
is itself time-consuming, but is not an inherently unsuccessful condition except to the extent that 
the pursuer denies the fugitive the option of remaining in a place.  For the pursuer, chasing 
without result is failure -- an unsuccessful enterprise.  However, the fact that the pursuer forces a 
rival to move, to be an active, moving fugitive is at least a mild success.  The purpose of the 
pursuer is to deny impunity to the fugitive in some place.  Inability on the part of a rival to 
remain in a place is tantamount to their inability to maintain impunity there.  If the pursuers 
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allow the pursued to backfill, that is, to return to the same place un-captured and relatively 
unharmed shows an ephemeral success on the part of the pursuers and a sustainable one on the 
part of the fugitive. 
The Colombian government has measured and asserted success against the various illegal 
armed groups using statistics that show changes in the rates of kidnappings, assassinations and 
attacks on key infrastructure.  These measures are valid to a degree in that perpetrators are, 
according to the statistics, getting away with less and less.  The perpetrators are less able to 
perpetrate.  Whether or not the perpetrators were „brought to justice‟ for past perpetrations, or if 
acts not covered by the statistics are equally dangerous to the wellbeing of the society, is not 
answered by such statistics. 
If a government can constrict and close the sanctuaries of its rivals, that is, leave no 
physical, territorial space to which and in which a guerrilla or criminal entity can „get away‟, 
then the government is successful.  If an outlaw entity can find, create and maintain territorial 
space out of the reach of government attempts to punish or sanction members of the outlaw 
entity, that entity enjoys impunity (or immunity if one is philosophically inclined toward the 
outlaw) and is successful to that extent. 
 It is difficult to describe the Colombian conflict in an ideologically indifferent manner.  If 
relating that conflict were confined to the creative overlay of visual GIS files, or to seeking 
revealing spatial correlations in Colombian maps, the exercise could do a disservice.  The 
tensions and moral compromises experienced by the Colombians require some tolerance of 
anecdotal description and implication, and regarding moral preference.  Colombia is a place 
whose mortal struggles are as flamboyant as they are complex, and so to ignore them might be its 
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own narcissism.  I try to pay respect to Colombian interpretations of their conflict regardless of 
how and whether those interpretations are exposed by the maps. 
 Much of the uniqueness of the effort, and almost all the methodological rigor it might 
claim, owes to advancements in Geographic Information Sciences and Systems (GIS).  Many 
Colombians have adopted GIS technologies, and they are increasingly likely to include spatial 
presentations in their observations, explanations and arguments regarding the conflict.  I used 
ArcGIS
®
 for much of the data I presented, and most other map images in the dissertation were 
themselves products of ArcGIS
®
 or similar software.  Many issues exist as to data compatibility 
or lack of metadata transparency.  To the extent possible, I expose these debilitations, along with 
known inconsistencies and shortcomings in the quality of underlying data on which many of the 
Colombian map illustrations were made.  The principle use of the maps is to demonstrate the 
location of the war and its spatial correlation with regions that by most definitions are considered 
remote.  There is such an overwhelming consensus as to the location of remote areas and as to 
the war‟s location that the metadata issues on that point are perhaps moot.  That correlation 
(between remoteness and the loci of the war) is significant to, but insufficient alone to examine 
the concept of risk distance.   
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Section 3. The Colombian Conflict in Geographic-Historical Perspective 
The following interpretation of Colombian history relates some of the interplay among 
propositions regarding power that have been based upon or attentive to physical geography and 
those ideological strains of thought not inspired by physical geography or place identity.  The 
focus is appropriate because the dissertation proposes a theoretical phenomenon (risk distance) 
and the coactions of that phenomenon with certain established physical and non-physical 
geographic determinants, all in the context of violent human competitive behavior.  In other 
words, I offer this brief interpretation of Colombian history to lend the reader unfamiliar with 
Colombian history sufficient context to ease reading of the anecdotes and regional analyses 
offered in support of the theoretical assertions.  I offer the historical narative modestly, the 
history of Colombia being the subject of a daunting range of better informed and better 
expressed interpretations. 
 
Intellectual currents affecting the spatial distribution of Colombia’s conflict 
 The interrelationship of Colombia‟s physical environment with human use (or abuse) of 
that environment has been marked for centuries by differences among inhabitants as to how 
power should be distributed, both as a matter of political theory and as a matter of material 
practice.  Four intermingling intellectual currents have fed those differences since the arrival of 
the Spanish in the early 16th century.  They are conquest and evangelization, federalism/anti-
federalism, European socialism, and gangsterism.  Colombians contested the balance between 
the expression and imposition of individual will on the one hand, and the expression and 
imposition of collectivized will on the other, throughout their history, and this contest leaves its 
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mark on the physical environment.  In the last several decades, even as technical and 
organizational innovations promised to ameliorate human argument and its impact, the 
competition of human resolve became more strident and costly.  Although it is perhaps too soon 
to tell, we may be seeing the influence of what we might recognize as a fifth intellectual current 
in the form of creative group identity formulation and assertion. 
 The first conflict-fueling intellectual current, conquest and evangelization, was a 
straightforward expression of domination, easily understood by both conquered and conqueror: 
subdue by force, take control of land rights, self-justify and domesticate.  Domination and 
submission were expressed in relation to the natural environment as well as in relation to other 
peoples.  Spanish conquest and evangelizing evolved a need for the Spanish crown to delineate 
boundaries, to the extent practicable, among conquistadors, and by conquistadors among their 
lieutenants.  As well, the Roman Catholic Church demanded and received great tracts of land for 
various purposes of the church mission.  In the mix, and as part of a notion of ethical 
stewardship, the Spanish crown and the Catholic Church attempted some ethical and practical 
limitations regarding the treatment of dominated peoples.  These expressions of conscience 
evolved to manifest themselves by two-dimensional territorial boundaries under such concepts as 
resguardos (communally owned indigenous territories similar to the North American Indian 
reservation) and encomiendas (a territorially delimited system of tribute and obligation).  To the 
domination-submission relationship between (mostly) Spanish immigrants and people of the 
indigenous tribes, we can add the master-slave relationship inherent in the commercial 
importation of African Blacks.  Meanwhile, resistance to domination would succeed in 
establishing some compromise boundaries that would survive over time.  Among escapee 
African Blacks a significant number of palenque communities arose, palenque translating to 
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English as a community fortified with wooden palisades.  Fugitive slaves would site these 
communities, often organizing them martially for purposes of constant self-defense, in 
inaccessible areas.  In great measure because of the effectiveness of their organization and use of 
terrain, Afrodecendiente (African descendant) communities were soon granted official status, 
played a significant physical and spiritual role in the independence movement, and accelerated 
disposal of the institution of slavery in what would become Colombia.  Consequences of these 
courses exist in the still-evolving Comunidades Negroes and Comunidades Indígenas, 
communally owned lands tied to named collective, usually tribal, identities.  The territorial 
spaces defined by these remaining borders of territorial dominance, influence and compromise 
among human identities sometimes coincide with logical ecological regions, usually watersheds, 
but often they do not, making rational and copacetic exploitation of resources more challenging. 
 A second intellectual current, accelerating around the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
was of federalism/anti-federalism.  This is perhaps the most “Colombian” of the violence-
propelling intellectual streams in that it seems to fit both terrain and cultural disposition.  Even 
though it initially drew for its destructive energy on a polarized interpretation of the North 
American revolutionary experiment, it matched Colombia‟s exotic geography, giving political 
meaning to broken terrain.  How far from Bogotá can or should the central government hold 
sway?  What is the proper balance between localized and centralized power to tax?  Who is to 
pay for the roads?  The civil wars of the 19th century were guided by this question (or by cynical 
reference to the question in order to clothe simple arrogations) up through at least the disastrous 
War of the Thousand Days at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.  No serious student of 
Colombian history, of any ideological bent, can separate land ownership issues from violence or 
from ever-conflicting Colombian schemes to stabilize land ownership rights, or to realign or 
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redistribute them.  Most of these schemes fit into the notion of federalism/anti-federalism 
because the associated arguments expend most of their energy on the play between geographic 
distance and varying authority to tax.  Place identity, the naming of power according to locale, 
and the theoretical justification of a superior right to power based the notion of geographic 
proximity quickly established themselves as essential arguments -- as assumptions. 
 I characterize the third ideological current as imported class struggle.  One can argue that 
the Colombian Comuneros uprising in the mid-to-late 18th century was a harbinger of later class 
revolt, but it was during Colombia‟s nineteenth century melee to decide the matter of geographic 
arrogation that news of European socialism arrived.  Perhaps the socialist revolution can trace its 
heritage to conflicts of squatters against speculators in the late 19th century, to dissidence on 
haciendas, indigenous rebelliousness and then perhaps to the land invasions of the 1920s and 
1930s, or to the modern development of the Black autonomous communities.  Many in Colombia 
today will point back no further than to the assassination in 1948 of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, 
populist and socialist, as the birth of the current socialist revolutionary movement.  The 
construction or exploitation of a collective identity -- a concept of membership not based on 
geographical or place reference – is a difficult task in a country that has not yet urbanized or 
industrialized.  It appears that the federalist/anti-federalist argument remained the more powerful 
undercurrent during the 19
th
 century and well into the 20th.  This is manifest in the character and 
strength of two political parties, Liberal and Conservative. European socialism did not much 
influence the platforms, rhetoric or especially the actions of either party until the last half of the 
20
th
 century.  Voting patterns, and fiercely loyal membership in fighting units of the two parties 
during the War of the Thousand Days and during the post-WWII Violencia, matched local place 
identities.  Local elites, usually great landowners, represented those geographically based 
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identities.  Until recently, the two parties existed as proxies for the propositions that the names of 
those parties herald, names emblematic of the continuing federalist/anti-federalist tiff.  The 
Liberal would generally invoke the superior logic of local place identity and individual moral 
authority, while the Conservative would argue the superior claim of a national identity and the 
moral authority of the central State as guided by the church.  Both sides fought over a narrow 
band of tax arrogations and clientelist land concessions.  Only in the second half of the 20
th
 
century did the internal violence break open the federalist/anti-federalist container of political 
debate over which the two traditional political parties had nearly exclusive domain.  Socialist 
arguments partly impelled that violence. 
 The extent to which class has been a basis for struggle in Colombia is a matter of 
vigorous polemic debate.  There is little questioning that social and economic inequities have 
contributed to the recruitment potential for violent opposition groups such as the M19, EPL, 
ELN and the FARC.  Even today, however, the notion of fixed classes is hard to maintain under 
scrutiny even while public arguments to the effect enjoy some resonance.  Arguing that Marxism 
was historically not a significant intellectual current motivating Colombians to violence does not 
exclude the finding of Marxist arguments for why there was violence.  Many qualified 
intellectuals adopt some measure of class struggle in their presentations of Colombian history 
(Palacios and Safford, 2002).  Some focus more directly on land fights, to include their spatial 
distribution.  Catherine Legrande scrutinized nineteenth and early twentieth century colonization 
of remote areas in Colombia, and her cautionary advice regarding how to interpret the constant 
construction of large landholdings in Colombia is proving to be durable and valuable. 
“To consider the expansion of large properties to be a form of labor acquisition 
contributes to explaining the persistence of the hacienda in Latin American 
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countries in the XIX and XX centuries.  From this viewpoint, the monopolization 
of land is not necessarily a colonial inheritance or a manifestation of the value of 
social prestige of being a hacendado.  More likely it constitutes a logical 
response, from the economic point of view, to the problem of labor shortage, 
which affects the majority of the regions where an increase in exportations 
presents itself.” (Legrande, 2007, p. 137) (My translation from the Spanish). 
Various organizations continue to attempt to consolidate their control of agricultural and 
extractive efforts, particularly in the remote areas highlighted as conflictive.  Whether we look at 
a government program under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, forced expropriations 
by the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or United Colombian Self Defence, now 
disbanded)  paramilitary guerrillas, or the FARC‟s enthusiasm for peasant reservation zones, 
Professor Legrande‟s commentary enlightens.  The business model for commodities appears 
incompatible with concepts like minimum acreage for family subsistence.  Cattle ranching, oil 
wells or coca fields require labor.  Whether or not that labor must be centrally organized and led 
may still be a question that is up for debate.  Not debatable is that in Colombia there are always 
competitors who want to be the leaders and organizers, and that there is always something 
valuable to extract or cultivate.  Often (as with coca and oil), the extraction locations of the latest 
commodity to be exploited will be where labor supply is sparse.  Thus, the source geography of 
available labor becomes part of the geography over which armed groups contend.   
 Traditionally, rural agriculturalists were socially conservative Catholics dependent on and 
loyal to paternalist dons, who in turn belonged almost invariably to one of the two existing 
political parties, the Liberals or the Conservatives.  Marxist arguments rarely inspired anyone in 
rural areas (whether subordinate agriculturalist or overlord) to political expression, violent or 
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otherwise, until late in the 20
th
 century.  Left-socialist or Marxist argument succeeded, if at all, 
when overlaying better-rooted determinants of competition, usually territorial and familial.  
Right-socialist argument was already embedded in a presumptively accepted system in which the 
catholic clergy had great influence within government and in which military leaders enjoyed 
traditional deference.  While such a condition might seem to paint the Conservative party as the 
party of the right, and, through polarizing logic, set the Liberal party as the flag of left-socialism, 
such logic would be difficult if not spurious.  The Liberal party promoted decentralization of 
power, free ownership of firearms, laissez-faire economic practices, the re-balancing of power 
toward individuals and voluntary associations, and although the Liberal party harbored anti-
clerical sentiment, it could hardly be painted as anti-Catholic.  The labels of the Colombian 
parties cannot be matched to what in the United States is today Democrat and Republican, the 
Colombian parties being more federalist versus anti-federalist than they were left versus right.  
The North American ideological battle, which concerned itself with distribution of power in 
geographic context, was until very recently more influential in Colombia than the European 
battle which concerned itself with the distribution of power according to class and featured two 
opposing flavors of centralized statism.  In other words, the main current creating the intellectual 
parameters of political philosophical thought in Colombia has been highly attuned to geography. 
 Revolutionary writers may then claim that the Violencia (a period of hyper violence in 
the 1950s) was class-revolutionary in nature, and the seedbed of the current crop of Colombia‟s 
leftist guerrillas.  Arguably the Violencia owed still more of its energy to the old federalist/anti-
federalist polemic, and to the two-party loyalties reflecting it.  Still, after the Violencia, the 
radicalizing effect of socialist revolutionary thinking had increased, spurred by organized efforts 
at class concientization, foreign intervention, formation of armed wings, and by growing 
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ideological dissipation and ambivalence within the aging Liberal and Conservative parties.  
Explicit collaboration between those parties in the late 1950s and 1960s, in what is known as the 
National Front, served to calm the federalist/anti-federalist polemic on which the Violencia had 
thrived.  Creation of the National Front also presented a common target (a single oligarchic 
concept) against which the new stream of socialist revolutionary organizations could argue their 
moral purpose and justify violence.  Paradoxically, compromise inside and between the most 
effective competitive identities (Liberal and Conservative parties) in the federalist/anti-federalist 
contract battle gave the socialist-revolutionary idea an opportunity to sustain itself.  European 
socialism could not find space within the federalist/anti-federalist argument, but when the 
opposing sides in that argument reconciled and unified, the socialists could set a flag in 
opposition to the newly badged and unified oligarchy.  In this context, and after decades of 
urbanization, non-geographically focused arguments of class and economic disparity would 
become stronger, and the geographic parameters of the distribution of power would weaken. 
 The fourth intellectual (or perhaps counter-intellectual) stream, noxious and currently 
virulent, is unrepentant gangsterism.  The notion is still one of taxation and its avoidance and of 
changing the balance of individual rights versus those of the government and society.  There has 
long existed within Colombian organized violence an admixture of purely mercenary criminality 
and self-justifying ideological assertion. Smuggling, moreover, has been a science in Colombia 
for at least five centuries, and since so much of the success of internal armed resistance groups 
depends on clandestine routes, the geographic separation of smugglers from revolutionaries has 
been impossible and a pure separation of their identities always improbable. 
 Colombian violence today (since the Violencia of the 1950s) is not the same as in the 
past.  Not only are many valuable geographic objects more likely to be illegal (coca instead of 
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coffee), but insidious methods and contraptions, such as widespread kidnapping and the sowing 
of inexpensive, easily deployed explosives, have had distinct effects on the physical environment 
and on the shape of spatial involvement in the conflict.  Colombian gangster Pablo Escobar, for 
instance, announced a sincere argument about local territorial identity, representing workers and 
the downtrodden, but his flamboyant spending also bespoke a volume of insincerities. 
Maintaining income encouraged justifications for opposing established standards of morality. 
Within a vicious syndrome of seeking legitimacy and challenging norms, Escobar toyed with 
establishment politics, himself becoming a congressman, and set about to establish his own 
taxing authority and tax territories.  He ultimately decided to directly challenge the State with 
violent actions, ordering the detonation within Colombian cities of lethal explosive devices. 
Thus, the Colombian fight slouched back both to its polarized federalist/anti-federalist roots and 
to self justification of pure conquest -- all of it territorial and homicidal. 
 
The birthplace of the FARC 
The exact birthday of the FARC is fuel for debate.  It is generally placed in 1964-65, 
either when the name was officially announced in Riochiquito, Cauca (See figures 7; 8; and 74, 
p. 207), a little farther back to the formation of Marquetalia, or even earlier to a schism between 
the Liberal party leadership and communist revolutionaries in the late 1950s.  An additional 
option has as its location a place called Davis or El Davis (after a river of that name) in Tolima 
Department.  Others will cite the first armed action of the FARC as its effective birth on the 
national stage, an attack on or „toma‟ (taking) of Inzá in 1965 (see description of the event on p. 
196).  Others will say the name FARC was not given until the second „Coordinadora’ 
(coordinator, or meeting to coordinate, or the group doing the meeting) in Guayabero, Meta.  
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Together these locations compose the firmament of candidate birthplaces.  Many have also 
served as recent refuge options for leaders of the FARC.  The analogy of birth to an organization 
like the FARC is itself perhaps misleading. In any case, if we were to imagine back toward 
conception, we could include a number of acts of banditry perpetrated by some of the earliest 
leaders of the FARC.  The geographic revelation or footprint of the FARC‟s early existence is 
more precise than that of the Communist Party of Colombia, the PCC, for reasons inherent in the 
development of insurgent or revolutionary organizations generally.  For some historians, 
histories of the two organizations (PCC and FARC) are intertwined, and so, too, the geographies. 
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Figure 7: Northern South America Map 1961 (Instituto Nacional de Geografía, 1961).  The rectangle highlights the 
approximate extent of map in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: Places of reference in the FARC birth legend.  Inzá is to the middle-left. 
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The FARC is in a sense the armed wing of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC).  
That is, the PCC may have been the controlling political entity and embrasure of intellectual 
authorship and control of the FARC (Mackenzie, p. 25).  That description of the relationship is 
overly simple, however. (Palacios 2012; Mackenzie 2007)  There has been a strong overlap of 
persons in the leadership nuclei of the two, it was through the PCC that the FARC received early 
support and guidance, and the FARC has been almost if not entirely obedient to the political and 
geopolitical dictates of the PCC.  Of course, as with other revolutionary movements, perhaps 
especially in Latin America, a number of internal frictions and disagreements have occurred and 
external factors shifted the balance of autonomy and influence within and among the members.  
Especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, we might reasonably conclude that the PCC lost 
control over a growing FARC.  To say this without qualifications would, however, be to deny the 
dual participation of memberships and the role of the party as nucleus for ideological leadership 
and discipline.  At any rate, for the purposes of this dissertation, we can say that the FARC is the 
armed wing of the PCC or that the PCC is a political wing of the FARC without inconsistency.  
The geographic placement of members of the FARC might be somewhat distinct from that of the 
PCC because the FARC attacks and retreats in a different way and in different spaces than does 
the PCC.  It is useful nevertheless, for background and because of other mentions of the PCC in 
the literature, to note that the PCC is a key organizational, geopolitical link between and overlap 
with the FARC in international organizations and foreign countries.  Since the 1920s, the PCC 
was a subordinate of Soviet structure.  This fact could not help but influence the physical 
deployment of the FARC.  For instance, sincc the early 1960s some lines of supply and medical 
evacuation would connect with Cuba.  In addition, Russian revolutionary theory may have 
influenced early military decisions.  “That conditions within the country were not yet mature 
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enough for this type of struggle (communist revolutionary) seemed to prove itself when they 
tried to set up in Quindío and were cut to pieces.”  (Palacios and Safford 647) (my translation).  I 
believe that a look at the map will tell us that while a great many socio-political factors doubtless 
weighed on the FARC‟s prospects, also influential is the proximity of Quindío Department to 
Tolima Department and the remote redoubt areas within the latter.  Quindío is on the western 
slope of the Cordillera Central, on the other side of the crest from the legendary birthing places 
of the FARC.  Quindío is also one of the old coffee growing areas, its capital Armenia forming a 
part of the „coffee axis.‟  It is an area relatively developed in terms of road and 
telecommunications networks, and in population dispersion.  Places within Quindío are not 
nearly as remote from governmental coercive authority as places like El Davis in southern 
Tolima Department.  A favorable balance of risk distances was probably the fundamental 
geographic condition that the FARC founders could not find or create in Quindío, not 
revolutionary inspiration.  In any case, escape routes of the proto-FARC from any tomas they 
might attempt in Quindío would have led them uphill to the east toward sanctuary in Tolima.  
Chasing the FARC from base locations in Quindío uphill toward the east would be (was) too 
costly for the government.  The government could not catch the fugitive elements of the 
guerrillas in sufficient numbers to eliminate them.  The FARC could not muster enough fighters 
or materiel from within their uphill sanctuaries to allow them to overcome the inherent risks of 
being overtaken within Quindío.  The cost distances of going down into Quindío were too high 
and the risk distances too short.  Such were the geographic facts facing the would-be 
revolutionaries, whether Quindío was more appropriate ideologically or not.  The matching 
inability of the government to mount from within Quindío sufficient strength to pursue going 
uphill meant that the guerrillas could survive, waiting such a time when conditions in the country 
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changed or their own strength increased.  I surmise that the socio-economic conditions within the 
country as a whole never really became favorable for a communist style revolution -- of 
whatever subtype imagined by communist party leaders.  FARC power, on the other hand, did 
increase substantially over time, especially with the explosion of illicit drug funding.  The FARC 
came to hold a comparative advantage within the illicit drug industry because of its physical 
control over suitable coca growing terrain, much of which lies to the east of the Cordillera 
Oriental (eastern mountain range).  The FARC also developed an energetic and thoughtful 
approach to predatory entrepreneurship, to include the routinization of kidnapping.  Not 
surprisingly, the drug trade obeyed many of the same laws imposed by physical geography on 
pursuit and escape.  Pursuits mounted by formal authorities pushed many aspects of the coca 
industry (processing laboratories, warehouses, transportation hubs) into increasingly remote 
areas, remote areas that overlapped FARC routes and sanctuaries. 
 “There isn‟t the slightest doubt that the increase in the rebel phenomenon 
coincides with the growth of drug trafficking in our country. Just one figure 
would be enough to demonstrate it.  In 1982, the main armed movement, the Farc, 
had nearly a thousand men and nine armed fronts in the entire country.  At the 
present time, twenty years later, mostly as a result of their resources from drug 
trafficking, this rebel group has nearly 20 thousand men, that is, it has multiplied 
by 20, and it has over one hundred armed structures, urban as well as rural.” 
(Guzmán and Muñoz, 2004, 48 citing Carlos Rangel). 
One might argue that Mr. Rangel was asserting a correlation as being a causal relationship, when 
it could actually have been some other factor, such as a rise in revolutionary consciousness or a 
deepening of socio-economic suffering, increase in perceived relative depravation or an 
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overreaching intensification of coercive authoritarianism by an increasingly oppressive 
oligarchy.  Those latter arguments, however, can call on no statistical witness.  One might also 
argue that the FARC had gained new leadership, but that is also not borne out by any revealed 
data.  That the FARC learned by opportunity and necessity to be aggressive armed commodity 
industrialists is the only answer that satisfies observation.  It is a conclusion that, if it does not 
enjoy a consensus among observers, enjoys as close to a consensus as one can hope for.  For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I take Rangel‟s observation as a conditional truth -- that the FARC 
gained power in accordance with its transformation into a drug enterprise and the agility of its 
leadership to translate drug profits into war-making infrastructure.  The assertion is relevant to 
this dissertation in that the physical geography of illicit drugs, and especially cocaine, frames the 
spatial expansion of FARC control and their fortunes in related predatory activities.  It may also 
frame the relative success of the government in responding to the FARC, the decline of FARC 
power after 2002, and current FARC strategies at ongoing peace negotiations.  That is to say, 
through simple spatial analysis we can visualize the opportunity of logistical fortune that 
presented itself to the FARC, the way in which the geography of the illicit drug enterprise, 
especially of cocaine, shaped FARC military actions and prospects inside Colombia and perhaps 
how coca-related spatial conditioning influenced the FARC‟s weakening.  In turn, the influence 
that cocaine geography has had on FARC prospects can be understood through the lens of the 
loss of power gradient and the dynamic of changing risk in the interplay of small armed units 
involved in death chases. 
“Not only Tirofijo‟s men feed their war machine with the rich dividends of  
narcotics trafficking. Not even the ELN escapes from this cancer of modern 
societies and much less so the so-called Self-Defense groups, incorrectly called 
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«paramilitary groups» in Colombia. The majority of the members of these illegal 
organizations- in a covered and deliberate way- are based in areas where coca, 
opium poppy and marihuana plants flourish.  Their location explains to a large 
extent the constant fighting between the illegal armed groups. Territorial control, 
which guarantees them control over large tracts of land with illegal crops, is the 
ultimate objective of the blocs, fronts and companies. In this sense, the massacres, 
forced displacement of peasants and other violations are part of a calculated 
strategy to repopulate those areas with either guerrillas or self-defense forces, who 
seek cheap labor to fill their armies of coca-pickers and lumberjacks.” (Guzmán 
and Muñoz, 10) 
 
Course of Colombian violence in recent decades 
 Four historic catalytic currents conducive to violence were listed above: conquest and 
evangelization, federalism and anti-federalism, revolutionary socialism, and gangsterism. These 
currents continued to influence the course and intensity of Colombian violence after 1985, but 
more specific determinants can be identified.  The period from 1985 to 2010 can be divided 
roughly into three segments. The first was a period of depressed national confidence and political 
reordering in the wake of extreme challenges to the state; the second was a period of public 
reflection and effort at negotiation in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet era, and the third was 
a period of widespread commitment to gaining a physical victory over the violent opposition 
groups. 
 In November, 1985, one of the leftist revolutionary guerrilla organizations, the now-
defunct M-19, took control of the Colombian Supreme Court Building in Bogotá.  An assault to 
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retake the building by the Colombian army ensued almost immediately.  Flames soon engulfed 
and reduced the court building.  Eleven of the court justices and apparently all the M19 members 
died, probably murdered by the M19 guerrillas.  The seminal event, (along with a nearly 
concurrent major natural disaster, a lahar that buried the town of Armero) catalyzed public 
efforts to reform the nation‟s fundamental laws.  The result was the 1991 constitution, which 
provided for some of the changes, at least in principle, that the Colombian left had for decades 
demanded.  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union collapsed, and with it much of the international 
support to the violent left.  Ideologically and geopolitically motivated support from the Soviet 
Union and satellite countries dried up.  The financial part of that support was soon more than 
replaced by drug money.  By the middle of the 1990s, the FARC had grown in power and 
military confidence on the back of its decision to tie its logistic health to the coca agro-industry. 
The survival and expansion of the FARC in spite of the Cold War collapse of its paternal 
Marxist support can be seen not just in political and economic terms, but geographical.  The 
guerrilla, along with much of the international diplomatic community pressed the government 
and society of Colombia to make concessions, and that process, exemplified by the 1991 
constitution, undermined the guerrilla argument for armed revolution.  The FARC had always 
been a rural movement, but in the quarter century since its founding, Colombia had experienced 
rapid urbanization, while the FARC had made few inroads as an urban insurgency.  Instead, 
illicit drug trafficking organizations had achieved control of smuggling routes in and through the 
urban areas.  In rural areas, however, and especially in more remote areas, coca and heroin poppy 
cultivation was in the midst of great increase within Colombian territory.  This was due, in part, 
to successful counternarcotics efforts in neighboring countries, particularly Peru.  The FARC 
found itself to have a clear military advantage over the drug trafficking organizations in rural 
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areas where the drug organizations were establishing source cultivations and clandestine 
laboratories.  So the geographic shape of the illicit drug trade overlaid areas where the FARC 
had unchallenged coercive control of clandestine routes.  The decision to exert pressure on the 
drug trade not only provided a financial windfall, it changed the nature of FARC thinking.  Now 
the federalist/anti-federalist question, or something like it, made its way into the FARC‟s own 
narrative.  Now it would be about local authority and control, the creation of autonomous zones 
and territories, the creation of local identities, a preference for the counties and the distribution of 
national wealth to them.  The basic nature of Colombian territoriality would return to dominate 
the FARC‟s argument.  Hybridizing its nature with that of the illicit drug trafficking 
organizations with which it now dealt, the new FARC had far more financial strength but 
continually expended revolutionary purity, a degradation which in turn subtracted greatly from 
public emotional and therefore political strength in and out of Colombia. 
 In May 1998, Andrés Pastrana won the Colombian presidential election on a platform of 
furthering a negotiated peace settlement with the major guerrilla groups.  Carrying out his 
campaign pledge, and with the initial support of the majority of voting Colombians, President 
Pastrana conceded to the FARC a 42,000 square kilometer zone in the middle of the country 
(which became known in Colombia as the Despeje) from which he removed all government 
forces.  (Figure 9; Figure 46, p. 142)  Perhaps this concession was a gesture of good faith 
intended to provide confidence to the guerrilla leadership and so underpin a process of 
negotiations.  Perhaps the government made the concession because it seemed necessary to trade 
space for time.  By late 2001, in any case, it had become clear that the FARC was not 
approaching the peace process with intent to cede anything in return -- in any sphere.  The event 
commonly cited as the last straw was an airline hijacking and kidnapping of its passengers on 
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February 20, 2002.  That evening President Pastrana ordered the Colombian Army to retake the 
demilitarized zone and reinitiate offensive operations against the guerrilla. 
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Figure 9:The Despeje Zone with an estimate of the FARC and ELN influence areas circa 2000 according to US author 
Thomas Marks.(Marks March/April 2002). 
 In the presidential campaign for the 2002 elections, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, whose father 
had been killed by the FARC, ran as an „Independent Liberal‟ (not as candidate of his former 
63 
 
party) on a campaign diametrically opposite that of President Pastrana, vowing to subdue the 
FARC and ELN by force of arms.  He was overwhelmingly elected in May 2002.  Much of the 
reason for his victory is attributable to disillusionment of the Colombian electorate with the 
peace process.  His victory and subsequent high public favorability ratings seem to owe in part to 
psychological release of potential admirers from ancient loyalties toward one or the other party.  
That he did not run as a Liberal or Conservative seems to have subtracted a great deal from that 
historic polarization, bringing to the forefront the relationship of the government to the 
insurgents.  His new labeling diffused opposition, and simultaneously drove opposition political 
opportunity into an almost necessarily anti-Uribe identity.  In turn, pro-Uribe publicists painted 
that anti-Uribe identity as tantamount to being pro-FARC.  While this is a simplification of the 
political-electoral formula, it is generally valid as a description of the Colombian political 
polemic through 2010.  Hence, in the 2010 elections, Juan Manuel Santos won in a landslide on 
the promise to continue the Uribe posture of defeating the guerrillas militarily.  By the time of 
the presidential inauguration of 2010, the political philosophical content had devolved away 
from the federalist versus anti-federalist, or the merits or defects of socialism, or the drug war.  
The political contest was more narrowly about how to deal with the FARC as a coercive force. 
 The above perspective on the Colombian conflict may not be altogether correct, but it is 
not altogether wrong.  Various commentaries, opinions, assertions, and hypotheses about the war 
-- regarding the war‟s causes and the ethics of behavior in prosecuting the war -- will be 
considered tangentially within the text, but are not the focus of this dissertation.  Herein the focus 
is on the geographic influences on manifestations of competitive territorial behavior, which, at its 
roots, seems very Colombian. 
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The year 1985 was pivotal in Colombia, maybe the year that the nation of modern 
Colombia was born.  Five major events seem to have comingled their public psychological effect 
to take the Colombian electorate and political elite in new directions, to open political space for 
some organizations, and to close it for others.  In 1985, the official registration of a legal leftist 
political party, the Unión Patriótica, the desired metamorphosis of the M19, changed the 
electoral landscape even though it would never do well at the polls.  That year, the same M19 
occupied the Colombian Supreme Court Building, which burned down during the ensuing melee. 
(Pardo 2004, p. 485; Mackenzie 2007, p. 410)  One of the worst natural disasters in human 
history occurred in Armero, Tolima; and for the first time, county leaders were elected instead of 
appointed.  Also in 1985, a strange, out-of-scale massacre took place at one of the epicenters of 
Colombian violence, Tacueyó, Cauca. (Cuesta 2002)  The five major events (registration of the 
Unión Patriótica political party, burning of the Supreme Court building, the mudslide at Armero, 
local election of mayors, and the Tacueyó massacre), each of which might alone have defined a 
year, together created an ambivalent sense of national doubt combined with a sense of mission 
and of possibility.  
The holocaust at the Palace of Justice seemed to rivet national attention on a need to deal 
in some way with the national crisis, while the Armero disaster piqued public suspicion 
regarding the preparedness of the government to handle major crises.  Decentralization of 
political decision-making and the movement of resources toward the counties increased local 
political participation and interest, and opened opportunities for some organizations to take over 
legal political reins in select areas of the country where before they could not.  Especially 
vulnerable to armed political proselytizing were remote areas where armed guerrillas were 
habitually present.  Registration of the M19 seemed to open a broad path for political 
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compromise and negotiation with the guerrillas, while the Tacueyó massacre induced public 
doubt regarding the legitimacy of the guerrillas as a political actor. 
In a span of weeks, many of the psychological and spatial trends ongoing in Colombia 
got an accelerating jolt by uncommon events.  Together those five events gave the FARC 
political advantage in some of the geographical areas where it was strongest, and simultaneously 
spurred the FARC leaders‟ dedication to armed processes over diplomatic ones.  The events 
seem to have had an opposite effect on the population at large, which for the next decade and a 
half would seek peace accords, liberalize the country‟s basic laws and continue to urbanize. 
 
Continuities and discontinuities 
 The right-hand map in Figure 10 shows the locations of almost all battles during the War 
of the Thousand Days, which took place in Colombia around the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 
centuries. (Riascos 1949).  The other map shows a plot of landmine fields as of about 2008.  
(Observatorio de Minas Antipersonales 2002).  Where there is a landmine, a violent actor was at 
an exact location with mortally violent intent.  If one is attempting to locate exactly where a war 
marks its intensity, then landmine distribution is a solid clue.  Comparing the battle locations of 
the War of the Thousand Days to approximate landmine distribution of a century later, we see 
some overlap, but also some very clear distinction in the overall spatial extent of the two periods 
of internal conflict.  The comparison invites questions regarding historical continuities and 
discontinuities that might help explain the spatial differences that a century would make.  The 
questions and reasonable answers to them are consistent with the overall observation that in 
Colombia, at least, geographic factors other than generalized socio-economic performance or 
social justice have been determinant of the course if not impetus of internal conflict. 
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Figure 10: On the left, landmine fields circa 2003. (Observatorio de Minas 2002) (IGAC) compared to, on the right, 
battles during the War of the Thousand Days. (Riascos 1949). 
 
Amnesties and negotiations as continuity 
 In the War of the Thousand Days, and as a more generalized habit of warfare in the 19
th
 
century, the Liberal and Conservative armies paroled and amnestied captured prisoners.  After 
the initial battles early in that war, the activities of both armies devolved to guerrilla practices 
and encounters. (Demarest, Spring, 2001).  As those practices of the Liberal and Conservative 
guerrilla bands descended more and more into indecency and at times depravity, it became 
harder and harder to enforce amnesties, the desire for vengeance constantly overcoming 
intentions to live and let live.  The intention to seek negotiated peace and to establish an official 
framework of forgiveness, mixed with increasingly unforgivable behaviors and intensifying 
vengefulness, marked the organized violence of the 1950‟s and the current period of conflict.  
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Steven Dudley (Dudley 2006) traces the tragic history of the Unión Patriótica political party, 
formed by amnestied members of the M19 guerrilla.  That amnesty was granted as an explicit 
continuity in Colombian conflict, and, sadly, the result included the eventual murders of many of 
the amnestied.  The identies of some perpetrators has been established, although the majority 
have gone unpunished.  The motives and collective identities of the murderers is as confused as 
might be expected and continues a fierce debate.  Guerrillas of the FARC and ELN killed many 
ex-M19 and Unión Patriótica members, considering their former comrades as traitors.  Anti-
communist paramilitary guerrillas killed many others, seeking to end the left‟s electoral life in its 
infancy.  Consistent with Colombia‟s history of political violence, most perpetrators have 
enjoyed impunity. 
The Álvaro Uribe government had greater success in amnestying and demobilizing the 
paramilitary AUC than it did the FARC guerrillas.  We can attribute this success in part to ties 
between elements of the AUC leadership and some Colombian military leaders, as well as to a 
general ideological concert of the AUC leadership with that of the government.  As the behavior 
of the AUC became decreasingly tolerable, international diplomatic pressures and internal 
political liability influenced the Colombian government to assert more control over the AUC.  
Well over thirty thousand paramilitaries surrendered themselves under the amnesty, as did many 
thousand left-wing guerrillas.  The government had estimated that the AUC counted on no more 
than fourteen thousand members at its height.  The oversubscription of demobilization acceptants 
was perhaps due in part to the benefits of the demobilization programs.  The numerous problems 
involved in the reintegration of those young men into civility aside, most Colombians seem to 
agree that the amnesty programs have been better than the alternative. 
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 In 1991, Colombians received a new national constitution.  It addressed within its 
paragraphs many of the grievances that the communist guerrillas had for years used as 
justifications for their violent endeavor.  The ideological left, and the M19, had won concessions.  
The government reached a peace agreement with the M19 in which many of the M19 guerrillas 
renounced their use of weapons and took on the structure and trappings of a political party within 
the electoral system.  (Dudley 2006).  The M19 suffered many assassinations and widespread 
rejection at the polls, finally becoming unable to muster minimum numbers of petitions to appear 
on ballots.  The FARC inherited the more committed revolutionaries from the ranks and 
hierarchy of the M19, and then participated in retribution killings of many of the M19 politicians 
whom the FARC leaders considered treasonous. 
 
Viciousness as continuity 
 La Vorágine (The Whirlwind) is a landmark of Colombian literature, written in 1924 by 
Jose Rivera. (Cormack McCarthy‟s No Country for Old Men and its movie adaptation give a 
similar style and concept set, including fate, honor, violence and the interweaving of these with 
the surrounding natural environment, not to mention the tolerance of violence.  That the 
geographic backdrop is exactly not the jungle is of no matter.)  It is no less than the prototype of 
an entire genre of 20
th
 century Latin-American fiction called the novela de la selva (jungle 
novel).  On its surface, Rivera‟s work (both as plot and literary phenomenon) supports an 
assumption that Colombian violence is somehow embedded in the society‟s fabric.  Evoking La 
Vorágine, some Colombians will claim the 1924 world decried by Rivera has gone unaltered; 
that Rivera‟s accusation is absolutely current and one need only substitute coca for rubber.  La 
Vorágine delivers violence as an omnipresent human contribution to the natural order.  In other 
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words, Colombians interweave human experience with the surrounding world, and involve the 
spiritual world as well.  Magical Realism is the name given to the broader artistic genre into 
which this expression falls.  Another Colombian novelist, Alvaro Valencia Tovar, who is also a 
retired Colombian Army general and news columnist, hews to the same interpretation (Tovar 
1997).  One of the most consistently insightful commentators on Colombia‟s agonies (and 
perhaps the most widely known and respected living military officer in Latin America), Valencia 
maintains that Colombian society needs to be re-educated for non-violence.  It appears, then, that 
Colombians at diverse points in the professional and ideological firmament accede to if not 
champion the idea that Colombia is culturally violent.  The same holds for other disciplines of 
Colombian art.  Fernando Botero, the most famous Colombian plastic artist, has dedicated much 
of his later works to the subject of Colombia‟s violent nature.  In cinematic art, Colombian 
screenwriters and artists have become associated internationally as masters of a whole genre 
dealing with the hyper-violence and existential desperation of drug-trafficking, corruption and 
poverty.  All in all, Colombia‟s art seems to indict the culture.  The political science follows suit.  
If a person were to de-shelve Colombian non-fiction texts on the subject of violent culture 
currently in a Bogotá bookstore, that person would be unlikely to have enough cash on hand to 
buy them all or enough strength to carry them away.  The existence of a Colombian academic 
specialty called violentología filled by violentólogos of every ideological stripe itself might hint 
to a society prepossessed by the idea of violent culture. 
 These elements of artistic and academic reflection are testimony from talented 
Colombians to the existence of a violent culture, and highlight how prideful is my rejection of 
the idea.  Math seems to aid the rejection, however.  The same bookstore browser, if allowed to 
double-count overlapping book topics, would likely find more titles on territoriality, land use, 
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and property ownership than on violence.  With titles like Dimensiones territoriales de la Guerra 
y la paz; Estado (Montañez, Gustavo, et al. 2002); Sociedad y Ordenamiento Territorial en 
Colombia (Borja 2000); or Territorio y Cultura: Territorios de Conflicto & Cambio Socio-
Cultural (Grupo de Investigación 2001) the literature on Colombian violence is tied to physical 
objects of contention, not just to human foible.  Therein lies a foundation for an argument against 
the notion of a culture of violence.  Violent behavioral habits exist, but they matter in the 
presence or absence of certain characteristics of the surrounding physical, political, 
administrative and economic geography, much of which can be changed.  This is important 
because the violence-as-culture trope can serve as an excuse, justification or reason for 
pessimism.  Solutions for long-term peace can be achieved by changing the geography of human 
competition.  Attempting to change the internal environment of human behavioral predisposition 
may be an attractive, but unproductive romance. 
 
Commodities as continuity and discontinuity 
 Colombia may present some continuity of violent cultural habit, but observation of 
Colombian geography and history shows something else as well.  Over time, Colombian 
localities have provided a continuously changing variety of goods to regional and world markets.  
These commodities have included palm oil, yam, exotic fruit, coal, oil and other hydrocarbons, 
coca, cacao, cardamom, heroin poppy, emeralds and other gems, gold and other precious metals, 
furs, rare bird feathers, exotic species, tungsten, rubber, archeological heritage items, potatoes, 
ink, bananas, coffee, quinine,  cocaine, and numerous others.  Each has had a distinct source 
geography, labor requirements and market destinations.  In a wet mountainous landscape, 
movement routes for these things constrict and overlap, giving some geographic continuity to 
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taxation and contraband.  I am not aware of spatial information disproving what is an apparent 
correlation between violent acts and the source geographies or transportation routes of 
commercial export items.  While spatial coincidence does not destroy arguments preferring 
cultural factors as the causal force of violence (culture could follow the goods), it could 
reasonably diminish the strength of those arguments.  I perceive (have not proven statistically) a 
coincidence in the spatial distribution of landmines (as reflected in the left-hand map in Figure 
10), for instance, with the source geographies of hydrocarbon extraction and coca cultivation.  
By 2003, the geographies of the two commodities extended east of the eastern cordillera, as did 
the combat.  The two commodities were not fight-worthy resources at the end of the 19
th
 century, 
however.  While I infer that the correlation of combats with the location of these two natural 
resources likely reflects some kind of causal relationship, even the observed correlation is 
tenuous.  Additional variables independently affect each.  For instance, the medical control of 
malaria and yellow fever contributes to the potential to exploit hydrocarbons and coca in the 
lowlands, and simultaneously contributes to the potential to fight in those environments. 
 Emeralds are one of Colombia‟s iconic export products and the object of centuries of 
smuggling.  They are the object of epochal stories of violence and retribution.  They stopped 
being the focus of Colombian social drama, however, when the lands of the emerald mines were 
subdued by force, then subjected to a more rigorous and formal property regime.  Such 
formalization and (albeit incomplete) imposition of the rule-of-law occurred before coca and 
heroin paste ascended as the most profitable illicit commodities.  I admit that my assertion 
regarding the distinct historical relationship of emeralds to the spatial pattern of violence is not 
entirely accurate or complete.  I believe, however, that it is valid enough to invite a related 
question: why are so many places within Colombia peaceful, even places that had been formerly 
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violent, and even places where violence was focused around a smuggled commodity?  
Commodities, smuggling, and associated cultures of violence might be continuities in 
Colombia‟s history of organized violence, but then just as important if less obvious are the 
continuities and incontinuities of peacefulness. 
 My entering assumptions include that the geography of Colombian conflict features a 
spatial tension among the physical geographic footprints of natural resources, territorial claims 
associated with those resources (to include transportation routes, processing points and labor 
sources) and the military geography of actual and anticipated contact between armed 
organizations.  An ultimate goal of those armed organizations is to gain or maintain territorial 
dominance over the aforementioned wealth items.  By itself, this set of factors produces a 
baffling complexity defying proofs of causation.  I couch assertions about risk distance within 
the same tension of factors.  The Colombian guerrillas seek escape and sanctuary, but they 
simultaneously seek proximity to commodity geographies while they second-guess the second-
guessing of their armed pursuers.  Add to this the fact that all the parties make mistakes.  The 
manifestation of these human decisions does not result in a particularly neat map of anything.  
Nevertheless, a useful separation of concepts appears.  The geography of the conflict is larger 
than the geography of impunity.  Places where fugitives must go to (or through) in order to 
maintain their impunity constitute the geography of impunity.  The geography of the conflict is 
these places of impunity plus the geography of lucrative targets of predation. 
This dissertation focuses the theory of risk distance on pursuits by armed groups against 
one-another.  Notably, the movements within that dynamic involve origins and destinations, 
„from‟ and „to.‟  In the context of armed competition, the fugitive force tries to escape in part 
because a fugitive leader senses that his entity has less physical power than his rival, at least at 
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the most immediately relevant times and places.  In a broader context of a conflict involving 
insurgents, criminals and hybrids (that are most often the fugitive entities during these pursuits or 
„chases‟) the origin or beginning locations might be a government or economic target that the 
insurgent has recently „taken‟ or „hit.‟  It might also be a source area of economic predation, such 
a coca cultivation area or processing plant.  In this sense, we might map the „conflict geography‟ 
as not just the terrain that the fugitive seeks in order to gain distance advantages by increasing 
the risks to his pursuers, but also the locations of and routes from the initiation points of the 
fugitive movement. 
The above said, the source location of a commodity may or may not be the most 
important geographic reflection of the resource competition phenomena.  Some commodity often 
serves as the object if not cause of social distension and violence.  However, the locations of 
targets only indirectly related to the commodity will adjust the spatial distribution of the 
violence.  For instance, a labor union‟s leaders probably have a geographic footprint only 
tangentially related to the geographic footprint of some commodity the extraction or transport of 
which is imperative to the existence of their union.  In addition, although they are not economic 
targets per se, some communities are coincidentally vulnerable to extreme violence because the 
actions of individuals in those communities can greatly influence the outcome of armed pursuits.  
That influence is indirectly the product of the physical location of those communities.  Pursuer 
and fugitive depend on information and silence, and so the perceived loyalty of some 
(unfortunately located) communities becomes a salient factor in decisions by armed elements to 
use force against them.  In addition, some elements of the civilian community, especially 
working-age men, may themselves be part of a commodity‟s geography as extraction or 
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processing inputs.  As such, they can become targets of extortion, vengeance or simple 
elimination as economic factors. 
 
Figure 11: Coca cultivation circa 1999 according to the US counternarcotics office. (ONDCP 2000)  The green 
blotches represent concentrations of coca cultivation.  The pink area is the zone ceded to the FARC from 1998-
2002.  Compare this map to Figure 51, p. 149 in which the mapmakers try to describe other aspects of the coca-
related geography, including territorial control, paste production areas, product movement routes, and escape to 
sanctuary.  Also compare this map to Figure 12, a UN map produced five years later. 
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Figure 12: Coca cultivation circa 2004 according to the United Nations counternarcotics office. (United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 2005)  This 2004 rendering shows previously un-depicted cultivation in the Santa Marta 
region on the Atlantic coast, a high concentration in Tumaco in the southwest, expansion in Antioquia, etc.  From 
this UN map, the intense Plan Colombia aerial eradication applied in Putumayo to the south seems to have 
‘worked’. 
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On 10 March 1984, the Colombian National Police found a place that they had known for 
some time existed, but could not find, Tranquilandia, an enormous cocaine production facility in 
Puerto Rico County in Caquetá along the banks of the Yari River, south of San José del 
Guaviare.  The discovery and subsequent dismantling of Tranquilandia was a great financial 
blow to the Medellín Cartel (Pablo Escobar, the Ochoa Vázquez brothers, and others), to which 
Pablo Escobar reacted violently.  He had several of the officials involved in the Tranquilandia 
raid assassinated, including the Minister of Justice, a senior judge and a number of police 
officers.  Pablo Escobar would not be killed until 1993.  The Tranquilandia discovery gave the 
government and the public a more vivid idea of the dimensions of the problem.  Few police had 
seen anything greater than small makeshift laboratories.  Tranquilandia had sixteen thousand 
gallons of gasoline, three thousand cans of acetone, five thousand of ether, huge automated 
drying racks.  To the detectives it was unbelievable.  The immense lines of supply for the 
precursor chemicals eventually gave the location away.  It also did not have a large guard force; 
two helicopters of police agents were able to overwhelm it. 
 The uncovering of Tranquilandia would greatly favor the FARC.  It weakened the 
Medellín Cartel at a time when the FARC leadership was coming to accept a number of 
compromises with what at first they kept at arms‟ length as a dirty business.  They taxed the 
movement of product and precursor chemicals where possible, extorted cartel hierarchies -- at 
times by kidnappings, and organized (often forcefully) the displacement of agricultural labor.  
The cartels were as dangerous as the FARC, however, especially in and near the cities.  The 
balance of power and respect shifted somewhat with the blow against the Medellín cartel, but 
moreover, it led to agreements between the FARC and the Medellín cartel that the FARC would 
provide the physical protection necessary for certain rural operations to continue.  The result of 
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this shift can be seen in the takedown of the cocaine production facilities at Gaitania in 2005.  
What required a platoon of police at Tranquilandia required thousands of soldiers at Gaitania.  
The remoteness was equivalent and the normal distances not essentially changed.  Both 
locations, however, allowed close proximity to a valuable commodities source and access to a 
smuggling highway.  In the expanse of the Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare jungle, the FARC was, 
with a relatively small investment, able to make the cost distances for any government force very 
high and their risk distances very short.   
 
Land and property as continuity and discontinuity 
Perhaps what has been missing from the Colombian social compact is a sufficiently formalized 
property system.  This is not a common sentiment among Colombians; or rather, the notion of 
formalized property is unpopular among a sizeable portion of the intellectual elite in Colombia.  
Property is not a popular theoretical concept, the Spanish word propiedad having suffered the 
same or worse historical abuse as its English cognate.  Transparency of the evidence of land 
ownership is a central part of what makes real property records formal, and transparency in 
Colombia has improved slowly if at all in recent years.  The public records, evidence of who 
owns what, is only a part of a formalized property regime, only a part of the greater social 
technology of a formal property system.  Institutions must exist that can give strength and 
practical effect to the evidence.  Courts, markets and democratic processes are the backbone 
elements that give property ownership records meaning.  In Colombia, the courts have been far 
away and expensive to access, the market for land in rural areas is crippled by arcane statutes and 
impracticable travel times, and the local democratic processes have been trumped in many rural 
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areas by a variety of communal ownership schemes, some well-meant and others simple 
arrogations. 
 
Figure 13: Counties where drug barons purchased land circa 1980-1985 (Reyes 2009, p. 76)  Professor Reyes did 
not reveal the method for acquiring this data.  Of note is the lack of land purchase in the Catatumbo, southern 
Bolivar Department, Arauca, Meta or southwestern Putumayo along the Ecuadoran border (circled in red).  These 
were all coca cultivation areas by the late 1990s, as can be seen in figures 11 and 12.  My suposition is that suitable 
coca growing land in these areas was controlled by the FARC or ELN, making sale to other drug lords unlikely. 
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One of the most promising and disturbing aspects of the current peace negotiations 
revolves around land redistribution.  The FARC has long asserted land reform as a column of its 
revolutionary social objectives.  Over time, the shape of the FARC‟s propositions has come to 
appear more and more programmatic and bureaucratic (tax relief, technical outreach, price 
supports, market research).  This banality seems to parallel fashions within the Ministry of 
Agriculture and so elicits increased skepticism from those who see a mild if dull conspiracy.  
Part of the challenge is not so much the historic failure of such rural agricultural land reforms as 
it is the lack of transparency as to where all the land is that might be involved.  A stable 
incantation of Colombian cynicism holds that the land redistribution agency has redistributed 
millions of hectares of rural land, but without recording exactly where that land is. (Demarest 
2003).  As figures 14 and 15 suggest, tenancy patterns in Colombia are more complex than 
perhaps journalistic accounts might lead one to believe.  The types and predominance of types of 
tenancy do not appear to be highly correlated spatially to the most conflictive zones. 
 Many Colombians want the government to negotiate with the FARC, but when asked 
what in such a negotiation might be given to the FARC as part of a deal, few Colombians feel 
any important concession should made if it means giving land.  Areas where the FARC 
denounces land ownership injustices (ostensibly on behalf of the rural peasant) and demands 
reforms as part of a peace settlement, always seem to fall along some FARC escape route or 
supply line.  Like other great landowners, the FARC has not shown enthusiasm for transparency 
of ownership rights and duties in areas where it controls the population.  The FARC has 
geographically concerted its population control, land ownership, and military strategy. 
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Figure 14: A tenancy and ownership concentration map from the National Atlas of Colombia (IGAC 2002, p 248)  
The color scheme is a bit confusing in that the dark green represents areas featuring mostly larger landholdings 
(greater than 500 acres), while the dark blue-green areas feature mostly minifundios (the smallest holdings of less 
than 50 acres).  The purple and pinkish areas are nature preserves or indigenous reservations.  The red and orange 
tones are for areas of medium-size plots (between 50 and 500 acres).  The kinds of tenancy and size of holdings 
varies greatly among the several most conflictive regions.  There is no observable correlation between landholding 
patterns and organized violence. 
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Figure 15:Communal lands, prospective ‘peasant reservation zones’ and 2012 ‘consolidation’ counties.  Not 
included are government ‘baldio’ (unpatented) lands, smaller preservation areas, and lands expropriated and in 
court processes. (Base data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Urbanization as discontinuity 
One of the most obvious changes in the geography of Colombia over the past century, as 
in much of the world, regards urban demographics.  Medellín, for instance, did not exist as an 
industrial metropolis at the turn of the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries.  That part of Antioquia would 
become one of the most densely populated, both rural and urban, parts of the country.  In 1900 it 
was still of no particular economic consequence, and the transportation network underdeveloped.  
Until the 20
th
 century, some Antioqueño peasants could still make a living carrying rich travelers 
in a seat on the peasant‟s back, many of the precipices being daunting even for burros.  The total 
population of Colombia has increased ten-fold in the last century and unlike the majority of Latin 
American countries, Colombia boasts several cities of over a million inhabitants.  It seems that 
urban life presents an inconsistency between the geography of 1900 and that of 2000.  However, 
a consistency may exist as well.  Although the country has developed an urban life of the most 
cosmopolitan stripe, the move to cities has left some formerly populated areas less populated.  
Other formerly inaccessible areas have opened for colonization.  So, while we can safely say that 
Colombia today has an urban character that it did not have a century ago, we can also say that, 
just as it did a century ago, Colombia has a rural character. 
The history of FARC success between 1980 and 2000 exposes the value of a theoretical 
distinction between rural and urban, as flexible as those terms might seem.  Figure 16 is a pair of 
visualizations of georeferenced data from the Colombian national geographic institute that shows 
spatial distribution of the Colombian rural population in 1993 and 2013.  The underlying census 
data is somewhat inconsistent as to collection method in those two years, but generally reflects 
persons living in areas within a county but outside the county seat as opposed to within the 
county seat.  The county seats, however small, were urban by definition. 
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Figure 16: Rural population in 1993 (left) and in 2013. (SIGOT 2013)  The Colombian statistical agency, for the 
purpose of these spatial representations, defined rural population as that population living within a county, but 
living outside the county seat or main urban center.  Thus, some counties with high total populations and a large 
urban center will show a high rural population.  The color ramp shows higher totals of rural population in darkest 
red and the lowest total of rural population in darkest green.  The significance of these two maps is the not in the 
totals, but rather in the change in rural populations of counties over twenty years.  A few of the most conflictive 
areas have experienced changes in total rural populations, such as the Paramillo area of Antioquia or the El 
Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander.  The change has gone in both directions, however, while many conflictive 
areas have been demographically stable.  Some researchers are challenging the statistical definition of rural, 
seeking a better use of the concept. (See Figure 17). 
In Colombia, the distribution of rural population is higher than one hundred persons per 
square kilometer in some areas of the country and less than one person per square kilometer in 
others. (IGAC 2002, p 199).  The two decades between 1980 and 2000 were growth decades for 
the FARC, which quadrupled its foot strength and increased its financial power almost 
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immeasurably during the same period in which the previously dominant M19 guerrillas 
disappeared. (Safford and Palacios 2002, p. 362). 
The boost afforded to the FARC‟s financial portfolio by the cocaine industry came during 
the decade that the greater global geopolitical environment was absorbing a sea change.  At the 
end of its 1980s decline, the Soviet Union abruptly ceased to support Cuba economically, and 
with Cuba thus unsupported, the FARC also was, if to a lesser degree, left unsupported.  
Providentially for the Colombian drug trade (and especially coca cultivation within Colombian 
territory); the United States succeeded in suppressing coca cultivation in Peru, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia, the principal source countries at the time.  As a result, cultivation in Colombia boomed 
at about the same time that the Soviet Union was disappearing, the Cold War coming to an end 
and support to many revolutionaries with it.  The FARC had developed its sanctuaries in rural 
areas, however, especially to the east and south of the eastern mountain range.  When the 
cultivation of coca appeared in those regions, the FARC already existed as the best-organized, 
best-armed and most disciplined organization in the area.  The solution to FARC logistics 
problems all but fell into its lap.  Urban drug lords sought to expand production in the eastern 
jungle plains.  They were met by demands from an organization whose leaders and followers 
were familiar with the terrain, inured to walking long distances, and as ruthless as the drug lords 
were. 
The other direction from east to west mirrored, in a way, the experience of the drug lords 
with the FARC.  As the FARC tried to recruit young urban males from peripheral communities, 
around Medellín for instance, FARC leaders met the inverse experience.  Urban youth saw no 
attraction in walking long distances in the mountains.  They were used to concealable weapons 
and motors.  Revolutionary jargon only seemed to work if tied to hip-hop, and for the hidebound 
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leadership of the FARC, that was a difficult psychological reach.  The FARC was born as a rural 
insurgency when Colombia was beginning its rapid urbanization.  The country would move from 
fifty percent urban to perhaps eighty-five percent urban depending on the definitions.  Whatever 
the definition, the FARC did not adapt to urban terrain.  All of Colombia‟s internal wars had 
been rural in that they centered on rural lines of communication and rural sanctuaries.  Today, so 
much of the population lives in cities; it may be that the expansion of the built environment 
simply left the FARC in the jungle.  Nevertheless, the rural experience of the FARC still matches 
Colombia‟s rural character. 
When people stand at the corner of Junín and La Playa streets, in the shadow of the iconic 
Coltejer building, they know they are in urban space, at an urban place.  Twenty miles west in 
Ebéjico, save for that town‟s headlong rush to embrace tourism, people know they are in a rural 
area.  In between what downtown Medellín and a side street in Ebéjico are like, there is a good 
deal of space for argument about what the words urban and rural mean.  The FARC is a rural 
guerrilla, and that classification is helpful to understand why it has had relative longevity 
compared to other Colombian insurgent organizations and why it maintains presence and 
strength where it does today.  The FARC was able to enter Medellín, and at least vie for 
influence in the peripheral zones of that city because it could maintain presence in rural areas 
located only a cannon shot outside the city. 
Urban must mean more than a relatively greater density of buildings and people.  It also 
means sharing services such as a power source, entertainment, potable water, or a sewer system.  
Some would say that a restaurant is the beginning of urban life, while others might say it is a 
church of some kind.  Advancement in technology and levels of urbanness seem correlated.  The 
result of all these things is a cultural distinction, and while the details of urban as compared to 
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rural cultures are material for endless narrative, at least there appears to be a strong consensus 
that a difference exists, that people from Holton, Kansas (population 3,322) enjoy a more rural 
culture than do the people in Manhattan (New York).  In Colombia, perhaps as elsewhere in the 
world, urban dwellers find communal and socialist solutions to basic needs more palpable and 
logical.  Community land-use is a necessity and of obvious material advantage.  In rural 
Colombia, the basket of ownership rights tends to shift toward the family and away from 
government.  Therein lies a long-term intellectual conundrum for an organization like the FARC.  
Much of its intellectual support comes from the cities and the cosmopolitan minds they have 
produced.  Meanwhile, the FARC attempts projects of social ownership in rural places, but much 
of rural Colombia questions communal solutions, especially if the projects are not genuinely 
autochthonous.  In other locales, communal organizations already stake claim to control over the 
basket of land rights. 
Maybe eighty-five percent of Colombians live in cities of over fifty thousand people, 
most of which have centralized sewer systems.  Where rural and urban begin and end in 
Colombia are academic curiosities and matters of self-identity.  If a person rides a chiva (a 
colorful bus-like truck conversion with a wooden cabin, no doors and pithy sayings on the 
bumpers) as an economic necessity, he or she probably calls the chiva a misto (mostly urbanites 
and tourists call it a chiva).  The Colombian who unwittingly calls a chiva a misto is probably a 
rural Colombian, whether self-identification or democratic vote is the adjudicating criterion.  The 
geographic extents within which chivas roll as mistos has been shrinking because suburban areas 
have reached out, roads have improved (allowing lighter-framed buses), and fewer people live in 
some of the more remote areas.  In those parts of Colombia where most regular riders call the 
bus a misto, they have probably also ridden a lot of mules. (Fernández, 2008) 
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A „demobilized‟ FARC guerrilla leader related to me that in his block (a regional 
guerrilla unit), mules were an integral part of logistics and operational movement.  For years, it 
was puzzling and reassuring to the guerrillas that the Colombian army disdained the use of 
bestias (beasts).  The guerrillas, meanwhile, maintained sizeable units dedicated to animal 
husbandry and pack loading.  The mule provided a means to transport water or mortar 
components too heavy for the individual guerrilla fighters.  They also changed the formula of 
speed and distance when the government units were pursuing them in rough terrain.  The mule 
was a significant element in the tactical math of creating advantage in aggregate culminating 
points.  The landmine was extremely influential to this same end, but mule handling was also a 
technology that gave the guerrilla an ability to gain separation from pursuing army units.  
Landmines shortened the risk distances of army units in contact while mules lengthened the risk 
distances of the guerrillas.  A simplification to be sure, but in general this formula worked 
hundreds of times over. 
The rider of a mule is probably rural, but might or might not be a campesino.  This term, 
often translated as peasant, is central to political argument in Colombia today.  I am aware of no 
good map of where someone is or is not a campesino, and no test even as haphazard as what 
might suffice for the word rural.  Nevertheless, a number of organizations, central among them 
the FARC and its sister the ELN, claim to represent campesinos, and would be their exclusive 
agents.  Within other Colombian constituencies, a quantity of thought exists (perhaps unevenly 
distributed and of intermittent flow) holding that campesino, as a collective concept, is a 
phenomenon to be preserved as a matter of national cultural identity.  For some Colombians, and 
apparently for a considerable community of foreigners interested in Colombia, campesino is a 
presumptively admirable category of human.  According to this view, the campesino has a 
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deeply rooted identity that is inherently worthy of preservation.  The campesino lives and 
represents a kind of environmental sustainability, purity of ethic and so on.  As a political entity, 
Colombians regard the campesino as an underdog who must be organized and represented by 
some person or group of persons better equipped to confront the vicissitudes and travesties of a 
materially more powerful and morally more corrupt system.  The FARC leaders are not the only 
ones who would supply that leadership.  The Ministry of Agriculture also vies in the contest to 
represent the campesino, as do organizations of large landowners and many disparate elements of 
civil society. 
Cities seem to be where insurgencies go to die, and so it is no wonder that the FARC 
opted for surrounding them and extorting power, rather than trying to build physical sanctuaries 
within them.  It is difficult for an outlaw organization to control anonymity in a city.  The urban 
dweller has too many opportunities to anonymously report information to authorities, and the 
authorities have too many opportunities to plant things and people within an urban insurgent 
organization.  This depends, however, on how the insurgent uses city terrain, and on timing.  In 
Colombia‟s cities, the FARC encountered criminal organizations already in control of key 
neighborhoods and key smuggling routes.  The gangs controlled anonymity, kept secrets well, 
and used selective violence to maintain territorial control.  Urban gangs are more accostomed to 
the speeds, technologies, timing and pitfalls of urban life.  The FARC found it difficult to 
dominate the drug gangs inside urban space. 
“The mass movement of Colombia‟s poor helped boost agricultural productivity, to 
improve living standards in areas the migrants left, and even to transform the landscape.”  
(Palacios and Safford 1995, p. 223).  This statement sets awkwardly against the popularly 
repeated assertion that what is wrong with Colombia, and a base cause of the conflict, is a 
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disparity in the ownership of agriculturally productive land.  Such an argument should at least be 
made to shoulder the requirement of additional evidence.  In Colombia, mass movement to the 
cities after WWII coincided with the inception of the pre-FARC communist guerrillas and has 
run its course during the FARC‟s institutional lifetime.  If only two phenomena were present in 
the Colombian world -- increase in FARC power and urbanization -- the two would show a 
positive correlation.  It may be that the movement of population away from some rural areas 
lessened local institutional and individual resistance to FARC presence.  Perhaps the violence 
perpetrated by the FARC, by those opposing the FARC, or simply by the violent interplay, 
accelerated the exodus from some rural areas.  Increase in FARC power accelerated an already 
rapid evacuation of already isolated areas.  Most of the remote places I chose for discussion from 
this research have lost population in recent years even as the country as a whole showed a 
population increase.  In 1905, Colombia had over four and a half million inhabitants; in 1951 
about eleven and a half million; in 1973 almost twenty-one million; in 1985 (by which time the 
FARC was rapidly increasing its power because of the cocaine industry) the country had almost 
twenty-eight million people.  By 1993 over thirty-three million and now, twenty years later, 
Colombia has about forty-five million citizens. (Caracol 2012). 
The most significant relationship between Colombian urbanization and the FARC‟s 
power prospects may be as follows: Urbanization took the society and most of Colombian space 
further and further away from any conditions that would favor the FARC‟s being able to enjoy 
impunity, gain military initiative and achieve victory via the use of force.  Political power might 
grow out the barrel of a gun, but it is a lot harder to change political power by force when 
geography and technological advancements increasingly favor the side that is in pursuit of a 
weaker foe. 
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Not all of the change brought by urbanization redounds against the rural guerrillas.  The 
total expanse of rural territory in Colombia available for economic activity has been increasing to 
the extent that jungle areas have been cleared for coca production.  This may be even truer of oil 
producing areas, observing the network of legally and centrally planned roads that have 
developed in them.  As an aside, Casanare, source of most of the current oil production increase, 
is savanna, not humid canopy jungle.  Many Colombians see the jungle areas of southeastern 
Colombia as preservation areas for species diversity and wild nature.  The coca industry might be 
more destructive of the Colombian jungle ecosystem than the oil industry is of the savanna, 
although guerrilla attacks on Colombia‟s oil and gas pipeline infrastructure have caused great 
harm. (Márquez 2004; Arredondo and Fraud 2004; Palacios 2012). 
Figure 17 is from a study asserting that a third of Colombians still live a rural life in 
counties that make up almost 95% of the surface area.  The study is the subject of the first of 
nine essays that follow the overall title theme, “The distressing geography of the countryside.”  
(La Silla Vacia 2011).  The authors state and depict in maps that the country is rural, that rural 
correlates to low indices of material wellbeing, and that the violence is rural.  Together the 
essays imply that the lack of material well-being causes the violence.  The spatial evidence as 
indicated on the maps is more ambiguous, however.   For instance, in the same La Silla Vaca 
presentation is a map of the Human Development Index by counties (Figure 18).  Note that the 
counties in Arauca or in Putumayo, or in the eastern part of Valle del Cauca Department near the 
Nevado del Huila are high on the index, whereas other conflictive zones appear to be low on the 
index. 
91 
 
 
Figure 17: Rural and less rural counties. (La Silla Vacia 2011) Darker is less rural and lighter is more rural.  According 
to these researchers, the standard government statistics (and therefore the spatial description that those statistics  
generate) understate the rural stamp of the country.  The researchers included a set of ‘lifeways’ factors to better 
describe, in their opinions, the percentage of Colombians that lead a ‘rural’ life.  Under both the government 
definitions and this more complex methodology, the most contested territory in Colombia today is rural. 
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Figure 18: Indice de Desarrollo Humano Ajustado (Adjusted Human Development Index).  It was not clear to me 
from the article how the index was ‘adjusted’.  In any case, this map does not support a premise that the violence 
is caused in some way by socio-economic performance, as the spatial representation does not even present a clear 
correlation  of violence to human development as defined by the indexers. (La Silla Vacia 2011). 
 Likewise, the La Silla Vaca presentation includes a map showing land ownership 
concentration.  The researchers suggest in their text a causal relationship between the conflict 
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and an over-concentration in ownership of rural land.  At least they suggest a causal relationship 
between over-concentration and quality of life, which in turn, they argue, has a causal 
relationship to the conflict.  Their map, however, does not, appear even to offer a strong 
correlation of these variable. 
I believe there exists a correlation between ruralness (almost irrespective of the 
definition) and the spatial concentration of the conflict.  However, there have also been urban 
battles and extreme organized urban violence.  The battle for Comuna 13 in Medellín is the 
example I use later in this text.  The challenge facing the FARC in Colombia‟s urban geography 
includes but goes beyond decadal demographic shifts and simple scale.  Certain operational 
aspects associated with criminal necessities and behaviors within the cities made them 
increasingly difficult for the FARC to take, as it might take some rural town.  Once the FARC‟s 
logistical strength was no longer in ascendance, the possibility of surrounding and taking a city 
from the outside-in had evaporated.  The rural areas that are today the most hotly contested by 
organized armed groups are located against the international borders, or (now to a lesser degree) 
along other escape routes to guerrilla or gangster sanctuaries within the country.   
Some observers will suggest that social resistance to the mainstream political structure -- 
a resistance that is indeed present in some rural and urban communities -- is due to a lack of 
public or government services.  Some, including the La Silla Vaca researchers, may tend to 
conflate the provision of government services with material prosperity.  Social resistance in 
Colombia, however, is often rooted in generational political affinities within a community, that 
resistance predating the colonization of economically remote areas.  Some colonizers were 
themselves part of an escape from pursuing forces and authorities.  Some of these fugitive 
communities, tied perhaps to decades-old sectarian violence or associated with one or more of 
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the various guerrilla movements, have, after moving to the economically remotest areas of 
Colombia, demanded public services from the system they resist, arguing that the lack of those 
services is the reason for their disaffection. 
 
Ecological harm as a discontinuity 
Unintended and harmful affronts to the surrounding environment are greater now than in 
the past.  (Arredondo and Díaz 2004; Márquez 2004) While the most obvious reason for this is a 
greater population (45 million today as compared to 5 million in 1900), the difference is also due 
to the kinds of commodities that are the subject of parasitic behavior and illicit industry.  The 
idea that South American jungle soils are poor is difficult to accept in view of the dense jungle 
vegetation, and the success of coca plantations that have been carved out of the dense vegetation.  
It seems more reasonable to assert that the soil is poor as a base for certain flora and not other.  
Coca crops do well.  Unfortunately, those crops quickly deteriorate nearby ecosystems, as do the 
clearing patterns that precede them and counternarcotics activities in reaction to them.  The 
callous dispersal of precursor chemicals alone has caused tremendous disruption to existing 
species of fauna and flora.  In the north of Colombia, meanwhile, attacks on oil pipelines have 
caused oil spillages greater than that of the Exxon Valdez. (Cárdenas and Rodríguez 2004)  
Moreover, the movement of illicit farm labor populations has changed the ecology of some areas, 
including vast swaths of Putumayo and Guaviare.  Assertions that illicit agriculture causes the 
environment to be less „natural‟ than before may be subject to valid argument, but that 
agriculture has undeniably changed huge swaths of territory in Colombia in a way that supports 
fewer species accelerates erosion processes.  The changes that have occurred in Colombia‟s 
jungle regions are at a larger scale than what we can associate with former spasms of Colombian 
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internal violence.  In this sense, Colombia has been witness to some of the hemisphere‟s most 
egregious ecological disasters of the past half century, directly and indirectly, because of the 
internal war.  This ecological stress can be greatly blamed on decisions made by leaders of the 
FARC and the ELN. (Nagle 2004). 
Another area of stressed environment, perhaps less dramatic, involves Colombian cattle.  
The FARC has become not only the largest coca cartel, it apparently has become one of the 
largest cattle ranchers, having converted thousands of acres of smaller agricultural holdings into 
vast cattle producing areas.  (This, by the way, is a current accusation, the exact geographical 
boundaries of which are yet to be exposed.)  Perhaps what the FARC will accept at the 
negotiating table will have a lot to do geographically with cattle ranching, coca production, or 
gold mining.  In such areas, we are likely to witness forms of communal agriculture or mining 
that may later draw scrutiny as agro-industry and mineral exploitation.  Furthermore, if the 
FARC leaders can extort some sort of land concession, they could be the last to adhere to 
government ecological protection regulations. 
Some in Colombia, with reason I think, fear that the peace process can only proceed if 
something of value is offered to the FARC, and in Colombia that something of value always 
seems to be real estate, whether it is agricultural land, a gold mine, a transport hub or even a 
constriction such as a bridge or mountain pass.  How does this compare with the past?  When the 
The War of the Thousand Days ended, the consequences of Liberal defeat included some 
expropriation and punitive taxation of Liberal landholdings.  However, Colombia‟s physical 
internal remoteness, that is, the great travel distances between regions, did not improve.  In fact, 
the war retarded the growth of a communications network that might have allowed 
Conservatives to translate their victory into centralized power.  Except for the rich, most of 
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Colombia would remain isolated, giving the anti-federalist argument a permanent leg-up.  At the 
end of WWI, in 1919, two groups of entrepreneurs vied to build an airline to link Bogotá, the 
burgeoning new city of Medellín, and the coast. (Semana 2004, p. 163).  When the dust settled, 
the Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transporte Aéreo (Colombo-German Air Transport 
Corporation), SCADTA (what would ultimately become AVIANCA) had established the first 
economically viable air routes.  The airplane reduced travel time for the well-heeled from Bogotá 
to the coast from days to hours.  Unfortunately for the Antioqueños, they had selected French 
Farma biplanes made of wood and fabric, while their rivals had chosen metal German Junkers.  
The Farmas immediately took themselves out of contention against the mountainsides.  For a 
long time in Colombia, the selection of the right technologies by small groups of persons has 
given them a competitive advantage over their rivals.  As often as not, the technologies‟ purposes 
were to overcome distance. 
 
World events as discontinuity 
 World events had only minor impact on the internal violence in 1900 Colombia.  
President Theodore Roosevelt‟s geostrategic appetite weighed on the fate of the Panamanian 
Isthmus, and undoubtedly the volatile market for coffee generated economic stress, but the 
internal violence of the end of the 19
th
 century can be described as one of federalism anti-
federalism conflict within Colombia.  Flags were drawn around loyalties to local dons and the 
loyalty of the dons to one of two political parties.  Some international intervention came from 
Venezuela, but hardly any from the rest of the world.  While there exist hundreds of titles in the 
English language about the Boer War, there are almost none about the War of the Thousand 
Days.  No one outside of Colombia (at least in the English-speaking world) paid much attention, 
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in part because of the contemporaneous Boer War.  The Violencia of the 1950s continued that 
pattern, with the two principal parties setting the competitive poles.  To resolve that conflict, the 
contending Liberal and Conservative parties came together to form what Colombians call the 
United Front.  It was a concert within the same ruling elite, and as such presented a unified 
ideological target for the radical left.  In the context of the Cold War, the armed left was then 
able to attract international sponsors while creating parallel, autochthonous enthusiasms. 
The two traditional parties are nothing like what they had been, organizationally or 
ideologically, when the current warfare between the FARC and the government began five 
decades ago.  Today, the Colombian elite is more diverse; and the population more urbane as 
well as urban.  The Colombian war changed with the end of the Cold War and especially with 
the rise of Colombian coca cultivation.  Now, globally oriented economically, Colombians see 
their internal war as more connected to the outside than it was in the past.  One of the greatest 
discontinuities, then, between the current war and those of Colombia‟s past, is that now it is tied 
to external as well as internal factors and influences. 
 
Religion, race, and poverty as continuities 
 Racial injustice has existed in Colombia and still does. (Duzán October 2008)  In the 
early 17
th
 century, before colonies in North America could claim a survivable presence in the 
New World, local leaders of some black Pijao and other groups rose against the Spanish 
colonizers.  Most failed (fatally), but others succeeded. (Semana 2004, p. 33)  In the past two 
hundred years, however, violence organized on the basis of race has been rare.  It may be that the 
costs of conflict fall more heavily on black communities spatially, but this remains unproven.  
The leftist revolutionary movements had not until recently made racial grievance an appreciable 
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part of their overall argument in Colombia, and I have seen no evidence in the literature that 
there is a differential in skin color distribution between any of the violent armed groups and 
government forces. 
 Similarly, religion now plays only a vestigial and indirect role.  Colombians rarely 
mention religious differences as an aspect of the supposed culture of violence.  Religion is 
almost a non-factor as an impulse for Colombia‟s internal struggles, although it is notable that 
the leftist movements latched on to Liberation Theology as a vehicle for making inroads into the 
influence of the formal Catholic hierarchy and for using Christian beliefs in support of socialist 
arguments.  To some degree, the leftist proposition is anti-Catholic, just as the Liberal 
proposition had been, to a lesser degree, anti-clerical.  The Colombian army, meanwhile, has 
been a bastion of traditional Catholicism.  In a sense, then, Colombians continue to fight the 
Spanish Civil War, which featured a significant Catholic–anti-Catholic dimension.  Nevertheless, 
while the same formula attaches to the conflict in Colombia, it is superficial and constantly 
diminishing.  The FARC commanders do not stress atheism as an element of indoctrination, 
preferring to avoid the issue of religion before offending their membership. 
Claims of class-based warfare are felt strongly enough by some Colombians that they at 
times prove themselves, but the demographics and ideologies of the contenders often belie those 
claims.  Colombians fight over the control of desirable/saleable commodities, where they come 
from, how to move them and who gets to tax the enterprise.  Resentment exists toward what 
some perceive as an arrogant and self-serving elite, but whether such resentment is greater by 
degree than elsewhere in the world would be speculation.  Perhaps a definable set of prominent 
families has been able to dominate electoral politics, and perhaps a large number, even a great 
majority of Colombian souls identify against these elites to some degree or another, even if they 
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do not subscribe to a progressive party or think themselves part of a proletariat.  Nevertheless, a 
look at the spatial distribution of misery in Colombia -- comparing the performance of localities 
(relative to the general performance of the country) to the incidence of organized violence -- has 
not presented strong correlations.  Colombians take for granted that illegal armed groups can and 
do recruit the bulk of their foot soldiers from poor communities.  Several government officials 
have asserted to me that poor rural counties have been the source ground of recruits for rural 
guerrilla organizations, including today‟s FARC and ELN, the Liberal and Conservative 
Guerrillas of the Violencia of the 50s, or the Liberal and Conservative guerrillas of 1900).  
However, the Colombian Army also recruits from many of the same rural poor counties, or from 
counties with nearly identical socio-economic profiles.  Add to this the observation that the 
current war has not directly affected many dozens of poor rural counties in Colombia, whether or 
not they were venues of violence in the 1950s, and whether or not they are recruiting sources.  I 
think it will be wiser for an overall understanding of the Colombian conflict to look beyond 
sociological and political-philosophical ingredients, not rejecting them, but remaining unsatisfied 
by them.  On inspection of the geographic evidence, I think they tell us neither why Colombians 
fight, why they do not, nor where. 
For instance, Colombian researchers have not clearly correlated counties suffering forced 
displacement of persons from their homes with counties that suffer economic disadvantage. 
(Gardeazábal 2002; Marquez 2004, p. 25; Acción Social 2010).  The violence apparently does 
not correlate to varying types of land tenancy, either. (see Figure 14, p. 76)  It is within this 
unsatisfying sea of contradictory or unsubstantiated causal assertions that this dissertation 
advances.  The principal researchers responsible for the landmark study Dinámica espacial de 
las muertes violentas en Colombia 1990-2005 (Spatial Dynamics of Violent Deaths in Colombia 
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1990-2005) highlight for reconsideration two common causal notions, one of which I mentioned 
earlier.  One is related to poverty and the other to the cultural tendency toward violence.  The 
comments of the investigators: 
“One commonplace public thought is that the violence is a generalized conduct 
that has registered a long continuity in the country, to the point that it becomes 
difficult to find a social sphere, geographical place or group of persons that has 
not been affected by it.  As Eduardo Posada Carbó asserts, the nation is submitted 
almost daily to an argument that criminalizes it.  For this author, stereotype is 
recurrent in news media columnists, prestigious intellectuals, and political leaders 
when they use the first person plural -- us -- to refer to the authors of the killings, 
converting all of us into a country of murderers, innate carriers of a malignant 
tradition.”(Echandía, 36) (my translation) 
 The authors of Spatial Dynamics note that the volume and pace of Colombian violence 
shows inconsistencies both in time and space.  The distribution of violence within the country, as 
borne out by spatial analysis, is not homogenous within Colombia.  In fact, there are certain 
groups of counties within the country that show a persistency or reoccurrence of violence far 
greater than the country as a whole.  Many counties have rarely experienced organized violence.  
A factor too often absent from public and academic discussions of victimization in Colombia, 
according to the authors, is its spatial contiguity with organized armed competition.   That 
competition occurs among outlaw groups or between outlaw groups and the government.  The 
authors wonder how it is that this does not appear more often in Colombian analyses, given that 
armed competition seems so obvious a potential contributor to worsening otherwise precarious 
social environments. 
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 The Spatial Dynamics authors highlight the second current of what they consider 
Colombian groupthink by paraphrase, 
“originally there is a provocation to violence which is the consequence of political 
exclusion, poverty and the profound inequalities that constitute the „objective 
causes‟ of the violence, that are exacerbated when the society sees its 
development blocked due to limitations that proceed from the social structures 
themselves, product of relationships based in inequality.” (Echandía, 38) (my 
translation) 
The country is not geographically homogenous as to violence or economic prosperity.  
According to a 2002 study covering 25 years from1975-2000 (Archila N., et al. 2002), there was 
little correlation between poor counties and violence in those counties, but there was some 
correlation between violence and counties that were doing better economically.  While the notion 
of poverty causation has had great public acceptance and has greatly influenced Colombian 
politics, the empirical evidence supporting it is as difficult to interpret as it is scarce.  In fact, the 
spatial data shows almost the opposite -- that many counties with the worst performance in terms 
of unsatisfied basic needs are over time often the most peaceful, while those counties showing 
relatively positive material performance are often the most violent.  Similar correlations have 
been observed by others. (Echandía 2008, pp. 38, 47)  There are ways to explain it away, perhaps 
noting that the participants in the violence are motivated by poverty, either their own or that of 
their fellow man, and their violent expression simply occurs where there is evident material 
wealth.  An attractive logic, it is only poorly borne out by the spatial correlations.  Many 
Colombians have opined to me that while the FARC and ELN have successfully recruited young 
men from poor rural zones, so has the Colombian army, and so has industry. 
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A Colombian Liberal would, historically, all else remaining the same, be likely to reject 
the central authority of Bogotá, the central government being more often than not Conservative 
and closely tied to the Catholic church.  It is to be expected, and the maps of electoral choices by 
county seem to confirm, that centers of Liberal political preference could easily be remote 
counties.  The Liberal place, from appearances, could very well be a remote place.  Many of the 
leaders of Liberal guerrilla remnants of the Violencia of the 1950s had not received Hegelian 
centralist philosophies, right or left, with enthusiasm.  So it was that the Liberal guerrillas and 
the budding Marxists suffered a falling out in Tolima.  The residue of that conflict is 
understandable.  While Liberal colonos (pioneers) might have gone to remote areas out of 
distaste for the central government, or more likely to escape local Conservative persecutions 
elsewhere, they were still part of the system.  The new communist leaders had a taste for central 
government, and were in the remote areas because the central places were not yet theirs.  The 
FARC‟s reasons for being in remote areas and the Liberals‟ reasons both involved survival, but 
their philosophical overlap was only partial at best.  They Liberals did not place themselves in 
remote Colombia as a phase of preparation for some sort of counterattack.  The communist 
guerrillas, however, soon made it their business to be from the remote areas, not just in them. 
 While some clear spatial differentials in social phenomena (such as material well-being) 
can be shown spatially (usually by county), the statistics that produce these spatial differentials 
are rarely drawn from or regarding the same individuals over time, especially in those counties 
that are most relevant to this study.  Internal population displacement, both due to pressures from 
violence and to more peaceful motivations, confounds the longitudinal value of the data.  
Colombia would display a highly mobile population in the absence of internal conflict.  In 
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addition, there are many locales in Colombia, rich and poor, that have experienced almost no 
organized violence, inviting the speculation that other factors are more significant. 
 
Military technology as discontinuity 
 In the context of organized Colombian violence, technology has worked to increase and 
to decrease distances to the pursuers‟ culminating points.  The balance of the two effects has 
changed over time.  An increase in air mobility assets, for instance, can help those in pursuit 
escape many of the challenges presented to them by broken terrain.  The helicopter can extend 
distances to pursuers‟ culminating points.  It is only since the acceleration of Plan Colomboia in 
the early 2000s that the Colombian Army had sufficiently capable models in sufficient numbers 
to influence combat outcomes in the war.  On the other hand, a fugitive force can use the 
landmine to decrease distance to a pursuer‟s culminating point.  When the pre-FARC communist 
guerrillas eluded the oncoming units of the Colombian Army to escape Marquetalia in the early 
1960s, the landmine was a novel item, and the artisanal processes used to make landmines were 
extremely dangerous.  Alias „Richard‟, an early guerrilla peer of Pedro Marín and for a short 
time the chief of the guerrilla band at El Pato, blew himself up while making landmines.  By the 
1980s, however, the FARC had adjusted landmine designs in order to produce the munitions 
locally in great numbers.  The FARC tested input materials that could be easily smuggled and 
distributed, would withstand environmental degradation and would have a reliable effect.  The 
FARC bred what some continue to call the „improvised explosive device‟ into a sophisticated 
armament.  FARC leaders recognized that the cottage industry landmine would augment the 
advantage that mountainous up-sloping terrain gave to the guerrilla. 
104 
 
Mass arrival of the helicopter is the most significant technological change favoring the 
government forces, although other technologies (notably remote sensing) have had a similar 
effect on government risk distances.  The landmine is the most significant technological 
discontinuity favoring anti-government forces, but the FARC exploited other technologies 
specifically to extend distances to their own culminating points.  The FARC used mules, donkeys 
and horses to this end.  In a sense, the mule, helicopter, landmine and remote sensing can be 
considered to have had the same effect. They each changed the differential in risk distances 
between one rival and the other during movement. 
 
Smuggling as continuity 
 Some places in Colombia, for instance the northern counties of Cauca Department, the 
Socorro area of Santander del Norte, the northern portion of the Medio Magdalena (middle 
reaches of the Magdalena River valley), to name a few, are constant focal points for violence.  
They are all either strategic communications nodes contested as such, or constitute escape 
geography where the fugitive force can gain a risk distance advantage over its chasing foe.  
Some areas of Colombia (many counties) have not seen violence in recent decades.  It seems this 
is because they do not provide escape advantage, usually because they are not on the way to a 
sanctuary, nor are they on the way to or from a valuable commodity. 
In the above discussion of continuities and discontinuities, I asserted that coveted 
geographies or the shifting of the locations of marketable commodities and their transportation 
routes and labor sources were a singularly important factor in Colombia‟s violence, especially as 
to where violence and its costs are to be borne and can be mapped.  I highlight the FARC in this 
dissertation, because while it is one of many insurgent organizations to appear in Colombia, it 
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has had the most success.  That success can be credited more-or-less to five factors -- military 
acumen of its leaders, financing, legitimacy, international support, and luck.  Legitimacy is not a 
central concern of this research.  As an abstraction often discussed in relation to insurgent social 
conflict it can mean popularity or public acceptance; or it can mean ideological purity or moral 
turpitude or any of these things as interpreted and influenced by the others.  As a shorthand for 
all of the public psychologies that relate to the FARC, I believe, as do many, that the FARC 
enjoyed a great deal more of the quantity in the past than they do today, and that the quantity of 
legitimacy enjoyed or generated by the FARC diminished in positive correlation with its 
continuously more successful methods of financing.  At first through taking villages, robbing 
banks and kidnapping rich people as did the old bandoleros, the FARC‟s reputation could grow 
on a Robin Hood thematic.  Alfredo Molano, a well-known FARC apologist, states, 
“The guerrillas' rapprochement with coca also led to the belief that they are 
traffickers-narcoguerrillas. That notion is false, however. Cultivation of illegal 
crops was established in the colonization areas not simply because of weak army 
presence, but because the colonists were on the brink of ruin. And the guerrillas 
were in the colonized regions long before coca cultivation appeared.  Their 
growth was due mainly to the repression unleashed against popular protest, and 
by the growing impoverishment of the population - not to their participation in the 
drug trade.” (Molano, September 2000) 
FARC targeting dipped deeper into the middle class as its kidnapping became routine.  Public 
tolerance toward the FARC diminished somewhat as a result.  It was not, however, until the 
rising curve of FARC logistic requirements crossed the abruptly diminishing curve of material 
support from a dying Soviet empire that FARC leaders made their Faustian bargain regarding the 
106 
 
drug trade.  The FARC controlled remote territories, many of which were perfect for the 
cultivation and smuggling of coca.  American counternarcotics successes in Peru and Bolivia 
were pushing the industry into Colombia, while American collaboration with the government of 
Colombia was placing greater stress on the illicit drug entrepreneurs to make new alliances for 
protection and international connections. (Thoumi 2002).  Figures 89, 103, and 123 are 
photographs of the 1:500,000 Colombia wall map (Figure 4) with a plastic overlay from 2000 
that the author obtained.  That overlay was perhaps the most explicit American assertion 
regarding the extent of illicit crop cultivation in Colombia at the time.  The process involved in 
its production was called „blobology‟ after the shapes formed on the coca cultivation overlays.  
Competition over various data collection methods, including remote sensing, on-the-ground 
agricultural censuses, and expert opinion (especially from law enforcement officials), generated 
some beaurocratic friction.  The blobological maps might relect some level of compromise 
among various counternarcotics offices, including those of the United States, the United Nations, 
and the Colombian government.  The overlay I use here was derived from the same collection 
sources as the map offered in the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP, 
2000 report. (Figure 11).  The 2000 overlay and the ONDCP map indicate that circa 2000, at the 
height of the peace talks between the Colombian government and the FARC, coca cultivation 
was just accelerating in the center of the Despeje while the latter enjoyed unfettered control.  
Despeje translates literally as clearance.  In Colombia, it now means a huge territory from which 
the government removed all of its armed forces including police in the 
Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare area. 
Coca cultivation was also accelerating in the Catatumbo, Southern Bolivar (Sierra San 
Lucas) and Arauca areas, all controlled by the guerrillas or paramilitaries.  The total acreage 
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under coca cultivation had more than doubled in fewer than five years.  The only large growing 
areas where the cultivation acreage did not increase was in eastern Caquetá and Guaviare -- 
decreases that can be credited directly to the successful government reaction to the FARC 
occupation of Mitú and of Operation Gato Negro, discussed later in this dissertation.  In 
summary, in areas with significant presence of the FARC or its allies, especially in the Despeje 
and along the borders with Venezuela and Ecuador, the coca crop appeared or increased.  Where 
the Colombian military had enjoyed some military successes against the FARC along the river 
extraction routes, the coca cultivation acreage diminished.  The spatial record (as with all other 
evidence) shows the presence of the FARC to have been intimately correlated to the cocaine 
business.  All evidence also shows that the FARC became spectacularly wealthy as commodity 
industrialists. 
 Terrain ruggedness has been shown to correlate spatially with violence in Colombia 
(Fowler, 2012, p. 146), but it is an imperfect correlation.  Colombia‟s international borders also 
correlate spatially to organized violence, the borders only intermittently drawn along rugged 
terrain.  However, for guerrillas and smugglers to survive, they must seek geographical contexts 
likely to favor them as to the immediate balance of power as they escape to sanctuary.  Terrain 
ruggedness contributes to change that balances in favor of the fugitive in almost the same way as 
an international boundary or jungle expanse.  Meanwhile, a community located along a route of 
recurrent escape and pursuit may display an absence of government services relative to more 
centralized, more urbanized communities.  The same community may also evidence relative 
material under-performance.  A mountain community‟s relative material poverty might be 
related to the rugged terrain in which it finds itself; the quotidian economic cost distances might 
be substantially greater than in less peripheral urban areas.  Two effects of rugged terrain -- 
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relative material impoverishment of the local community and tactical assistance to fugitives -- 
may occur in the same mountainous counties, but that coincidence of effects hardly argues that 
the former causes the latter.  I believe this dissertation makes a compelling argument that certain 
geographical phenomena, plentiful in Colombia, have served to prolong the armed conflict, not 
because of the influence of those geographical phenomena on socio-economic performance, but 
almost entirely due to their direct effect on armed competitive outcomes. 
 
Geography versus democracy versus demography 
 I will take some liberty here in defining a selection of political philosophical outlooks or 
categories of political mind-sets.  Their definition is not the purpose of the research, and not a 
centrally important element of its design or result.  They should, however, facilitate explanation 
of the dissertation‟s theory regarding distance.  If we could map that space in the ideological 
firmament where anarchism and libertarianism range, the resulting image might be finely parsed, 
irregular, with overlapping territories of thought, and the map quickly would obsolesce.  A Venn 
diagram of anarchism, libertarianism, and individualism would show considerable overlap, with 
violence but a sliver of the whole.  Because there are and have been violent „propagandists of the 
deed‟ who call themselves anarchists and because that kind of anarchist is a staple character in 
irregular wars, violent anarchism tends to become conflated with its more peaceful shades, 
tainting anyone who would advertise themselves as an anarchist.  In Colombia few admit to 
anarchy and, as in other parts of the world, we can assume that an anarchist would find common 
ground with a Marxist while sharing their struggle against the structure.  Once the time came to 
take the reins of governance and act as nucleus of the vanguard, however, those of an anarchist 
tilt might not get along well with the Marxist-tending-toward-Communist.  In Colombia, much 
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of the internal dispute about the amount of centralized power versus diffuse power, can be seen 
in the messy internal history of the EPL, one of the revolutionary guerrillas that ultimately turned 
its weapons in and all but threw itself into the dustbin of history. 
As noted earlier, the official, formalized administrative division of Colombian space 
descends in scale from nation to department to county, sometimes with province in between the 
county and the department.  Sometimes the counties form county associations.  Sometimes the 
counties are contiguous with tribal or ethnic boundaries and sometimes not.  The county has 
become the principal statistical container and guide for democratic representation.  Sometimes 
voting and gerrymandering are disputed at the next level down from the county, the veredas.  
Water matters often follow, (due to the extent of watersheds or to the extent of water provision 
districts) the various administrative units just mentioned.  There exist in Colombia a set of 
Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales (autonomous regional corporations, CAR) that are 
established by law, have their own budgets and administrative hierarchy, are organized according 
to environmental regions (large watersheds mostly) and enjoy a mandate to protect the natural 
environment.  In a way they are equivalent to the Environmental Protection Agency.  A national 
requirement holds all counties to produce a land-use plan, which is to be reviewed and approved 
by the respective CSR.  Thus explicit interest in the geography of common effort is generated at 
the county level.  Also, the CAR bureaucrats develop practical professional relationships with 
county officials.  It appears this may be giving a county‟s CAR as much or more political 
influence in that county as has the respective departmental government. 
Many national government distributions, particularly royalties from the hydrocarbon 
industry, go directly to the counties.  How much and to which counties is a matter of central 
government political negotiation and intrigue, which thus fuels interest in the democratic 
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representation.  It also fuels interest in controlling county governments directly, extorting those 
in control of a county government, or creating new counties to control. 
 We are currently witnessing a round of battles to control local governments at the county 
level in the most conflictive regions of the country.  Simultaneously, we see efforts to create new 
forms of communally owned space that will be administratively autonomous from the local 
county government but nevertheless hold dominating political influential in that government.  
The FARC, and a number of proponents that we can fairly characterize as prefering centralized 
land-use problem solving, are promoting entities called the zonas de reservas campesinas 
(peasant reservation zones).  Campesino, and apparently desplazado (internally displaced person) 
and the even more abstract víctima (victim) have in Colombian political Spanish come to replace 
proletariat and worker as the non-geographic collective identities that the radical left argues to 
represent.  A tension exists between participation in the established democratic representation 
scheme and a revindicative collective identity (campesino or peasant in this case).  That tension 
manifests itself within the overlapping challenges of land restitution and the national peace 
process.  Many of the obvious candidates for membership in the above-mentioned but 
geographically undefined collectives (peasants) wish for stronger place-based identities, that is, 
they want to regain or establish new roots and deepen them in a fixed place.  They seek some 
geographic stability.  Because the FARC has a mindset of territorial military strategy, a growing 
precision is revealing itself in its arguments about where the zonas de reservas campesinas 
should be located.  The FARC leaders, as others, wish to assume the role of exclusive agent of 
the otherwise placeless collectives.  The FARC may not call themselves the nucleus of the 
vanguard, but they will wish to retain as many of the reins over the land rights of their peasant 
followers as can be negotiated.  It will not surprise Colombians if the basket of controlling rights 
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gained by the FARC approaches that which the historic hacendados (plantation owners) might 
have held.  Meanwhile, the proposed zonas de reserva campesina almost all seem to be militarily 
favorable, or smuggling-favorable, to the FARC.  The FARC leaders seek to own the best 
geography of impunity. 
The government‟s land restitution programs and projects manifest the dynamic friction 
between place-based and abstract identities, and between free market and collectivized decision-
making.  Parallel to the various government restitution programs are others involving 
commercial efforts to buy nearby agricultural land and move agricultural labor.  It is difficult to 
determine much less describe the exact contents of the basket and distribution of the rights and 
duties that the zonas de reservas campesinas will ultimately entail.  What seems to be afoot is a 
fantastical and complex game of armed land-chess.  Constant, however, is a visible, patent 
coincidence.  The areas in play include the same areas of clandestine transport and escape, and 
especially those leading to or along the national borders.  It may be that the FARC is simply 
attempting to consolidate some political base in the lands where it has longest been present, or it 
may be they cannot discard the urge to build lines of communication to sanctuary, to build 
spaces of impunity.  True anarchists will always favor building spaces of impunity.  They will 
see little reason for the central government to have any local authority at all, but they may not 
abide the building of utopian socialist haciendas.  The true smugglers are always at odds with the 
ideological organizers. 
 The proposed campesino reservations are in every explanation a form of 
communal ownership, perhaps communes, perhaps more like the Mexican agrarian nuclei or like 
Israeli kibbutzim, but for some observers they will most closely approach the ownership model 
of the existing comunidades negras or reservas indígenas.  For some they are just agricultural 
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cooperatives.  To the less enthusiastic they are no better than re-imaged versions of the 1960s 
repúbliquetas independientes of the early FARC and pre-FARC legend. (figures 73, p. 206; 74, 
p. 207)  FARC control over the zonas de reservas campesinas would, to the skeptics, be nothing 
less than victory for the FARC leadership, who according to their own demands at the current 
peace talks in Cuba, place themselves and their lieutenants as exclusive representatives of the 
campesinos.  The definition of „campesino‟ then becomes a rural, agriculturalist Colombian who 
is represented by the FARC.  Figure 15 shows national parks, indigenous reservations, black 
communal lands and an estimate of the proposed extent of the zonas de reservas campesinas 
based on theVelasco rendering . (Figure 21, page 109).  Whether or not the peasant reservation 
proposals are realized, a large, but as yet uncertain portion of Colombia‟s rural land will be 
communally owned in one way or another.  There appears to be a strong correlation between 
counties where peasant reservations are proposed with Colombia‟s habitually conflictive areas.  
A skeptic might conclude that the word campesino means a rural person dependent on a violent 
smuggling organization.  The peasant lives in the best smuggling regions where the terrain and 
international boundaries collude to provide greater impunity to fugitives.  If that skepticism is 
warranted, and peasant reservation zones are in fact only a ploy for territorial control, then the 
peasant reservations project bodes poorly for the lives of rural agriculturalists who find 
themselves labeled campesinos and living in those areas.  According to this view, the FARC is 
purposing peasant reservations zones as geographies for their impunity. 
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Figure 19: Peasant Reservation Zones (Confidential Colombia, August 2013, citing “ANZORC”) The title translates 
to, “Departments with Colombian Peasant Reservation Zones.”  Orange is for departments with zones (ZRC) 
constituted in 2011, green is for those in the process of constitution in 2011, and yellow (Cauca only) is for already 
existing zones.  Counterclockwise from the top left are Montes de Maria; Valle del Rio Cimitarra (southern Bolivar 
and eastern Antioquia); Cauca; El Pato (Caquetá); Calamar (Guaviare); La Lozada-Guayabero (Meta); del Ariari 
Guejar (Meta) Sumapaz (Cundinamarca); Cabrera (Cundinamarca); Sur de Bolivar (Bolivar); Sur de Bolivar (Bolivar); 
and the Catatumbo (Norte de Santander).  Each entry includes participatory counties (municipios) or townships 
(veredas).  They are all in highly conflictive areas.  ANZORC stands for the National Association of Peasant 
Reservation Zones. 
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Figure 20: Peasant Reservation Zones (Caracol July 2013)  The information in this map concords approximately 
with that given by the map in Figure 19.  Notably, this map omits Cauca and the Catatumbo.  This map provides 
additional information on numbers of peasants involved, acerage, and regulatory identification. 
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Figure 21: Peasant Reservation Zones (Velasco June 2013, June 2013b)  Shown by county, this is the most precise 
rendition.  The green-colored counties have zonas constituidas (zones in being); yellow are zonas en trámite (zones 
in bureaucratic processing), and dark red have zonas solicitadas (zones requested or petitioned).  Notable is the 
2013 expansion of this concept in the Catatumbo region. 
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Why is the war? 
“The territorial imperative is as blind as a cave fish, as consuming as a furnace, 
and it commands beyond logic, opposes all reason, suborns all moralities, strives 
for no goal more sublime than survival.” (Ardrey 1966, p. 236). 
 
 I do not know why Colombians are at war with one another, but I suspect Robert Ardrey 
makes a useful observation about human territoriality.  Many factors intervened during a century 
from the time of the War of the Thousand Days to the present to change the spatial distribution 
of violence in Colombia.  Medical advancement against tropical lowland diseases is one, for 
instance.  However, the spatial distribution of organized violence seems mostly to have changed 
in accordance with changes in the spatial distribution of commodities.  Colombians fight over 
things of value.  These are indeed „socio-economic‟ influences, but the term „socio-economic‟ 
like „culture‟, can contain everything and anything.  Socio-economic causation theories have 
been offered to argue or imply that the violence in Colombia is caused by socio-economic 
underperformance or socio-economic egoism -- particularly that egoism inflicted by a strictly 
definable class of oligarchs or plutocrats on larger classes of downtrodden have-nots.  Marxist 
perspectives often inform these viewpoints, mildly or stridently, and the Marxist argument 
generally entails at least a nod to dialectic insistence regarding the history of resistance in 
Colombia.  These perspectives would tie, if only the facts would allow, all of Colombian 
violence to a single historical byline.  While it can hardly be doubted that powerful Colombians 
have dominated less powerful Colombians, I have found little evidence of class warfare in 
Colombia‟s past conflicts.  Admittedly, my Rorschach blotches do not easily show me class 
warfare, but at least in the War of the Thousand Days there is hardly a hint.  There are historical 
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exceptions and it is from the Violencia of the 1950s that the organized armed left emerges.  If, 
however, it were not for the economic possibilities afforded to the guerrillas by a small set of 
commodities and by other geographic factors that favored escapes, the class warfare model 
would be under-represented in Colombia as compared to other countries in the region and the 
world.  Figure 22 displays a curiously exteme statistic.  Apparently, Colombia has a high level of 
human development relative to most other countries suffering internal conflicts, but suffers more 
landmines.  If one were to take this chart as the only data from which to draw a conclusion, that 
conclusion would have to be that scoring higher on the human development index would be a 
dangerous aspiration for a country. 
 
Figure 22: World Human Development Index for 2005 versus number of landmine victims in 2006. (Consejo 
Nacional de Política Económica Y Social, CONEPS 2009) Blue represents a high Human development, green a 
middle level of development and red the lowest level.  I believe the indicated country codes are as follows 
PAK=Pakistan; MOZ=Mozambique; KHM=Cambodia; VNM=Vietnam; ERI=Eritrea; and AGO=Angola. MAP/MUSE 
stands for anti-personnel mines and unexploded munitions. 
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Where in Colombia is it remote? 
 A number of influences bear on the creation or preservation of remote spaces within 
Colombia, which today are easy to read cartographically, at least in general terms.  The national 
parks mentioned in the introduction have been increasingly well-defined as Colombia advances 
in applying GIS systems to legal, legislative and administrative land-use matters.  In addition to 
the country‟s larger national parks, concerns about the protection and definition of indigenous 
communal lands, black communal lands and a complicated regime of environmental protection 
concepts also contribute to a Colombian national mapping and preservation of rural space.  
Spatial correspondence of the national parks with transportation remoteness is evident in Figures 
23 through 27.  Figure 27 shows three major forms of communal land ownership -- national 
parks, black communal lands and indigenous reservations along with the major roads.  The three 
communal property types differ as to the intentions of their creators, their active constituent 
communities of advocates, and the desires of their occupants as to future rights and land-use.  
Evidenced by the road network, they are mostly remote. 
 Figure 28 zooms the elevation model to south-central Colombia to show an area that is 
transportation remote.  While transportation remoteness may correlate with lower economic 
performance statistics (especially according to urbanite material measures), we might better 
explain the violence that some rural people in Colombia suffer by the location of their homes in 
areas coincidentally preferred as guerrilla sanctuaries (or routes to and from those sanctuaries).  
 The Nevado del Huila area is among the areas that guerrillas have preferred most.  The 
Nevado del Huila area is perhaps paradigmatic of zones wherein rural communities might suffer 
a greater likelihood of mass violence because the area offers uphill escape options and sits 
between jungle sanctuaries to the east and cities and ports to the west.  Unlike many others of the 
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most violently contested areas, however, the Nevado del Huila is not near an international 
border.  It is, for Colombian smugglers and guerrillas, the remote rural middle of the country.  It 
is the birth zone of the FARC. 
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Figure 23: A government strategy map asserting a correlation of remote areas to conflict using the road network. 
(Unidad Administrativa Especial 2012)  On this map, the government agency highlights what it identifies as security 
priority zones using the blue circles.  The road network is in red and the grey lines are county boundaries. 
Figure 23: A government strategy map asserting a correlation of remote areas to conflict using the road network. 
(Unidad Administrativa Especial 2012)  On this map, the government agency highlights what it identifies as security 
priority zones using the blue circles.  The road network is in red and the grey lines are county boundaries. 
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Figure 24: The title translates to “Synthesized indicator of social conditions for endogenous development.” This 
Colombian rendering proceeds from that in Figure 21, implying that the remoteness causes the poverty that causes 
the conflict. (Unidad Administrativa Especial 2012). In the four color legend, (1.) is Very Low (below 43%) 
[Meaning, according to the social conditions index, which is not cited, that the white areas exhibit the lowest 
overall material well-being]  (2.) is Low; (3.) is Moderate; and (4.), in the darkest brown, is High.  The white cut-out 
box in the upper left tells us that per-capita income in rural areas is 31.4% of what it is in urban areas; that the 
rural poverty rate is 68.2 %; and that 49.2% of all indigent [abjectly poor] live in the countryside.  I include this map 
not for the data it presents per se, but as a typical Colombian perception regarding the relationship of poverty to 
remoteness and remoteness to the organized violence.  The blue circles (same as in Figure 23) propose to highlight 
areas of poverty that coincide with holes in the road network and that coincide with areas of violence. 
122 
 
 
Figure 25: Elevation model and national road network. (SIGOT 2013)  In this rendering I represent the road 
network (same basic data as in Figure 21) in yellow. 
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Figure 26: Elevation model, national road network and major national parks. (using ArcGIS with base data from 
SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 27: Roads, parks, Indigenous communal lands and Afrodecendiente communal lands. (using ArcGIS with 
base data from SIGOT 2013)  The Nevado del Huila National Park is highlighted for orientation, as it is a focal point 
for discussion later in the text. 
Nevado del Huila 
National Park 
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Figure 28: Road network around the Nevado del Huila volcano. (using ArcGIS with base data from SIGOT 2013)  The 
Nevado del Huila area is further discussed later in the text. 
 
Nevado del Huila 
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Where is the war? 
 Testing the explanatory value of a theory of distance using Colombia‟s internal warring 
demands a significant intermediate question -- „where in Colombia is the Colombian war?‟  
Several phenomena serve to depict the armed conflict spatially, to map where within Colombia is 
the war.  I divide the Colombians‟ answers into two groups.  The first includes presentation of 
the spatial distribution of the costs of the war, and the second includes depictions used in 
explanation of some plan or strategy that directly asserts the war‟s location.  In the first category, 
„costs‟ include landmines; significant combat actions; massacres; murders; forced displacements 
from homes, ecological destruction, etc.  The second category includes areas of the country that 
Colombian institutions and scholars have asserted as strategic priorities for dealing with the war 
and its costs. 
 
According to Costs 
Figures 29 through 44 relate Colombian attempts to depict the spatial distribution of the 
war according to its costs. 
 Kidnapping is a phenomenon commonly used to describe the nature, scale, intensity and 
costs of the war.  Kidnapping is extremely hard to pinpoint geographically.  Figure 29 indicates a 
concentration in the far northeast, in Cesar Department around Valledupar along the Venezuelan 
border.  Other apparent concentrations correspond to the three largest cities, Bogotá, Medellín 
and Cali.  The area around Medellín, in Antioquia Department in the northwest, appears to have 
suffered a relatively greater number of kidnappings.  One might reasonably conclude from this 
distribution that the kidnappings follow population, money, and escape.  However, kidnappers 
purposefully vary the places they use to take hostages and keep their prison locations secret.  
127 
 
Victim families and companies often prefer to pay ransoms and avoid what they feel might be a 
mortally ineffective intervention by the government. (Posada 2002).  As a result, kidnappings are 
under reported, and hard to map visually with any confidence of precision or comprehensiveness. 
 
Figure 29: Kidnappings in Colombia 1996-2003. (CERAC 2013). 
 
Sexual violence has become another cost of the war discussed by Colombians. (Centro 
Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013, p. 77).  While I did not find a suitable spatial distribution 
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for sexual violence, Colombians have alleged that it corresponds to forced displacements.  We 
can safely surmise that, with few exceptions, the perpetration of direct sexual violence is mostly 
a male phenomenon.  The war in general is highly gender-specific.  The rate of male deaths 
attributable to the war is about twenty times that of female deaths. (Figure 30)  The rate of 
perpetrations of violent death is about 200 times greater for males, and males perpetrate almost 
all of the sexual violence.  In some local areas of Colombia, the demographic differential 
between men and women varies more than thirty-five percent. (Figure 31)  At first glance, there 
appears to be a correlation between county masculinity and county violence indices, but I did not 
discover a suitable study examining the issue. 
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Figure 30: Male versus female deaths by age in Colombia’s War. (CERAC 2006).  The blue line is for female deaths, 
the green for male, and the yellow the total.  Police officials related to me that a high percentage of the female 
deaths were ‘trophy’ or ‘harem’ kills, that is, the murder of female members of rival gangs.  I believe the policemen 
intended to imply that the majority of the females were not killed in shootouts, but were passive victims in most 
cases rather than equal participants.  I did not see statistics or written reports to substantiate this claim. 
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Figure 31: Masculinity of counties in Antioquia. (Instituto Para el Desarrollo de Antioquia 2007).  The maroon bar 
columns are male population and the light green are female.  The color ramp rises from less masculine to more.  
The most masculine counties (burnt orange) are as high as 118 men to 100 women and the least masculine (pink) 
as low as 85 men to 100 women.  Any assertion of a correlation with violence is subject to challenge as numerous 
other variables, including economic opportunities, active paramilitary and guerrilla recruiting, etc. may impose. 
 Ecological destruction is an oft-noted cost of the war in Colombia.  It is subject to a wide 
range of definitions, and because there are so many agents of ecological destruction, it is hard to 
Apartadó 
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separate out those that can be logically assigned to the armed conflict. (Cárdenas and Rodríguez 
B. 2004)  There are exceptions, such as the blowing up of the oil pipelines.  The pipelines pass 
through numerous economically remote areas designated as nature preserves.  The parks and 
preserves are home to priceless terrain anomolies, flora and fauna.  Many such locations have 
suffered attacks, especially by the ELN.  Colombians also tie the armed conflict to the 
environmental damage caused by coca cultivation and cocaine processing. (Arredondo and Díaz 
2004, Márquez 2004)  It is relatively easy to place geographically and represents an ugly 
degradation of habitat. (Figure 32) Most of the coca-related destruction is directly attributable to 
the FARC and its industrial partners. 
 
 
Figure 32: Cocaine agriculture and forest loss. (Semana February, 2011) The red on the left side represents 
deforested area while the black on the right hand represents new coca cultivation. 
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Figure 33 shows a spatial distribution of unilateral attacks by either the paramilitaries or 
the guerrillas during a four-year period.  The killing subsided somewhat in a few of the regions 
shown, such as around Medellín and in the Montes de María area to the north.  Figure 34 shows 
war-related deaths as compared to homicides, most of which are not connected to the organized 
political conflict.  Separating regular, domestic or „everyday‟ murder from organized violence is 
methodologically challenging at best.  However, the two maps apparently indicate what we 
would expect -- that the organized violence had a different spatial distribution than the regular 
violence.  The regular violence was evenly distributed, appearing to follow demographics, while 
the organized violence appears clustered in relation to the physical geography.  The clusters of 
organized violence correspond to the Santa Marta, Catatumbo, Arauca, Magdalena Medio, 
Nevado del Huila, Putumayo, and Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare regions as I describe them later. 
Figure 35 is a United Nations finding regarding the spatial distribution of forced internal 
population displacement during a two-year period of the war.  The areas highlighted in red as 
being the most troubled include Arauca, Putumayo, southern Tolima (Nevado del Huila), 
Paramillo, southern Bolivar (Medio Magdalena), Santa Marta, and Catatumbo – the same areas 
highlighted on other cost maps.  Figure 36 displays one of the sequences of maps in a Colombian 
government atlas titled Characterization of Rural Lands and its Correlation with Forced 
Displacement in Colombia. (My translation) (Presidencia, República de Colombia 2010)  That 
atlas emphasizes the correlation that displacement has with coca cultivation.  The atlas does not 
include a distribution of violence map or attempt to show a correlation between the 
displacements and violence.  Figure 37 illuminates a related phenomenon, the loss of property by 
those displaced.  The map suggests that a great deal of rural property suffered illegal transfers in 
the process of population displacement.  It appears that the geographers and others involved in 
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the construction of these spatial distribution maps presumed coca cultivation to have been the 
indirect engine of the forced displacements.  Methodologically, the atlas makers used coca 
cultivation as the logical, visible proxy for places of displacement perpetrations. That is to say, 
armed actors induced the displacements under study.  The receiving or net in-migration counties 
are often not far from the out-migration counties.  Logically, such migrants were escaping 
immediate harm, rather than deliberatively seeking a more economically viable environment.  
That the displaced families suffer material hardship as a direct result of the displacement requires 
no statistical support.  The beginning places of the forced migrations are places of perpetrations.  
Whether we can classify those places as places of impunity depends on the success of any 
pursuits after the perpetrators.  Armed pursuits themselves increase the immediate levels of 
violence, which in turn raises migratory pressures. 
More troubling even than displacements are the massacres.  Figure 38 is noteworthy not 
only for the multiplicity of massacre events that it reflects, but also for their spatial distribution.  
Note the spatial coincidence among almost all the „where is the war?‟ maps, including the 
massacres map in Figure 38 and the human righs violeations map of Figure 53. 
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Figure 33: Guerrilla and paramilitary unilateral attacks 1998-2002. (CERAC 2013). 
134 
 
 
Figure 34: Homicides and deaths caused by the conflict. (CERAC 2013). 
 
135 
 
 
Figure 35: Counties showing ‘critical’ levels of forced displacement (2006-2008). (United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees, 2008)  Red is worst.  Population displacement is also difficult to understand spatially.  There is no 
doubt that in the past few decades, paramilitaries, guerrillas and violent gangs of all sorts forcibly and illegally 
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evicted thousands of Colombians from their preferred homes.  Depth of the victims’ place identity, distance and 
frequency of displacement, number of returns and the conditions of the return -- these and many other sub-
questions embroil Colombians in what for today has become a centerpiece issue to be solved. 
 
Figure 36: The 150 counties with the most out-migration of displaced persons versus  
cocaine coca cultivation. (Presidencia, Repúbica de Colombia 2010). 
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Figure 37: Areas with highest loss of property or dispossessions. (Unidad de Restitución de Tierras 2013). 
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Figure 38: Concentrations of massacres in Colombia. (Montañez, et al. 2002 p. 179)  The title translates to, 
‘Counties where massacres have been committed against civilians by illegal armed groups (1998-2001)’.  The 
shading is of number of victims, darker is more. 
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Of the items that depict the location of the war according to its costs, I believe landmine 
phenomena are the most revealing.  The locations are relatively specific and tied to a high degree 
of malevolent intent.  Figures 39, 40 and 41 show a counrty-wide distribution of landmines.  The 
guerrillas use landmines and other explosive artifacts for a variety of purposes including terror, 
but they use the great majority of landmines in tactical combat situations.  For the past three 
decades, the FARC and the ELN planted almost all the landmines in Colombia.  In most 
instances, guerrillas initiate planned ambushes with the devices or leave them behind during 
escapes.  The guerrillas and paramilitaries have sometimes used the landmines as terror weapons 
against civilians, but they plant the vast majority in mountain terrain in corridors to their 
sanctuaries.  In several of the regional discussions later in the dissertation, I include departmental 
scale maps that clearly indicate the mountain terrain use of the landmines.  The landmines are 
more effective when routes are constricted, multiplying the effect of the terrain itself.  Principal 
among those effects is an increase in the perceived risk faced by the pursuers.  When a pursuer 
does detonate a landmine, his medical evacuation demands the apportionment of significant 
resources, including and especially air transport. 
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Figure 39: Landmine distribution. The title translates to Georeferenced Mined Zones. This is a government map 
produced by the National Council on Political and Social Economy.  The legend indicates mine accidents, demined 
areas and suspected minefields. (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica Y Social, CONEPS 2009). 
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Figure 40: Landmine distribution by county 1990-2008. (Vicepresidencia 2013) The map caption states, “41% of 
counties, that is to say, 460, have presented victim-causing accidents from antipersonnel mnes (MAP) and 
unexploded ordinance (MUSE).”  The darker areas are worse.  The period is 1990-2008. 
 
Figure 41: Landmine distribution by counties circa 2002. (Observatory on Human Rights in 
Colombia undated). 
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The renderings in Figure 42, all titled, “Síntesis de violaciones Acciones Bélicas (AB), 
Violaciones al DIH y Violencia Político Social (Synthesis of violations Combat Actions (AB), 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (DIH) and Political-Social Violence)” are of the 
Colombian researchers‟ use of data from the non-governmental organization CINEP to show 
human rights violations for 1995, 1997 and 2000.  Notably, while the overall spatial pattern of 
violations does not appear in the renderings to have changed greatly over the five-year period, 
the area of the Despeje (zone conceded to the FARC during peace negotiations (1998-2002) is 
one of intense violations in 1997 and of no violations (or null data) in 2000.  Considering the 
timing of the study, the researchers may have been argumentational in their representation of 
data, preferring to suggest human rights improvement in the area of the FARC controlled 
Despeje.  Alternatively, they may have had insufficient data and decided to interpolate.  A 
similar sequence in Figure 43 also shows that the war has not been waged in any one place over 
time, but that it has been waged in some places regularly.  Note that in Figure 42 as in Figure 43, 
the depiction corresponding to the year 2000 shows an absence of conflict in the 
Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare area.  (The sequence is a small sampling of the Echandía study, 
which has almost 250 pages of maps and other graphics.)  The sequence in Figure 44 was 
prepared at about the same time as that in figures 42 and 43, using data prepared by a different 
research NGO.  The images deceive visually in that, in 42 and 43, the data was not adjusted for 
area or population, whereas in 44 it was adjusted for population.  Nevertheless, the sequence in 
Figure 44 suggests that, in terms of the intensity of violence, the war got worse (in terms of the 
overall intensity and extent of geographic involvement) and then better over the period tracked.  
Some parts of the country seem to be perpetually suffering.  Figure 45 derives from the same 
dataset as the sequence in Figure 44.  The twelve regions highlighted in Figure 45 concord 
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generally with the zones indicated in many other studies as being where the war is located within 
Colombia.  Notably, the Figure 45 graphic highlights areas of heroin poppy cultivation (using 
purple triangles).  Heroin poppy had been a daunting counternarcotics challenge in Colombia 
along with cocaine coca, but during the first decade of this century, the cultivation of heroin 
poppy all but disappeared.  Colombia narcotics police attribute the decline to various factors, 
including land tenancy (smaller holdings at appropriate growing altitudes) and more effective 
law enforcement in those areas.  One undeniable factor is a precipitous drop in the world market 
price because of an explosion of growth in other parts of the world, especially southern Asia. 
(United States Government 2005). 
 
 
Figure 42: Series titled, “Síntesis de violaciones Acciones Bélicas (AB), Violaciones al DIH y Violencia Político Social 
(Synthesis of violations Combat Actions (AB)” (Violations of International Humanitarian Law (DIH) and Political-
Social Violence) from a 2002 study. (González, et al. 2002; pp. 126, 109, 110)  The researchers use data from the 
non-governmental organization CINEP to show human rights violations for 1995, 1997 and 2000. 
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Figure 43: Sequence on spatial dynamics of the conflict. (Echandía 2008 pp. 130-145). 
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Figure 44: Sequence showing counties by ‘intensity’ of violence over time. (FMSO 2008) The darker the earth tone, 
the more intense the violence as measured by number of incidents in that year in that county.  My interpretation 
of the sequence is that it reflects a spatial dilution of the war into more and more counties.  From the mid 1980s to 
2000, the increase was due to the rapid growth of guerrilla capability and initiative. After 2002, the increased 
intensity was due more to the Colombian military gaining capacity and greatly increasing the tempo of its armed 
pursuits.  Decrease in the dilution of intensity by 2008 reflects military successes by the government against the 
guerrilla groups. 
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Figure 45: A depiction of twelve areas where confrontations pitting anti-communist paramilitaries against 
communist guerrillas were especially frequent and violent. (Reanier 2007). 
 
I did not focus research on the spatial distribution of economic performance within 
Colombia.  Numerous Colombian maps show spatial differentials in material well-being by 
county. (See generally SIGOT IGAC) Especially in those rural counties most relevant to this 
study, the internal population displacement has been considerable, both due to pressures from 
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violence and to peaceful motivations.  That movement somewhat confounds the longitudinal 
value of some economic data.  In addition, many locales in Colombia, rich and poor, have 
experienced almost no organized violence, inviting the speculation that other factors are more 
significant than is economic performance as measured place-to-place.  Finally, guerrilla 
sanctuaries within Colombia appear in areas where economic data is often absent or incomplete.  
With all of the methodological weaknesses, and although (as I argue elsewhere) poverty does not 
seem from spatial evidence to cause the violence, it does seem logical that the close proximity of 
armed groups would be a detriment to a local population‟s economic well-being.  Much of the 
longitudinal violence data indicates that counties from which Colombians derive the most 
wealth, or where people with wealth live, are subject to violent predatory activity. 
 
According to strategies 
 Figures 46 through 53 relate Colombian depictions of the spatial distribution of the war to 
inform or explain a strategy of one kind or another.  In 2002, the incoming president, Álvaro 
Uribe, designated the first two of what that administration termed Rehabilitation and 
Consolidation zones. (El Tiempo, September 2002) (Figure 46)  These followed closely what the 
previous government, of Andrés Pastrana, had tried to designate as „Military Operational 
Theatres‟ wherein special exceptions to civil liberties would be allowed.  The Colombian 
constitutional court struck down the Pastrana rules for those areas, requiring a legislative review 
and remodeling.  This is a centrally important point in that the designated areas were not just 
priorities for increased military operations or government investment in social infrastructure 
(although this was the case).  The zones were also the subject of a land-use plan the backbone of 
which included a suspension of certain civil liberties and specific powers given to the military 
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commanders of the zones.  The military was given authority to do detailed census and cadastral 
work, to limit the presence of foreigners, etc.  Legally, if not practically, the rules imposed on the 
residents a new obligation to report changes in tenancy and the presence of armed persons. 
(Diario del Pueblo, September 2002)  The first Rehabilitation and Consolidation zones included 
nine counties in Bolivar Department and fifteen in Sucre.  Although this was initially to be 
administered as one zone by the military, the counties in Bolivar and Sucre correspond to the 
„Montes de Maria‟ and the „Sierra de San Lucas‟ or „Barrancabermeja‟ areas as depicted 
elsewhere.  The other of the first two zones was composed of three large counties in Arauca.  In 
Arauca, the Álvaro Uribe government consolidation plan included encouragement of large scale 
industrial agricultural practices in order to draw agriculture away from coca production. 
“The Montes de Maria area strategic point along the corridor that communicates 
the Serranía de San Lucas, in southern Bolivar - where there are large areas 
cultivated with coca and heroin poppy - with the Gulf of Morrosquillo, in the 
Caribbean Sea, where cargoes of illicit drugs are embarked and contraband 
weapons brought in...In Arauca, the FARC, the ELN and the AUC are all fighting 
over the Department, which receives millions in petroleum royalties.  Arauquita 
and Saravena form part of a strategic corridor that permits illegal groups to move 
between Boyacá, the Santanders (departments) and Arauca, and then take 
sanctuary in their rear guard in Venezuela.” (El Tiempo 2002) 
It appears after a decade that the government efforts in the Montes de Maria area have been more 
effective in reducing violence and in reducing the influence of the guerrillas than has the effort in 
Arauca.  Such a result is not inconsistent with the findings of this research, given that Arauca is 
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far more remote than Montes de Maria in terms of the potential for a fugitive force to take 
advantage of and augment favorable competitive risk distances. 
The UN Human Rights office in Colombia was immediately interested in the Álvaro 
Uribe administration‟s choices for its first two Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones, 
especially in light of a restriction of civil liberties in those zones.  The UN map highlighted the 
Limon-Coveñas pipeline and the by-then defunct Despeje (cleared zone conceded to the FARC 
1998-2002).  This may be cartographic evidence that the human rights office, while focused on 
collusion between the government and the paramilitary AUC, recognized the trail of violations 
marked by certain infrastructure and territories. 
 The authors of the Colombian government briefing in which the image in Figure 48 
appears introduce their presentation with the question “What is the problem.”  The image was 
included at the beginning of the document along with those related in figures 23 and 24 (pages 
115,116).  The authors attributed the Figure 48 overlay to the Ministry of Defense.  The 
document offers no explanation of the map‟s symbology.  Nevertheless, based on the same 
general priority zones, the map asserts a challenge of contraband corridors and fugitive 
movement. 
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Figure 46: Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones in 2002. (Office in Colombia of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2002).  The blue dots indicate locations of UN offices, the yellow area is the 
former ‘Despeje’, orange highlights the first two Rehabilitation Zones during the Alvaro Uribe presidency, and th 
red line represents the Caño-Limon oil pipeline. 
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Figure 47: “Principales Teatros de Operaciones 1998-2005” (Principle Theatres of Operation 1998-2005).  The map 
offers a spatial distribution of combat operation priorities, perhaps according to named operations or some 
unstated level of resource application.  Red shows the highest operational tempo. (González 2007, p. 17).  
González cites “DNP-DJS-GEGAI” which refers to Departamento de Planeación, Nacional-Dirección de Justicia y 
Seguridad – Grupo de Gobierno y Asuntos Internos (National Planning Department, Office of Justice and Security, 
Governance and Internal Affairs Group).  It is not cited to the Defense Ministry. 
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Figure 48: Impressionistic Map of the Problem. (Unidad Administrativa Especial 2012) Red areas are FARC 
concentrations; orange shows areas of non-cultivation narcotics-related activity; blue areas are narcotics 
cultivation zones; yellow shows areas with milicia presence (milicia are non-combatant support groups of the FARC 
or ELN); and green shows BACRIM areas (BACRIM stands for Bandas Criminales, criminal bands which are mostly 
remnants and reconfigurations of broken guerrilla and paramilitary units).  I do not know what the dark ovals stars, 
etc. represent.  Please note in particular the east-west sequence of yellow and red blotches leading through the 
Nevado del Huila area in the center-south of the map. 
 
153 
 
 
Figure 49: National Consolidation Plan, 2010. (CCAI) ‘Zonas Focalizadas’ (focus zones). (Centro de Coordinación de 
Acción Integral, CCAI 2010, p. 9) Gonzalez, addressing the same map, refered to the indicated areas as those in 
which the principle military operations have developed in recent years. Gonzalez 2007, p. 12)  Note the year of the 
Gonzalez paper in which the map appears.The map in Figure 49 shows the priority areas for the flagship 
government plan in mid to late 2010.  Figure 50 shows the priorities two years later. 
The spatial construction in Figure 51, from a Colombian web-based journalism and 
analysis organization led by Juanita León highlights coca, contraband corridors, and national 
parks.  The following image, Figure 52, from another non-governmental research organization, 
CINEP, also orients on contraband movement corridors.  CINEP produced the simpler image in 
Figure 53 purporting levels of rights violations by county.  The image on the left in Figure 54 is 
from a 2012 USAID report that presents Colombian government priorities according to the four 
categories indicated by the map‟s title and the legend categories, „GOC Prioritized 
Municipalities: Ethnic Communities, Land Restitution (Microfocalization), Victims, and 
Consolidation.‟  The image on the right in Figure 54, provided to the author, is of a slightly 
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earlier plan, and shows overall priorities in three categories, red being the highest, then blue then 
yellow.  Numerous factors entered into the prioritization decisions, including those ultimately 
suggested in the left-hand image.  The reasoning for the prioritization seems to have included 
most of the phenomena mentioned throughout this dissertation thus far, to include forced 
population displacements, land restitution projects, environmental reparation and protection, 
pacification, counter-narcotics, protection of indigenous peoples, etc. 
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Figure 50: “Map of the National Consolidation Territories,” 2012. (Unidad Administrativa Especial para la 
Consolidación Territorial 2012b)  Priority counties are in blue.  The Santa Marta and lower Atraco River areas had 
been dropped and the Montes de Maria area (re)added since the making of the map in Figure 49. 
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Figure 51: “Priority Zones.”  A think-tank rendering of the geographic spread of conflict. (Atlas Politico 2010)  The 
green areas are military priority zones, the purple are coca eradication priority zones, and the salmon colored 
areas are alternative development priority zones.  The black arrows are drug traffic corridors, the red dots are coca 
cultivation as of 2007, and the red ovals are a summary of where the presenters think the war is. 
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Figure 52: Another NGO’s spatial rendering of the problem. (Center for Research and Popular Education.2013).  
The red lines are ‘logistic corridors’; the green are ‘strategic corridors’; the blue are ‘corridors in decomposition’; 
yellow are ‘corridors in formation’; and the pink cirles are contested areas.  The principle message of this map of 
the geography of the war in Colombia is ‘corridors.’  A similar earlier map is in González, et al.( 2002, p. 135). 
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Figure 53: A rendering, also from CINEP, that orients on counties. (Center for Research and Popular Education... 
2013)  In counties presented in light blue, the map asserts that there had occurred some type of human rights 
violation.  In the counties presented in light blue, the map asserts that there had occurred some type of human 
rights violation.  In the counties presented in dark blue, the assertion is of a high level of conflict to include 
systematic violations of human rights.  The map does not identify perpetrators nor the identities of victims. 
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Figure 54: Colombian government priority counties, 2012. (Agency for International Development 2012).  On the 
left, the counties with black outlines are home to indigenous tribes identified for priority attention; the yellow-
outlined counties are venues for micro-focused land restitutions; the red hash-marked counties are home to select 
victim identities with specific grievances the government intended to address as a matter of priority; and the 
green-colored counties are military consolidation priorities.  One intention of the overlay was to visualize the level 
of coordination of concepts and efforts from various agencies.  The map on the right is concerned with 
‘consolidation’ counties (security conditions).  The red represents counties that the Colombian government at that 
moment considered more critical for consolidation efforts, followed by the blue, then yellow counties.  The final 
decision on priorities was to go through numerous changes.  The Arauca area along the border with Venezuela, for 
instance, grew in priority.  Note that Arauca, which hwas one of the two original government Consolidation Zones 
(Figure 46), did not make the 2012 top priorities map.  I believe Arauca was put back in as a higher priority area in 
2013. 
 
Figure 55 is from the land restitution program office and is closely related in its 
provenance to Figure 54.  It details progress in restitution of mostly agricultural land holdings.  
Within areas colored in orange, the national government is directly applying national-level 
administrative assets to implement land transfers.  The government reported to have completed 
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transfers in the areas marked in green.  The spatial distribution of the restitutions does not 
correlate closely with that of the majority of the “where is the war” maps.  The reasons for the 
disparity vary, but include the age of cases, technical ease with which restitutions might be 
accomplished, a substitution of lands in cases where the original residents did not wish to return 
to their original holdings, etc.  Many displaced families are understandably reluctant to return to 
areas where illegal violent groups continue to exert influence.  Some of the counties identified as 
consolidation counties in the Nevado del Huila area of northern Cauca/eastern Valle and 
southern Tolima (Miranda, Corinto, Toribío, etc.) do not appear in Figure 54.  The absence of 
restitution successes is perhaps related to continuing armed conflict in those areas or because, as 
in the Toribío case, they feature extensive communally owned tribal lands.  While some areas in 
the country are still venues of active military campaigning, other areas are the object of 
environmental preservation strategies.  Recently, for instance, President Santos declared a 
doubling of the size of Chiribiquete National Park in Caquetá-Guaviare. (Santos August 2013) 
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Figure 55: National restitution program priorities. (Unidad de Restitución de Tierras 2013b). The map shows 
‘microfocalizations’ (counties where specific land restitution programs are extant) and green shows counties with 
completed restitutions.  The legend assigns fuscia to represent counties from which solicitations have been 
recieved, but the map appears to not have been completed such as to match the legend in that respect. 
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The maps in figures 46-55 reflect a constant tension, discussion, and re-evaluation of 
priorities for the distribution of limited resources within a context of competing interests and 
evolving goals.  However, I believe most of the areas deemed to be worthy of prioritization are 
recurrent and obvious, constitute the spatial distribution of the war as perceived in Colombia.  
The maps are not perfectly contemporaneous, are products of differing methodologies and the 
underlying data used to build them is not uniform.  Together, however, they demonstrate where 
Colombians think the the war is located within Colombia.  Not only is the war region-specific, 
there have been overall increases and decreases of violence in Colombia as well.  From about 
1980, violent activities of the main leftist guerrilla organizations, the ELN and the FARC, and of 
the paramilitary AUC rose until 2003-2005.  Then, after the government more sharply 
challenged those groups (demobilization in the case of the AUC), the violence generally 
decreased.  Colombian researchers have exhaustively depicted this in graphic form as a statistical 
reflection of various kinds of violence totals (Gutierrez, et al. 2006, pp. 505-542) and spatially by 
county. (Gutierrez, et al. 2006 pp 357-367; Restrepo and Aponte 2009. pp. 264-269). 
Why the Colombian struggle has been so intense here and not there, why it has lasted as 
long as it has or why one actor and not another succeeds at any given time can be answered 
without striving to answer why there is violence in Colombia or what the Colombians are 
fighting about.  In the last decade or so, Colombians‟ process of answering the where often 
featured marking the worst conflict zones using counties and county groups.  The costs of the 
war can be associated with a limited set of counties.  The various prioritizations (of Colombian 
focus, effort or concern) vary as to the counties highlighted, but they rarely display more than 
150.  In most depictions of the war the number of counties is about half that.  Although they vary 
from one analysis to another, almost all Colombian depictions delimit the war to within a total of 
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about twenty percent of Colombia‟s 1,100 counties.  It appears that about five percent of the 
counties, or a little over fifty in total, can be currently considered the location of the warfare.  
Some effects or costs of the war are felt universally, and many, such as internal displacement, 
affect counties that are not direct venues of violence.  Landmines appear in almost half the 
counties.  While their effect can be devastating, the vast majority of injury-causing detonations 
occur within the five percent of counties where the war is most actively contested.  
 
Figure 56 highlights areas that Colombians recurrently display in their maps of the war.  
It is my interpretation and summary of their expressions of the spatial distribution of events, 
effects and plans (Figures 29-55).  Later I discuss the first eleven zones:  Santa Marta, Montes de 
Maria, Catatumbo, Paramillo, Arauca, Comuna 13 Medellín, Magdalena Medio, Cundinamarca, 
Nevado del Huila, Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare, and Putumayo.  This is the same order as in the 
Contents and in Figure 87, p.248.  The order follows no geographical or historical rigor, but is 
for convenience in reading based on how the labels appear in Figure 87.  The war has been going 
on for five decades and not all fifteen areas have been salient in all decades.  The Colombian 
government does not currently consider them all as top priorities for the application of resources, 
military or otherwise, in part because of expensive successes achieved against guerrilla groups.  
That is to say, all eleven may not currently be focal points of the internal war, but all eleven at 
one time were.  I omit discussion of the Urabá/Atraco, Tumaco, and Eastern Antioquia and 
Buenaventura areas (12-16 in Figure 56) for efficiency and to avoid repetition. 
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Figure 56: Where I perceive the war to have been or to be concentrated within Colombia. 
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Why some Colombian guerrillas have survived and some have not 
“If he were not of great ability he would have died last night.  It seems to me you 
do not understand politics, Inglés, nor guerrilla warfare.  In politics and this other 
the first thing is to continue to exist.  Look how he continued to exist last night.” 
(Hemingway 1940, p. 284) 
 The anti-communist AUC was for a period of time the second most powerful guerrilla 
organization in Colombia, and doing considerable damage to the FARC.  Between late 2004 and 
early 2006 the bulk of the AUC had turned in its weapons and the great majority of its fighters 
took advantage of a government amnesty and reinsertion program.  In fact, far more young men 
took advantage of the amnesty than anyone thought were possibly in the AUC.  Why did the 
AUC surrender and not survive to defy the state? 
 In comparing the internal warfare in Colombia with that of the warfare in Vietnam and in 
the Philippines, Professor Russell Ramsey offered a useful list of reasons why some insurgent 
organizations do better over time than others.  His 1981 Peasant Revolution dates to a time when 
the Colombian internal conflict only seemed old, not eternal, and much has changed in Colombia 
since its writing.  The following „Applicable Factors Chart‟ from Peasant Revolutions is 
nevertheless a useful discussion guide. 
 
-- “Foreign military forces present.” 
Ramsey asserted this to be a net negative for a government and notes that no foreign military 
forces were present in Colombia.  Few are today. 
166 
 
-- “Foreign anti-revolutionary material aid.” 
Ramsey saw this as a positive factor for a government and noted that the US and Britain gave 
Colombia limited aid.  United States aid was substantially increased under Plan Colombia in 
the late 1990s. 
-- “Foreign anti-revolutionary sympathy.” 
Ramsey noted that military regimes in Spain and Latin America, as well as US governmental 
leaders and some Catholic and commercial interests, supported the Colombian government.  
Except for continuous support from the United States, the Colombian government has since 
enjoyed only intermittent or tepid support from foreign governments in recent years. 
-- “Anti-revolutionary indigenous forces.” 
Regarding Colombia, Ramsey identified the National Police and conservative gangs in this 
category.  Today, the „indigenous‟ anti-revolutionary forces in Colombia are a large 
government military establishment that has occasionally been assisted by other anti-
revolutionary groups, most prominently the organizations belonging to the AUC. 
-- “Geographic contiguity of a pro-revolutionary ally.” 
In 1981, Ramsey identified a „limited role‟ by Venezuela.  In the last decade or so, 
Venezuela has played a much greater role in assisting the anti-government forces in 
Colombia, especially the ELN and the FARC.  The Ecuadoran government has at times also 
been guilty of at least accessorial behavior. 
-- “Foreign pro-revolutionary material ally.” 
As to this factor, Ramsey observed „slight aid‟ from Venezuelan elements.  Today, 
Venezuelan aid is determinant in the sense that it provides sanctuary and safe passage for 
communist guerrilla groups. 
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-- “Foreign pro-revolutionary material assistance.” 
Ramsey cites “US and Latin American liberal groups.”  This is still true today to a degree, 
but the FARC and ELN have little need for material assistance from such groups. 
-- “Foreign pro-revolutionary sympathy.” 
This is as true today as it was during Ramsey‟s observations.... 
-- “Unfavorable land tenure pattern.” 
Ramsey opined that this condition, which was almost synonymous with unbalanced 
ownership, assisted revolutionary prospects.  He thought that in Colombia the problem was 
„moderate to bad.‟  Land continues to be a central issue, but „tenure‟ is now broadly accepted 
as a complex term in an ambiguous context.  There is far more to the land ownership puzzle 
than “tenure patterns” can contain.  Using land policies to help solve the internal conflict still 
seems a good idea, but setting the shape of those policies is its own conflict. 
 
 Ramsey goes on to suggest that “accepting the premise that not all factors are applicable 
even to these case studies, we can take factors which have demonstrated commonality and rate 
them in order of impact on these three revolutions.” (Ramsey 1981, p. 206)  He continues his list, 
indicating with one word how he thought Colombia rated as to the impact: 
-- „Historical revolutionaryism and secret societal patterns‟ -low in Colombia 
-- „Historical maltreatment by colonial power‟ -low in Colombia 
-- „Proclivity to violence for the solution of problems‟ -high in Colombia 
-- „Physical presence of colonial power‟ -not applicable in Colombia 
-- „Rugged topography for revolutionary base area‟ -high in Colombia 
-- „Accessible border with pro-revolutionary ally‟ -medium in Colombia 
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-- „Peasant apathy toward change‟ -high in Colombia 
-- „Impact of religion as a non-violent restraining force‟ -low in Colombia 
-- „Unfavorable land tenure as a frustrating force‟ -medium in Colombia 
-- „Existence of a violence continuum‟ -low in Colombia 
-- „Revolutionary leadership‟ -low in Colombia 
-- „Revolutionary leadership or élan‟ -medium in Colombia 
-- „Economic aid from pro-revolutionary ally‟ -medium in Colombia 
-- „Dynamic attitude of counter-revolutionary forces‟ -medium in Colombia 
(Ramsey 1981, 206) 
 Probably the most important environmental factor absent when Professor Ramsey 
asserted his list was the immense financial wherewithal available to the FARC through 
commodities predation and direct involvement in coca cultivation and cocaine trade.  Looking at 
the only factor that Ramsey identified as especially high and clearly favoring a revolutionary 
force was „rugged topography for revolutionary base area.‟  In later decades, he probably would 
have added border accessibility to a pro-revolutionary ally as highly favorable to Colombian 
revolutionaries. 
 Considering the Ramsey list and the now defunct AUC, I propose there are five basic 
reasons why the AUC all but disappeared.  The AUC did not have a foundational purpose other 
than to oppose the communist-inspired FARC, ELN and EPL.  It did not have or was it able to 
create any extensive physical sanctuaries within or outside of Colombia.  Most AUC members 
and leaders were not from remote areas.  They were ultimately not able to permanently implant 
themselves in remote parts of Colombia suitable as sanctuaries.  The AUC embarked on military 
adventures into Tolima and the Guaviare river basin to compromise FARC lines of 
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communication and disrupt or deny the FARC sanctuary, but did not build jungle redoubts as had 
the FARC.  The AUC had no long-term plan to build sanctuaries by creating distance between 
themselves and government forces. The AUC leadership, in fact, refused to consider the 
Colombian Army as an enemy. (Aranguren Molina, Mauricio 2001)  Add to this that the AUC 
could count on very little international support, especially from neighboring countries.  In 
addition, the AUC did not have a systematic method of leader replacement as has the FARC.  As 
the AUC leaders died or were killed, AUC leadership suffered. 
 The reasons given for why the AUC failed to sustain itself: Lack of positive mission; loss 
of leadership; intimacy with state agents; lack of international support; and (most significantly) 
the near total lack of physical sanctuary – does not include loss of popular legitimacy.  In spite of 
murderous violent behavior, the popularity of the AUC seems at no time to have been less than 
that of the FARC.  This is not to say that popular legitimacy, and the moral legitimacy that would 
ideally produce popular legitimacy, is not important.  It is just that in Colombia‟s context of 
many horrors, comportment of the AUC was a lesser factor in its demise. 
To contrast with the demise of the AUC, FARC longevity owes to a fixed and maintained 
ideological azimuth; continuity of leadership; long-term international support, especially in the 
local region; and (most importantly) the ability to create and maintain physical sanctuaries within 
and outside the political borders of Colombia.  Some amount of local popular legitimacy has 
been necessary to assure those physical sanctuaries, and the FARC has successfully achieved that 
necessary amount.  Popular legitimacy, however, has been a secondary factor and concomitantly, 
the FARC‟s moral comportment has not.  The most successful period, militarily and territorially, 
for the FARC was in the late 1990s.  The FARC came to control great swaths of Colombia‟s 
eastern jungle plains.  It is true that the FARC could count on the willing support of a sizeable 
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portion of the population in those eastern plains.  The FARC protected or paid many thousands 
of young men employed as coca leaf pickers, processors and transporters. 
 The above observation/assertion is significant to the proposal of this dissertation in that, 
if the creation of physical sanctuary is in fact the ultima ratio or sine qua non of guerrilla 
survival, and not popular legitimacy, then theory regarding which geographical realities favor the 
guerrilla is similarly important.  Ramsey asserts, 
 
“The relatively greater influence of a geographically contiguous pro-revolutionary 
ally over other factors tends to overshadow other determinants in these case 
studies.  Further, the role of a foreign ally which supports the counter-
revolutionary forces appears considerably less significant than the role of a pro-
revolutionary ally.” 
 
 A supportive Venezuelan government is a central column of survivability for the FARC 
and the ELN, as mountain terrain had been earlier in their histories.  Even as cocaine gave 
financial autonomy to the FARC (as oil has, if to a lesser degree, for the ELN), FARC leaders 
eventually had to depend on Venezuelan sanctuary to stay alive.  Two broad categories of 
geographic phenomena – the geographies of commodities on which to feed and geographies that 
help make physical escape viable -- are the twin sources of guerrilla longevity. 
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Section 4. Distance as a Determinant of Competitive Prospects 
Zero distance 
An insurgent modus operandi or standard operating procedure is to meld into the 
population in civilian clothes and disappear on the metro after an action, at least in urban 
situations.  In such a setting, insurgents will fear a system that checks individual identity when 
persons enter the train station, or a local neighborhood full of people willing and able to report 
the presence of strangers.  A rebel‟s line of retreat is made less secure to the extent he does not 
enjoy anonymity.  Every system that makes individuals identify themselves makes the fugitive‟s 
line of retreat a little less secure.  It means that every action the rebel takes is more likely to be 
taken beyond his culminating point.  He is forced beyond his risk-distance.  As the number of 
fugitives increases, the danger of exposing the whereabouts of sanctuaries or routes to them is 
multiplied accordingly.  To the extent Colombia established systems that endangered insurgent 
anonymity, the government forced the insurgents into inhospitable areas, that is, toward 
remoteness.  As plan Colombia progressed after about 2000, and included the development of 
increasingly sophisticated Colombian government intelligence methods and technologies, the 
zones to which insurgents could retreat and remain anonymous shrank. 
In the explanation-of-terms paragraphs in section II, Methodology, I distinguish three 
types of sanctuary as furtive, patent and governance.  The three intermingle or co-constitute, but 
are nevertheless observable as tendencies.  When a group forms to commit some act or acts that 
might be considered a perpetration of illegality or immorality that induces a will toward 
punishment by some authority able to impose that punishment, then the perpetrating group (if it 
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has any sense at all) keeps the identities of its members secret - maintains anonymity to the 
degree possible.  This may seem so obvious as to not require mention, but to explain the 
geography of impunity and therefore risk distance it is essential to note the relevant characteristic 
of the phenomenon.  During that period when a perpetrator can maintain perfect anonymity, the 
place of his or her sanctuary is everyplace, everywhere.  He does not need to create physical 
distance between himself and the policeman, soldier or competing perpetrator who would pursue 
him if the anonymity were compromised.  The perpetrator can exist safely at zero physical 
distance from his pursuers.  His risk is determined by secrecy and deception, not distance.  He 
faces, in effect, no risk distance.  The space of his sanctuary has the same geographic extent as 
his other spaces and he needs no physical remoteness.  Imperfections in anonymity can take a 
number of forms.  Perhaps a perpetrator can maintain anonymity in one set of spaces and not 
others, or perhaps the anonymity is healthy and valid as to most everyone, but not in the 
company of certain other people or at certain times of the day.  Maintenance of perfect 
anonymity is difficult, and ultimately impossible if, for instance, a perpetrator is intent on 
increasing illicit profits from some illegal activity, or on leading a political movement.  To the 
extent that anonymity weakens and/or to the extent the perpetrator decides to forego anonymity 
for the purposes of his material or ideological enterprise, that perpetrator must find or develop 
physical sanctuary, and therefore needs more than zero distance.  He must create distance to 
sanctuary.  He must attend to shortening the distances to the culminating points of his pursuers 
(their risk distances) and to the lengthening of his own. 
 
Movement under duress 
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Colombian scholars and officials of all political types describe the open high ground 
depicted in the middle of Figure 28 (where there are no roads shown) as a communications hub.  
They will say that from the remote highlands of the Nevado del Huila one can go east to the 
jungles of Meta and Caquetá, north toward the nation‟s capital, west to the Pacific port of 
Buenaventura, or south, passing out of the Colombian Massif to Ecuador.  The observation is 
obviously true and simultaneously ridiculous.  Every map of Colombian road or river networks, 
or of altitudes or seasonal weather disruptions tells the same story, one that every Colombian 
seems to understand: that it is a region around which one travels to get places, not through 
which.  The road network in Figure 28, highly developed in the valleys of the Cauca and 
Magdalena rivers, hardly extends at all into the middle of the central cordillera.  The roadless 
middle is nevertheless a roundhouse for those who wish to elude law enforcement and to have 
open travel options if they travel under duress.  It is indeed a hub for transportation -- of 
contraband and escape.  While the contraband areas do not count on improved roads that can be 
used regularly by most motor vehicles, they are typically criss-crossed with trails that can be 
navigated by foot, pack aninmal, or perhaps a motorcycle.  The transportation geography of 
furtive or fugitive traffic is different from that of innocent traffic.  At altitude, the headwaters are 
easier to cross, ancient pathways lead in all directions, and the urgent traveler can impose 
intolerable costs and risks on his pursuers.  That is to say, the escaper can shorten the distance to 
the pursuer‟s culminating point, the pursuer‟s risk distance.  Any traveler has to be patient in 
such a region, as passage is not as fast as it would be going around the „long‟ way.  The cost 
distances are great.  For the guerrilla it helps to have rifles and landmines in order to further 
decrement the already disproportionately short risk distances faced by the pursuers. 
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Figure 58 highlights several highly conflictive counties in the northern Cauca/south-
eastern Valle del Cauca region, most of which have appeared on government plans and 
prioritizations as counties needing special attention.  In Figure 58, I also included Inzá, Jamundí 
and Yumbo counties because they are a focus of attention elsewhere in the text.  They do not 
today receive special government priority, but they are sites of historic tomas and massacres.  
Figure 59 shows the „consolidation‟ counties selected from out of the northern Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca region by the Colombian military as recent priorities.  The image in Figure 59 is an 
example of many similar „stoplight‟ graphics that show where guerrilla presence is greatest 
within the counties.  In all these graphics, green is good and red is bad, meaning more guerrilla 
presence in red areas.  The pattern is almost universal; the red areas are uphill.  Figure 60 is of 
Miranda county, which I chose from among its neighbors because that county‟s website had the 
best looking map, but also because it may be a somewhat exaggerated example.  What it relates, 
however, is typical of hundreds of counties in Colombia.  Watercourses often invited the original 
political shapes of the counties.  The deciders created a political geography in Miranda that is 
longer than wide and within which the physical geography includes lowland, foothill, and 
mountain terrain.  Figure 122 shows a spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in the area.  
As might be expected, the people of Miranda experience landmines in the upsloping part of their 
county that leads toward the Nevado del Huila sanctuary.  The political shape of Miranda county 
came into being partly because the river boundaries were easy to see and maintain.  The shapes 
also owe to travel cost-distances.  In Miranda county, the walking paths uphill snake along and 
between the larger streams.  In effect, the shape of Miranda county is a typical shape for 
smuggling geography.  Control of the Miranda county government could be especially useful to 
the smuggler, or to a guerrilla.  The location of Miranda County within the country is also 
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favorable for the smuggler in that a major urban center, Cali, is not far away (downhill to the 
west).  Large urban centers facilitate the smugglers‟ search for money laundering opportunities 
and for selling product.  Figures 88 and 89 on pages 250 and 251 show that many of the counties 
of the Santa Marta Region have the same combination of political and physical geographic 
attributes.  Like Miranda County the smuggler counties of Santa Marta are in close proximity to 
a major city, Santa Marta.  Likewise, counties outside Bogotá or Medellín enjoy similar sets of 
contraband-favorable characteristics.  Colombia does not just offer mountainous terrain to the 
smuggler. 
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Figure 57: Zoom in the elevation model to the Nevado del Huila area. 
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Figure 58: Selected counties and major national parks. (base data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 59: Red/Yellow/Green analysis of priority counties.  Red means most guerrilla presence.  Red also correlates 
generally to the uphill slope.  Note Miranda County in the middle of the set. 
 
Figure 60: Miranda County. (Alcaldía de Miranda, Cauca 2013) Note the political shape and the terrain types.  
Uphill is to the east, to the right.  Miranda is the northernmost county in Cauca Department.  Landmine 
phenomena occur in the middle of the county, in the lower uphill portion of the county. (See Figure 122). 
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The effect of gravity 
 Gravity is among those few „independent‟ variables to affect human behavior and 
outcomes in human competition.  With some limited if spectacular exceptions, gravity controls 
our behavior, not vice versa.  In Colombia and in irregular wars generally, the cumulative effect 
of gravity can be summarized by the effect it causes during escape and pursuit.  (Figure 60) is a 
stylized rendering of a digital elevation model at very small scale.  It shows a small network of 
mountain streams flowing downhill from east to west, the topography the result of millennia of 
erosive action in a wet climate.  During a typical pursuit, the party under duress, that is, the 
group trying to escape, typically will move uphill, in this case from west to east.  At point A, on 
the left or west side of the image, where two watercourses conflow, is a point at which the 
pursuing force (in Colombia, in the vast majority of occasions government forces will be the 
pursuers) faces  a decision.  The leader of the pursuing force has to decide whether to go left or 
right, up one valley or the other.  If he chooses incorrectly, his pursuit will likely fail.  If he 
divides his force, his strength diminishes by half and he may subject part of it to encirclement 
and ambush.  Therefore, regardless of any other factor, or any action on the part of the pursued, 
the distance to the culminating point of the pursuing force, its perceived risk distance, has been 
shortened. (remembering that the culminating point is that theoretical point in time and space 
beyond which it is imprudent (too risky) to proceed).  Gravity alone has given a distinct 
advantage to the party trying to escape uphill, especially in wet terrain.  The fugitive can amplify 
if not multiply the advantage by using landmines or snipers.  Moreover, this single gravity-
induced effect on a pursuer‟s risk distance has a direct spatial relationship to otherwise remote 
communities.  Many of the rural communities of greatest interest to the contestants in the 
Colombian armed conflict are those just downhill from that point on the ground where the 
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pursuer is challenged with the decision to go left or right.  Tacueyó, Toribío County, Cauca is 
one such town. 
Looking at Figure 61, suppose that a fugitive group is being chased uphill toward the top 
of this nominal terrain.  When the pursuing group gets to a certain point (marked with a red X on 
the drawing), and supposing the pursuers do not know up which of the streams, left or right, the 
fugitives went, the risk distance for that pursuing force shrinks just by the fact of having to make 
a decision imposed by the terrain.  The fugitives would much prefer the people in the town at the 
bottom of the hill not tell the pursuers which way they were likely to have gone.  Compare this 
nominal map to the map in Figure 61 of Toribío County, Cauca, Colombia.  Note the town of 
Tacueyó and its surroundings in the upper middle part of the map. Tacueyó has been a recurrent 
scene of dramatic mortal events in the Colombian conflict. 
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Figure 61: A nominal, typical point at which risk distance decreases in armed pursuits.  As the pursuers reach point 
X on their way uphill, they face a decision, all else being equal) as to which way to go.  Both a  wrong choice or a 
decision to split their force impose an element of greater risk. 
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Figure 62: Autochthonous, informal map of Toribío County, Cauca, Colombia. (Toribío, Sitio oficial de Toribío en 
Cauca 2012) Note the location of Tacueyó in the upper center.  Note how similar the terrain is to the nominal map 
in Figure 61. 
 
The effect of jungles 
 In contemplating the weight of slope as a factor of fugitive success, the question of 
densely vegetated terrain might draw the question how it is that vast flat areas of selva (jungle) in 
Colombia have also been prominent features in both coca cultivation and FARC survival.  If all 
else being equal the balance of risk distances in mountain terrain favors the fugitive, then why 
does it appear that jungle terrain does as well?  The logic does not center on slope or ruggedness 
of terrain, although such topography serves to highlight the logic.  The logic remains one of 
relative risk distances, especially during the pursuit. 
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If a guerrilla base area or intended sanctuary were well down-river, we can suppose the 
speed of movement of both pursuer and pursued to be the same, given equal technologies, and 
that the pursuers‟ problem of knowing which route the fugitives are taking is much simplified.  
The fugitive, however, can set ambushes along the banks as they pass downriver.  In other 
words, the escapees can still increase the risk distances of the pursuer.  The pursued can 
artificially decrease the distance to the pursuers‟ culminating point.  Moreover, at some point the 
pursuing force has to go home, has to go back up river.  If they do not bring along enough food, 
bullets and fresh water to get back home, they face an uphill pursuit in which the pursuer 
(formerly pursued) might not suffer the disadvantage of ignorance regarding the routes back to 
base of the government force.  The calculation of getting back home is part of the initial 
calculation of distance to the culminating point. 
Although ambushes present unique challenges in jungle terrain, the more significant 
operational effect of Colombia‟s jungles is simple Euclidean distance, combined with the fact 
that older technologies used to overcome distances are easily suppressible.  Airplanes, for 
instance, require airstrips.  A fugitive force can easily prevent the use of an isolated jungle 
airstrip by using simple barriers and small arms fire.  Roads are sparse and are subject to easy 
ambush, as are the rivers.  Although steepness and ruggedness of the surface is nothing 
compared to the mountainous highlands of the cordilleras, the fugitive can create much of the 
same decision perplexity for the pursuer using the slight increases in terrain elevations between 
many of the rivers.  In addition, the guerrillas have been ingenious in creating decision 
conundrums for their pursuers by creating false pathways and booby-trapping others. 
Many of the jungle areas still pose an extreme disease threat as well, and for soldiers who 
are not properly acclimatized, trained and protected, the terrain presents daunting health 
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challenges.  Cost distances can be higher in jungle areas during some parts of the year than 
mountain terrain, as a few of  the military setbacks suffered by the government (such as at Las 
Delicias, Billar and Miraflores) attest.  The fugitive FARC has been able find and build 
sanctuary in jungle terrain, but that ecosystem is clearly not the FARC leaders‟ preference.  They 
have constantly tried to move headquarters back up hill, back in the direction of the old 
repúbliquetas.  Over the same years, the government has extended the distances to its 
culminating points during jungle pursuits by increasing the number of personnel, but also by 
applying better intelligence, much of it highly technical.  Aircraft operating range and loitering 
times have increased, and remote sensing of human presence has advanced greatly.  As the 
government has overcome FARC advantages for escape in both mountainous and lowland 
selvatico (densely vegetated jungle) jungle terrains, the FARC has increasingly had to depend on 
the advantage provided by international borders. 
 
The effect of borders 
 If we were to imagine a daring, defiant rabbit whose mission in life was to eat carrots 
right in front of every dog in the neighborhood and then run, and if every dog in the 
neighborhood were collared to a long chain, the rabbit would only have to outrun the dogs to the 
ends of the dogs‟ chains.  That space beyond all of the chains is sanctuary for the rabbit, but if 
there were no space outside the length of all the chains, the rabbit will likely be consigned to his 
fate -- if all the dogs are alert and resolute.  The chains define a specific geographic limitation for 
each dog.  It is imposed by the dog‟s master because the master feels he or she takes too much 
risk to allow the dog to go free, not perhaps because of the danger posed by pirate rabbits, but 
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because of other dogs and other masters.  International borders act on national armies in a similar 
way as the chains work on the dogs. 
The national borders of Colombia have a similar, unequal effect during pursuit and 
escape as does the country‟s mountainous terrain or jungle expanses.  The international borders 
greatly favor any fugitive trying to escape official Colombian government pursuers by shortening 
the risk distances of those pursuers, usually without at all shortening the risk distances of the 
fugitives.  When the fugitive comes to an international border he is rarely slowed by it.  In 
accordance with strict instructions from their hierarchies, Colombian Army and police units, 
meanwhile, have been careful to respect the borders, and to not cross into neighboring sovereign 
territory.  The boundaries are themselves generally the product of some degree of physical 
remoteness.  The Serranía de Perijá to the west of Lake Maracaibo, for instance, or the dense and 
swampy Darien region of Panama are examples.  Many miles of Colombia‟s national borders 
were to some degree set as long river thalwegs, mountain crest lines, or in the middle of dense 
jungles in order that border remoteness would itself help avoid border conflict -- either by clarity 
of demarcation, indifference due to inaccessibility or both.  Border agreements are logically 
easier to achieve when there are few economic rights at issue and few personal wealth interests 
enter to sway negotiations.  These characteristics are attractive to the establishers of smuggling 
routes, as well.  Those same routes are of course going to attract a politically-motivated guerrilla 
that must secretively move weapons and personnel.  In Colombia, ancient smuggling experience, 
and long-established tactical knowledge and informal ownership of the best smuggling routes by 
extended smuggling families have historically bumped these families up against the guerrillas 
needing to use the same routes.  Sometimes the families overlap, sometimes the smugglers share 
political partisanship or ideology with the guerrillas, sometimes a deal can be reached, 
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sometimes the guerrillas do little more for the smugglers than to attract unwanted government 
forces to the area, and sometimes the government agents have already made business bargains 
with the smugglers.  The possible admixtures vary greatly, but the best terrain remains the same, 
and whatever group can best establish a favorable balance of risk distances is the group most 
likely to survive.  The bringing of existential power, in the form of credible threat, is often the 
prevailing method in a given region.  The fight for smuggling routes in Colombia does no 
disservice to those who will assert that political power grows out the barrel of a gun.  To the 
extent an area is remote, the dominant rule might very well be that might makes right. 
 The international borders of Colombia apparently have not been correlated with violence 
consistently over time.  Socorro Ramírez looked carefully at that relationship.  (Gutiérrez, et al. 
2006, pp. 121-137).  It seems that, according to at least one data set, between 1980 and 1997, 
only two of the eighteen most violent counties in Colombia were border counties, these being 
Saravena and Arauca in Arauca Department along the border with Venezuela.  The border 
counties make up only seven percent of the total of counties, but fifty-seven percent of those 
counties suffered a presence of guerrilla or paramilitary presence.  A high percentage of that was 
along the border with Venezuela.  As the illegal armed groups attached themselves to coca, and 
as the intensity of the war increased (especially after Álvaro Uribe became president) the border 
counties were increasing affected.   
“Guerrillas and paramilitaries also took advantage of the weakness or absence of 
the state along the international borders to increase their presence there; seek 
certain kinds of logistical support from neighboring countries; use strategic 
corridors in order to control roads or routes by which to move drugs, weapons and 
contraband such as gasoline, and vie for territorial control where there were 
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important resources or coca cultivations and processing laboratories.” (Gutiérrez, 
et al. 2006, p. 131). 
 
The Ramírez quote above is quite typical.  Even in essays that aim to discuss 
geostrategic, psychological, social or ideological factors, the description of what is going on 
always devolves to a containable set of geographic factors.  Among these are “weakness or 
absence of the state.”  What that means quickly becomes clear.  The government of Colombia, in 
a given area within Colombia, does not have sufficient relative power to keep an illegal armed 
group from getting away with doing something illegal.  The government is not able to close a 
space of untouchable action.  As the government‟s efforts to expand its coercive capability grew 
after the peace process with the FARC collapsed, the war pushed outward toward the borders, 
even as the illegal groups strived to expand coca revenues, which also contributed to a drift 
toward the international borders.  
This game of rebalancing risk distances, which could be likened to some sort of 
intuitive/experiential map algebra in which the distances of all players to their respective 
culminating points are constantly re-evaluated, affected and then articulated in deadly practice, is 
the ultima ratio of success in the Colombian war.  Socio-economic conditions, legal innovations 
and reforms, propagandistic fashion, electoral organization, international boundaries, and other 
human geographic factors interact with several distinct physical geographical phenomena. All of 
it greatly raises the value of a leaders‟ coup d`oeil (ability to measure the competitive advantages 
and disadvantages of terrain at a glance). 
 
A risk distance interpretation of Colombian armed conflict 
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 What follows in this subsection is a proof in multiple anecdotal form of the assertions 
made above.  I sorted descriptions of several events into five broad categories: Massacres, Tomas 
(takings or occupations), Manhunts, Battles, and Zones.  The categories assist in focusing on the 
cause and effect of differential risk distances.  Although the temporal order of the events within 
the categories is correct, their use jumbles the correct temporal order of their overall occurrence 
in the presentation.  Taking such a liberty can do disservice to a reader‟s comprehension or 
inference regarding events‟ causations, especially given the high probability that the actors in 
almost every case were acutely aware of the prior happenings.  As a partial remedy I include as 
appendices an Excel spreadsheet and a less inclusive Word document of events in their proper 
temporal order.  The events I selected for discussion within the categories seemed outstanding as 
milestones of the war according to the way they are treated in Colombian literature and 
conversation, and because they seem to me representative of the type, including and especially as 
to the nature of the geographies in which they occurred.  The categories obey a sense of scale 
that might best be understood according to the point/line/polygon habits of current automated 
cartographic practice, that is, the trigon of visualizing power in which Geographic Information 
Science is invested.  In the descriptions of events available to me, massacres, and tomas are 
expressed as point events, occurring in this or that location.  Manhunts and battles more often 
require some drawing of lines and movements, while the larger military operations (with their 
multitudes of aggregated events), or the „civic action‟ kinds of efforts and programs to control 
territory are described in relation to some form of space.  When faced with the need to describe 
Colombian violence over a large area and long span of time, thinking in terms of points, lines, 
and polygons is a valuable mental exercise.  Dr. David Spencer, a foremost expert on the 
Colombian conflict, described the Colombian Army‟s approach to the war as having “three lines 
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of strategic action: active area control, sustained offensive operations, and special operations.” 
(Spencer 2010, p. 69)  Those who envisioned and implemented GIS attacked the problem of 
organizing knowledge for ease of analysis and depiction, responding to the conditions of life and 
language as we see and hear them, and I believe this is born out in a comprehensive look at 
Colombia‟s internal warfare.  Violent events in Colombia happened at some point on the ground, 
or a „point in time‟; or they happened along that river or ridge, or „over time‟; or they happened 
throughout that county, or during that period. 
“In February of 2012 a campaign named Sword of Honor began implementation, 
which was designed according to a new war plan with the goal of hitting and 
dismembering the FARC and the ELN on three levels: Command and control 
(leaders), armed structures, and support networks.” (LaTarde.com, 2013) (my 
translation). 
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Figure 63: Location of some events discussed below in Massacres, Tomas, and Battles. (using ArcGIS with base data 
from SIGOT 2013). 
Massacres 
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Colombia laments a long tradition of massacres, many with political undertones.   In 1928, the 
nascent Socialist Revolutionary Party organized a large workers strike against the United Fruit 
Company at its Colombian Plantations at Ciénaga Grande near the Atlantic Coast town of Santa 
Marta.  A local command of the Colombian Army broke up the strike by firing into the crowd.  
The number of victims has become one of the adjustable elements in Colombian political 
narratives.  The strike was a failure, causing a loss of pay and a schism among the organizers.  
That schism birthed the Communist Party of Colombia, however.  The massacre at Ciénaga 
Grande is the grandfather of twentieth century Colombian massacres -- a failure for the banana 
workers became, nevertheless, propagandistic gold for the radical left. 
Most of the massacres selected for exposition in this section were not perpetrated using 
planted explosive devices (Nogal being the notable exception), although there have been many 
killings using explosive artifacts.  None of the massacres described below involved contact 
between an anti-government armed group and a unit of the government armed forces.  Plenty of 
those occurred, but I would more than likely have placed them in the „battles‟ category.  The 
massacres chosen highlight an environment of violent habit and context that allows an odd array 
of excesses, each with its own character.  The reasons for massacres include control of territory, 
paranoia, or revenge.  Guerrillas and paramilitaries often perpetrated a massacre to enforce 
preservation of anonymity and silence regarding illegal and materially profitable activity.  Some 
massacres were retributional, but still closely associated with a need on the part of the illegal 
groups to preserve anonymity.  With tomas, rapes, and selected murders, massacres are the 
mainstay of violent presencia (presence) efforts to delineate domination and submission.  
“Massacres are spaces of interaction where the armed actors do presencia in order 
to deploy their real and symbolic logic as a form of exercising, reiterating and 
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disputing power.  In the same sense, they are a symbolic venue of the violence to 
the degree they are full of meanings, symbolisms, and messages given by the 
actors for themselves and for others.” (González et al. 2002, p. 72) (my 
translation). 
 Massaces appear to have changed the direction of Colombian public psychology, marked 
changes in the fortunes of the contending groups, and exposed internal divisions or loss of 
leadership either in the government armed forces or inside the non- or anti-government armed 
groups.  Sometimes the massacres appear to have been just horrible mistakes or the work of the 
criminally insane. (Cuesta, José 2002)  Colombians consider some of the massacres to have been 
turning points in the war.  Some massacres appear to support the hypothesis that the most 
dangerous places in Colombia are „geographies of impunity‟ wherein or through which fugitives 
find sanctuary.  Other massacres do not appear to support that hypothesis. 
 There exist various working definitions of the word massacre (or its cognates -- masacre, 
in Colombian Spanish, for instance).  Those definitions have an effect on statistics and stories.  
One recognized measure of a massacre in Colombia is four persons killed in a single incident 
(González et al. ibid.), which is a standard used by a number of international organizations.  I 
was told by a Colombian presidential candidate a number of years ago, however, that if fewer 
than ten persons -- soldiers, policemen, civilians -- were killed in a single incident, the 
Colombian public would not take notice, inured as it was to news of homicide. (Demarest 1989, 
p. 143)  To earn the label masacre in Colombia, an event had to reach some appreciable level of 
public recognition and impact, which meant at least ten dead victims.  All the massacres 
highlighted in this section take their name from the place in which they occurred.  That fact by 
itself is revealing.  The massacres rarely are named after the people killed or the people doing the 
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killing.  There exists a palpable Colombian sense that where the event happened runs to the 
cause of why it happened.  Another word, atrocity, perhaps spans both massacres and genocides, 
but that word seems to have gained no legal or mathematical definition, as have the other two.  I 
do not believe any recent events in Colombia merit consideration as genocidal.  The notorious 
Colombian cases offered below, out of many dozens, highlight some divergence in the identity of 
perpetrators and victims of massacres in Colombia, and yet most share a geographical 
commonality – one that a consideration of risk distances exposes.  Significantly, some massacres 
are not surrounded by the geographic phenomena that build an advantageous differential in risk 
distances during a pursuit by an armed group after another.  This absence may accompany 
another – the event is not one in which one force is trying to get away from another.  It is not a 
flight to sanctuary.  In some other cases where escape-geography is absent, the fugitives do not 
get away.  
 
Tacueyó 
 During a take-over of the town of Tacueyó, in Cauca Department, it appears that a few 
pro-government individuals may have attempted to infiltrate the dissident „Ricardo Franco‟ 
guerrillas.  At the time, the Ricardo Franco column was already greatly at odds with other 
members of the CGSB (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar, Simon Bolivar Guerrilla 
Coordinator).  It seems José Fedor, alias Javier Delgado, had run off with some money belonging 
to the FARC secretariat in order to form his own group.  In any case, at the time, the Ricardo 
Franco front was in good shape financially.  Recruiting was positive, with a number of students 
and others voluntarily arriving.  Fedor, already an unstable if charismatic personality, became 
increasingly paranoid and upon being informed of the possible infiltration, began weeks of 
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torture/executions of at least 164 men and women, almost all of whom were sympathetic to the 
guerrillas and the leftist revolutionary movement.  Author José Cuesta (Cuesta 2002) asserts that 
the event constitutes the beginning of broad public disillusionment with the FARC guerrilla, 
even though the Ricardo Franco column was clearly a rogue group and treated as such by the 
FARC Secretariat and the CGSB.  The massacre was discovered publicly around December 13, 
1985, not long after the unrelated M-19 takeover of the Colombian Supreme Court Building and 
the natural disaster that buried the town of Armero in Tolima.  The coincidence served perhaps 
to amplify a generalized sense of insecurity.  Although it was mostly FARC renegades killing 
themselves, the Tacueyó massacre is generally marked as an event that took away much of the 
favorable opinion held perhaps by a majority of Colombians that the FARC was a guerrilla with 
noble goals. 
 The town of Tacueyó in Toribío county is a logical target for presence operations, located 
as it is en-route to and from the high ground of the central cordillera and placed below a junction 
that is paradigmatic for the shortening of the distance to a pursuer‟s culminating point.   
(See figures 61, 62).  Perhaps we cannot say that the massacre was caused by the dynamic of 
pursuit and escape.  It is better explained as individual psychosis within a generalized 
environment of armed conflict and widespread impunity.  However, the location of the massacre 
and the place origins of most of the victims can be ascribed to Tacueyo‟s paradigmatic escape 
geography. 
 
La Chinita 
 In the La Chinita neighborhood of the town of Apartadó, Uraba (figures 63, 75, p. 211), 
an evening attack during a town celebration on January 23, 1994 left 35 dead, mostly young 
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men.  (Apartado, by the way, means remote).  The action was a reprisal for failure of 
commitment, growing out of differences between the Frente Popular, the political party of the 
EPL guerrilla organization and the Union Patriótica, the political party of the FARC (Aranguren 
2001, p. 21) (Museo Casa de la Memoria 2011).  As with other Colombian massacres, La Chinita 
cannot properly be considered in isolation.  FARC had been attempting to wrest power in the 
zone from the EPL, and attacked demobilized EPL fighters as traitors to the revolution and to 
arrest increases by the EPL in legitimate political power.  According to Carlos Castaño, many 
EPL fighters joined the AUC. 
Chinita was really just the beginning of another round of hyper violence, during a year seeing 
several massacres in the same area (El Tiempo 1995).  On August 12 that year, AUC guerrillas 
killed seventeen persons in Bosque de Chigorodó County at a discotheque called the Aracatazo.  
It was followed quickly on August 19 by a mass killing perpetrated by the FARC in Churio 
Pueblo also in Apartadó County.  On August 29 the FARC killed another sixteen in Zungo 
Corregimiento in neighboring Carepa County (Semana May 2004), then murdered six more in 
Pueblo Galleta on September 6, and so it went.  Apartadó is located along a smuggling corridor 
and not far from the upslopes leading from the Panamanian border to the Paramillo high ground 
to the east.  However, this case, like the Jamundí and Bojayá  massacres, was not one in which 
one group was fleeing and another group chasing.  The victims were not engaged by their 
initiative.  They did not have a chance to confound the decision-making of their pursuers by the 
use of landmines or to otherwise increase the risk distances of the pursuers.  This, like all the 
massacres included in this section, are milestones of the war that expose a variety of criminal 
motivations and organization schisms.  The risk distance theory does not suggest a cause of 
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violence.  The purposeful conditioning of a pursuer‟s risk distances does not cause massacres, 
nor does it delimit the places wherein mass violence might ocurr. 
 
Trujillo 
 Trujillo is a county north of Cali in Valle del Cauca Department. (Figure 66).  Trujillo is 
also the name given to what is really a series of massacres in about the same place.  I have been 
told that of all the named massacres, Trujillo is perhaps that event and place which best serves as 
emblem of the country‟s incivility -- Trujillo as the microcosm of Colombian violence and 
almost synonymous with Colombian massacre.  Various armed actors killed well over three 
hundred persons near Trujillo.  Most efficient were members of the AUC and the Cali drug 
cartel, who dumped many body parts into the Cauca River.  Almost all of the victims were 
activists of one kind or another, often accused by the perpetrators of their deaths as supporting 
the leftist guerrillas.  Many collusions and cross-corruptions were involved, and a long local 
history of partisan political killings preceded the greatest massacre spikes, which occurred 
between 1990 and 1994.  The details form a complex drama that Colombians periodically return 
to reinvestigate.  One of the latest and most thorough investigations is titled A tragedy that does 
not cease (Guisado 2008).  Of significance to this dissertation is the following pair of statements 
from that report: 
“Before analyzing these crossing conflicts, it is necessary to highlight the 
importance of the county‟s strategic location, since its closeness to the Canyon of 
the Garrapatas converts it into a key site for assuring an exit to the Pacific.  
Trujillo finds itself located in the foothills of the western cordillera, on its eastern 
slope...And although it forms part of the central Valle sub-region, whose epicenter 
197 
 
is Tulua, its historic and socio-economic dynamic draws it closer to the counties 
on the internal slope of the western cordillera.” (Ibid., p. 90). 
“The drug traffickers intervened in events as retaliation for the kidnappings, 
extortions and assaults on their property, as well as for the territorial competition 
related to the control of access to the Canyon of the Garrapatas due to its 
importance for the drug trade.” (Ibid., p. 160). 
The theme reflected in the above quotations is recurrent; in the Guisado report, the word 
Garrapatas is used fourteen times.  Notice in Figure 67 that the map displays no landmine 
phenomena at the southern end of the department where the Garrapatas River flows to the 
northwest out of the cordillera and out of Valle del Cauca department.  Smugglers are going 
downhill by the time they get to Chocó.  They are less likely to travel uphill to the southeast, and 
few authorities are situated so as to pursue them uphill if they do. 
 
198 
 
 
Figure 64: Map of Trujillo area from Historical Memory report. (Guisado 2008)  The territories shown are the 
county’s townships (veredas).  The legend lists places of ambushes, forced disappearances, torture centers, and 
forced disappearances and murders.  The arrows indicate the main movement of victims.  Many of the victims’ 
bodies were dumped in pieces into the Cauca River, shown. 
 
199 
 
 
Figure 65: The Garrapatas smuggling area. (CERAC  2008 citing Andres Mesa as preparer) Shown by the arrows are 
the Garrapatas River, Garrapatas Ridge and the Cauca River. 
 
Figure 66: The Garrapatas smuggling area with possible smuggling route in red. (base map Cartur. 2005b)  There 
are no roads to the coast, but Trujillo is nonetheless a transportation hub for contraband. 
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Figure 67: Spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in Chocó Department. (Presidencia de la República 2013).  
Few landmine incidents were reported on the western slope of the cordillera, suggesting few armed pursuits. 
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Mapiripán 
 In July, 1997 a group of anti-communist guerrillas from the AUC, having apparently 
traveled to the area from Urabá in the northern department of Córdoba, murdered dozens of 
people in Mapiripán, Meta Department, which is located on the Guaviare River east of San José 
del Guaviare.  Its location is shown on the maps in figures 63, 68 and 69.  It has been little more 
than a secondary marina and refueling point along the river.  In 2013 there are claims that a 
paved road will soon be completed from Las Guacamayas to the northwest.  Mapiripán hardly 
seems as remote a place as Barranco Minas a hundred or so miles further down river and out of 
reach of any roads, but for a while at least, Barranco Minas was a boomtown.  Mapiripán had 
about fifteen hundred to seventeen hundred inhabitants in 2000, three years after the massacre 
and apparently has three or four hundred fewer today. (Alcaldía de Mapiripán, Meta 2013).  
Mestizo colonizers began to arrive along that stretch of the Guaviare after WWII.  Displacement 
of some tribal peoples occurred, but those populations were sparse.  The colonizing increased as 
coca cultivation and processing operations induced a labor migration. 
The route along the Guaviare was of almost no consequence to licit economic exchanges, 
but the area was easily adaptable to coca cultivation and smuggling of coca base products using 
the Guaviare River, most often downriver to the Orinoco and into Venezuela.  Along with a need 
for labor to pick coca leaf and process coca paste came competitors.  By the mid-1990s, the 
FARC was already established further up the Guaviare and its headwaters of the Duda and 
Guayabero rivers.  The FARC was quickly gaining control of more and more coca suitable 
terrain and found it convenient if not imperative to influence major access points along the 
Guaviare River.  The AUC (the foundational mission of which was to combat the FARC) made 
some overly simple determinations about severing the FARC‟s Guaviare line of communication.  
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Cuting a major FARC line of communication would indeed have been a significant blow to the 
FARC, but the AUC misjudged the distances involved.  That is to say, the AUC attempted to 
hurt the FARC beyond the AUC units‟ risk distances.  The AUC perpetrated a massacre with the 
intent to change the overall psychological condition of the isolated community around 
Mapiripán.  Rather than fear FARC reprisals, the community was to fear the AUC.  The AUC 
would impose rules of silence in its favor, extract information about the FARC, and dissuade 
locals from providing FARC units the logistical support they needed during long movements up 
and down the Guaviare River. 
The AUC, however, did not have enough strength to maintain large enough numbers of 
foot soldiers in the area, at least not unless the AUC could count on indifference from the 
Colombian Army units all along its own lines of communication and retreat.  The AUC, at least 
without some level of support from the government, was operating beyond its risk distance. 
 Many Colombian recountings of the Mapiripán massacre highlight a pair of features.  The 
Colombian Army appears to have had sufficient advance notice an impending massacre that it 
probably could have moved troops into the town in order to stop the AUC from committing the 
massacre.  Some debate continues about the issue, but in any case, Colombian courts found 
negligence or failure of duty to protect on the part of the government.  Upon that finding a court 
ordered monetary awards for wrongful death to a number of Mapiripán families.  The massacre 
at Mapiripán in 1997 added to a mood of defeat and perhaps a lowered sense of government 
legitimacy in the intangible balance between the government and the FARC.  At Mapiripán, the 
victims were part of the pro-FARC population.  Within a year or two, the FARC regained 
dominating presence in the area.  Paradoxically, perhaps, some of the murder victims showed up 
alive in recent years, causing a number of fraud cases to be prosecuted. 
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Figure 68: A stretch of the Guaviare River with San José del Guaviare. (Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center 
1992)  Mapiripán is on the north bank of the river, in Meta Department. 
 
Figure 69: Cropping from the Meta Department map showing Mapiripán. (Instituto Nacional de Geografía, IGAC 
2003b).  Note that the area to the south of the river is called Sabanas de la Fuga, which translates roughly to the 
Plains of the Escape.  Downriver from Mapiripán is a place called Puerto Alvira north of which is a place called 
Refugio de Sordos Ciudad del Silencio, which translates to Refuge of the Deaf, City of Silence.  Quite possibly these 
names were assigned by smugglers. 
Mapiripán 
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Machuca 
 Machuca is a small town located along the Pocuné River in Segovia County, in eastern 
Antioquia.  Unfortunate about its location is that one of the major oil pipelines passes near the 
town upriver.  On October 18, 1998, the ELN blew up the pipe, spilling thousands of gallons of 
oil into the river, which caught fire, burned down the town and killed eighty-four people, half of 
them children. (Grupo de Memoria Histórica 2013, p 101)  At first the ELN tried to deflect 
public outrage onto the police, but eventually admitted the crime, claiming, plausibly, that the 
killing of the townspeople was unintentional.  In 2012 the National Police asserted they had 
captured the intellectual author of the disaster, an ELN comandante.  Segovia County has long 
been the scene of armed violence.  A decade earlier the AUC entered the county seat and killed 
what is still an uncounted number of persons, perhaps into the dozens.  Segovia County borders 
on the counties in southern Bolivar (Medio Magdalena, Serranía de San Lucas, 
Barrancabermeja) known as a center of guerrilla presence and organized violence, and of coca 
cultivations.  The county is also a center of gold and silver mining, much of it informal.  In fact, 
most recently the FARC and perhaps ELN remnants are shifting from coca toward gold and 
silver -- taxing and extorting miners and mining concerns.  At any rate, the dreadful plight of 
dozens of families in Machuca owes little to socio-economic conditions there or anywhere, at 
least not for a while.  Their heritage in the area reached back to the successful resistance of 
escaped slaves and the establishment of the eighteenth century autonomous palenques.  They 
were where they were as a direct result of an ancient escape.  They settled, however, not in a 
poor place, but in one that had the wrong combination of economically lucrative targets and 
terrain suitable for getting away with violent acts. 
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Figure 70: Machuca in Segovia County, Antioquia.  Note the road network and the San Lucas Mountains in the 
upper center of the map.  By all accounts, the populace of Machuca was not directly involved in the war, but 
suffered due to their town’s location along a pipeline, within a contraband movement corridor, and close to the 
bitterly contested Barrancabermeja. 
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Figure 71: Bojayá in Bojayá County, Chocó Department.  The major road network is in red.  Bojayá is not located on 
an upslope or along an escape route to a guerrilla sanctuary.  It is located along a major smuggling avenue, the 
Atraco River, and apparently along lesser east-west paths leading to and from the Pacific coast.  It is twins with the 
Antioquia town of Vagía del Fuerte across the river.  Vagía del Fuerte is also a frequently contested town among 
contraband groups. 
 
 
 
207 
 
Bojayá 
 The Bojayá massacre of May 2, 2002 occurred in the context of a battle between two 
contending guerrilla groups, the FARC and the now disbanded AUC (there were many instances 
in which the government and the AUC colluded, but this was not one of them).  In 2002, the 
FARC launched gas cylinders at a church in which maybe five hundred civilians had taken 
refuge in fear of an ensuing battle between units of the FARC and units of the AUC.  The gas 
cylinders are a primitive style of artillery, but effective.  One of them went through the roof and 
exploded on the altar, killing around 120 civilians, many of whom were children.  The United 
Nations cited the AUC for using the villagers as a shield and for pillaging), and the FARC was 
also subjected to international condemnation.  In this case, the populace was trapped in the midst 
of a battle that the participants had announced.  The battle might have taken place farther to the 
east, on the Antioquia side of the Atraco, or perhaps almost anywhere in the near environs.  The 
armed groups had attempted to deceive and out-maneuver each other during the days preceding 
the engagement.  However, the territorial prize was the advantageous spot along smuggling 
routes where the towns of Bojayá and Vigía del Fuerte are located.  As can be seen in Figure 71, 
the twin towns are hours travel from the next community of any size.  As in the case of 
Mapiripán, some observers felt that the Colombian Army had failed a duty to protect the people 
of Bojayá.  On the strength of that criticism, Bojayá became the object of a variety of 
government reconstruction efforts.  The town, however, remains at an epicenter of contraband 
movement.  We might classify the Bojayá massacre as more of a criminal negligence than an 
attempt to influence the town psychologically.  In any case, what exposed the population to mass 
killing relates to the physical location of the town and not to any cultural or ethnic attribute nor 
the town‟s economic performance. 
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La Gabarra 
 La Gabarra is located in the northern part of the Catatumbo area (figures 72, 95,96) along 
the Catatumbo River that flows to the northeast toward Lake Maracaibo in Venezuela.  The town 
is located in the middle of one of Colombia‟s most dense coca growing zones.  There is a 
substantial bridge at La Gabarra, located about ten miles from the international border with 
Venezuela and the bi-national Catatumbo-Bari parks.  It sits about fifty miles from the county 
seat at Tibú.  La Gabarra is on a navigable river, has a bridge, and is in an isolated area near an 
international border in an area highly suitable for growing cocaine coca.  La Gabarra has also 
been the scene of numerous massacres, mostly perpetrated by the AUC or the FARC.  In 1999, in 
one of the most notorious events, the AUC entered town and killed about thirty-five coca pickers 
who were working directly or indirectly for the FARC.  In 2004, the FARC killed almost the 
same number of pickers, who were working directly or indirectly for the AUC.  As in the cases 
associated with the La Chinita massacres in Apartadó, Antioquia, the Gabarra killings did not 
occur in the context of escape and pursuit.  They did occur, however, in a movement corridor 
highly valuable for the purpose of escape after predation.  The various geographic elements that 
favor perpetrator are all geographically proximate, but the killings were distinctly motivated.  
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Figure 72: La Gabarra in The Catatumbo, with La Gabarra indicated by the red arrow. See also figures 95, p. 260 
and 96, p. 261). 
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Nogal 
 The Club Nogal, located along 7
th
 Avenue at about 79th street in Bogotá is one of the 
most exclusive private clubs in the country.  On February 7, 2003, agents of the FARC detonated 
a huge car bomb in the third-floor parking garage, dropping part of the eleven story building, 
killing thirty-six persons and wounding about two hundred more.  It was Colombia‟s single 
worst bombing attack.  Although the government immediately accused the FARC, the FARC 
initially denied responsibility, perhaps because the efficiency of the device and the public outcry 
in reaction to the killing made the FARC leaders shrink from taking credit.  A variety of 
intelligence discoveries and especially the capture of the FARC computer files that came with 
the killing of Victor Suarez in 2010 put to rest any doubts the government might have had about 
FARC responsibility for the act. (El Tiempo, 2013)  One of the club‟s squash instructors, who 
had secretly been a sympathizer then collaborator with the FARC, brought the bomb into the 
club‟s indoor parking garage.  His anonymity allowed him into what the FARC leaders saw as an 
inner sanctuary of the Colombian elite.  The bomb may very well have detonated sooner than 
expected, or at least ahead of when the squash instructor expected.  He and his uncle were killed 
by the explosion.  Apparently, a third individual remotely detonated the device.  A FARC 
commander known as „Paisa‟ (paisa is a positive nickname for someone from the region of 
greater-Antioquia) was later arrested for the crime.  He was born, by the way, in Remedios, 
Antioquia, one of the recurrent place names in Colombia‟s internal conflicts.  (Mackenzie, 536). 
The geography of pursuit and escape to physical sanctuaries is not a one-sided equation 
in which an insurgent or criminal force is in every instance the fugitive.  In this case, the FARC 
leadership found a way to reach into a physical sanctuary of its enemy.  The details of perpetrator 
anonymity and victim complacency notwithstanding, the action‟s intellectual authors thought of 
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the action as a way to strike at government leaders in a government leader‟s sanctuary.  The 
FARC came upon a way to obviate what was seemingly an extremely short risk distance for a 
pursuer.  The immediate perpetrators did not survive their otherwise effective pursuit.  They, like 
many of the suicide bombers preferred by leaders in other longitudes, were expendible.  At least 
one of the intellectual authors of the attack (who has been convicted and sentenced by the 
Colombian courts) is in 2013 a FARC negotiator in peace talks in Havana. (El Tiempo 2013). 
 
Jamundí 
 On May 6, 2006, a unit of the Colombian Army, on orders from a Cali Cartel drug lord, 
ambushed and killed all the members of an elite Colombian counternarcotics police unit that had 
been trained in good part by the United States.  In Colombia, both the national police and the 
army belong to the Ministry of Defense.  Following the murder, the shock wave of questions, 
investigations, inter-institutional accusations, self-doubt and slumped morale was palpable.  The 
treasonous action related only tangentially to the insurgent war, even while its location reflects 
the influence of the cocaine trade.  Jamundí is a suburb of Cali, home turf of one of the two 
major cocaine cartels, the Cali Cartel.  Although often mentioned as a milestone event in 
Colombia‟s organized violence, the killing at Jamundí did not involve a pursuit.  We might 
torque the theory of risk distance by suggesting  that the counternarcotics police stepped beyond 
their risk distance in not knowing they were about to enter an ambush.  Such an interpretation 
would lead us to conclude that the police had no prudent distance for doing anything at all.  More 
useful to the theory of risk distance is the set of missing geographic phenomena.  Jamundí does 
not set next to an international border nor is it deep in the jungle.  It is not a remote or poor town.  
Jamundí is not situated along a route to a guerrilla sanctuary.  The county of Jamundí does fit the 
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description of typical smuggling counties in that it hosts a combination of lowland piedmont and 
highland terrain.  It may be that some minor contraband routes run through the county to and 
from the pacific coast.  The event, in any case, is not inconsistent with the theory of risk distance.  
The victims were not practiced fugitives (not fugitives at all), and had not calculated any costs of 
their being themselves pursued by a government force.  Meanwhile, the geography surrounding 
the event is relatively unsuited to escape.  The event supports the theory in the negative. 
 
Tomas (Occupations) 
 Tomas and massacres often serve the same psychological purposes, and in practice they 
overlap as to the scale of their mortality.  Many massacres in Colombia are followed by a 
forensic effort.  Some of those efforts are better than others, and they have been getting better 
over time.  That has meant a growing body of evidence that can be made available not only for 
criminal prosecutions, but for civil litigation.  Tomas, too, are subject to increasing legal 
scrutiny, but the tomas are perhaps the more revealing as to the nature of the war itself.  
Although similar in symbolic and political logic to the massacre, the reason for the toma relates 
more directly to where the target community is located on the ground. 
Simacota 
On January 7, 1965 (two months before the FARC‟s first toma in Inzá, Cauca) a group of 35 
guerrillas led by Fabio Vásquez and Victor Medina entered Simacota, Santander. (Figure 73) 
They robbed the agrarian loan bank; set a few prisoners free from the local jail; then collected 
together a crowd of townspeople in the plaza to announce that they were from the José Antonio 
Galán Front of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN (The National Liberation Army) 
(Valencia 1993, p. 77).  The ELN was from its inception cognizant of public imagery.  The 
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front‟s namesake, José Antonio Galán, for instance, was leader of the historic Comuneros 
Uprising of 1781, for which role the Spanish executed him.  The event took army intelligence by 
surprise.  The demeanor of the Colombian guerrilla had always previously been rural and 
agrarian.  The ELN guerrillas were articulate, urban and educated.  They captured the 
imagination of the Colombian public, seeming, as they might have, to exude a more Cuban or 
Spanish communist flavor.  With the four repúbliquetas independientes apparently overwhelmed 
by the Army, Colombia‟s urbanites might have felt relieved that the country was not going to 
regress to the violence of the 50s.  Then the ELN appeared, not with the image of the rural 
bandit, but one much closer to home psychologically.  Beyond their urban trappings and the 
thoughtfulness of their messaging (the area of Santander Department around Simacota was itself 
reknowned as an historical focal point of insurrection in Colombia), the ELN leaders chose the 
physical geography of their first toma well.  They picked a place from which to escape, and had 
prepared a sanctuary to which they could retreat.  The ELN organized and formed its base and 
sanctuary in San Vicente de Chucurí County, on the other side of the mountain crest. 
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Figure 73: Simacota, Santander and its surroundings. (using ArcGIS with base data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Inzá 
 On 17 March, 1965, the recently formed FARC attacked Inzá, Cauca.  (figures 8, p. 50; 
58, page 169; 63, page 182; and 121, p. 295)  It was the first armed presence action of the FARC 
under the leadership of Pedro Marín.  Inzá is today not one of the central government‟s 
consolidation priority counties, but is a next-door neighbor.  Pedro Marín planned the action in 
Riochiquito and led the toma himself.  His intention was partly to show to the public that he and 
his guerrillas were still alive after the Colombian army‟s operations to occupy and control 
Marquetalia, and to prove to the Colombian public the Communist guerrillas had enough power 
to occupy a relatively important town. (Alape 2013, p. 10-14)  Mostly, however, the action was 
to get money and supplies, since they were low on resources at that time.  There were apparently 
sixty or seventy guerrillas and maybe eighty indigenous campesinos who were mustered along as 
carriers to help bring back the loot.  The raiders killed seventeen people, including two nuns, one 
of them a Mother-Superior, who had been riding on the bus.  A policeman escaped to Belacázar 
to phone news of the attack to the departmental capital, such was the state of communications at 
the time.  (Bedoya Lima March 2009). 
As evident from voting data, Inzá was also one of the few Conservative exceptions in an 
otherwise Liberal stronghold.  This may be of little consequence, but it is at least not out of 
historical pattern.  The FARC early on began consolidating the security of their sanctuaries and 
routes to and from.  The two principal parties held electoral strongholds owing to family 
traditions and regionalism, but which in any case had demonstrable geographic boundaries.  Inzá, 
judging from election maps, was a relatively conservative county.  A study by Pinzón de Lewin 
depicts considerable geographic continuity in electoral behavior over time, county by county, in 
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northern Cauca and southern Tolima (Figure 74), even while the study shows that the voting 
within counties was hardly unanimous. (Pinzón de Lewin 1989). 
 
Figure 74: Historic voting patterns from 1930s (upper left) to 1980s (lower right). (Pinzón de Lewin 1989) Red = 
Liberal; Blue = Conservative; Yellow = non-traditional (local third party); green (and dark green) = leftist.  While 
there have been some durably partisan electoral counties, voting has been heterogeneous. In most counties, party 
electoral dominance has been achieved by plurality as often as by majority, including in some areas considered 
electoral ‘strongholds.’  The coloring is by electoral units, often coincident with veredas (townships).  The voters in 
Inzá (shown by the arrow) generally voted Conservative.  That partisanship helped make Inzá a FARC target. 
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 The voting pattern maps are reflective of the ancient federalist-antifederalist tension, of 
durable loyalties to local leaders and durable cultural constraints on changes in political 
behaviors.  Inzá, it appears, was the nearest Conservative community in the effective targeting 
range from Riochiquito of Marín‟s guerrillas.  It would be hard to believe that Inzá‟s 
Conservative legacy did not play into the targeting decision Pedro Marín and the other proto-
FARC leaders took regarding what town to take.  Partisan throwbacks influencing proto-FARC 
behavior were, at least early in its development, as influential as class warfare arguments.  It 
would be decades before the FARC leaders could target anything like the posh Nogal Club in 
Bogotá.  They started with the same targets that the old Liberal party guerrillas would likely have 
identified.  Inzá was not just any Conservative county seat, however.  It was a conservative 
salient in a traditionally Liberal area.  There were plenty of nearby counties in Huila Department, 
but perhaps they were too conservative.  Inzá had shown signs of wavering in the past, having 
opted at times for non-traditional candidates.  Of course, Inzá was also in walking distance.  
After all, any description of Colombia as compartmentalized, accidented or fractured will at least 
in part be a reference to transportation difficulties within the country, and therefore a reference to 
distance.  Whatever Pedro Marín and his nascent guerrilla band did, they had to get back home. 
The FARC is a rural insurgency.  It was born in the remote, Liberal areas of southern 
Tolima and northern Cauca.  In Colombia, rural means walking, riding a mule, or if lucky, riding 
a misto.  Dilettantes or urbanites with soft feet could not have achieved the march from 
Riochiquito to Inzá and back.  Still, the first thing they attacked was a bus, a misto, because they 
preferred to ride.  Therein lies a central historical fact about guerrillas.  Mao did not want to be a 
guerrilla; he wanted to move toward conventional war, command a huge army and take over all 
of China.  Likewise, the FARC leaders wanted to take urban Colombia.  The vision was to go 
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from a toma of Inzá to a permanent occupation of Bogotá.  Unlike the Chinese People‟s 
Liberation Army, however, total victory would never happen for the FARC.  It was born as a 
rural guerrilla and every event in its origins was of rural experience, rural capability, rural 
limitation and rural ride.  Inzá was in walking distance. 
 
Pica Pica 
 In January 1970 the EPL, a lesser communist guerrilla group, took the town of Pica Pica 
in Cordoba Department. (De la Pedraja 2012, p. 207)  Pica Pica is located uphill from 
Montelibano along the San Jorge River north of the Paramillo national park area. (Figure 75)    
The EPL had gone through a difficult period.  A few years earlier, the EPL had successfully 
perpetrated what amounted to its “coming out” toma in the town of Uré, which is located uphill 
from Montelibano along the Uré River.  In that toma, the EPL killed a policeman and a pair of 
unloved hacendados (landowners).  That toma did not have nearly the media response that the 
ELN‟s occupation of Simacota had had in January of 1965.  Uré is only thirty kilometers off a 
paved highway and at least had a poor road going through it.  Pica Pica, as a map reader might 
suspect, probably has its frivolous name for a reason.  It is a name given to small birds, insects, 
dance moves and soccer touch plays.  Pica Pica the place is almost as remote as a town can be in 
Colombia and still appear on any map. The EPL method was an unpolished interpretational form 
of Maoism, meaning that the organization did not spend as much energy on gaining weapons or 
operational planning as it did on proselytizing among the population.  Its leaders were aware of 
the Maoist maxims that warned against ever making a guerrilla attack unless victory (meaning 
escape alive) was assured.  Pica Pica was remote compared to Uré and can be classed as that 
level of urban target (for announcing dominating presence and revolutionary vitality) below 
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which there are no more levels.  Remote by almost every standard, it seemed to the EPL leaders 
a good place to prove they existed at a time when neither morale nor capacity were high.  They 
tried to take the police station in Pica Pica, but it was a sturdy structure, and the eight policemen 
resolute.  The EPL ran out of bullets and did not have enough gasoline for Molotov cocktails -- 
an obsolete technology that the EPL had not yet mastered.  They had to leave.  Of any nation in 
the world, Colombians have evolved a sensitive public taste for what constitutes effective 
expression of revolutionary potency, as well as guerrilla competency in planning for the almost 
inevitable need to escape.  At Uré, the EPL had announced in fine print that they had arrived on 
the national stage.  At Pica Pica, they stated in bold type that the fine print of the Uré statement 
might have used too much ink. 
 The EPL had understood the advantages of the northern Paramillo area.  It was a remote 
expanse where they could safely conspire and grow a base of support.  They had conflated the 
„foquista‟ fashion of revolutionary theory (build points of resistance and revolutionary 
enthusiasm and expand the revolution from there) with Maoist advice to build a mass base.  
Certainly the Sinú-San Jorge river basins fit both the Maoist and foquista requirements to an 
extent, especially since the San Jorge River flows to the Cauca from the west while  the Sinú is 
independent, flowing to the Caribbean Sea parallel to the Cauca.  That is, the zone promised a 
territorial range that would not immediately confront the territory of its ELN sibling guerrilla to 
the east.  The EPL apparently did a good job of proselytizing and concientizing the masses.  Part 
of the problem is that in the 1960s, „masses‟ in the Sinú-San Jorge watersheds did not amount to 
very many people.  Residents descended from generations of colonos who pressed into 
economically remote areas to get away from some sort of difficulty of their own at an earlier 
time. 
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The Colombian Army reacted energetically to the early appearance of the EPL, mounting 
a pair of effective campaigns in the mid-1960s.  The toma of Pica Pica in 1970, however, was a 
self-inflicted defeat announcing that the EPL was not a group to be reckoned with.  For a decade 
afterwards, the EPL struggled back into relevance within the overall revolutionary movement, 
often being a difficult partner within that movement.  The EPL would recover in the 1980s, 
having gained a greater appreciation for the severe consequences of tactical sloppiness, but 
would never assume a leading role in the community of guerrilla organizations.  The EPL would 
eventually accede to a peace process, and perhaps twenty percent would regroup or join the 
FARC. 
The map in figures 75 and 76 show Pica Pica Nuevo (or New Pica Pica).  The old Pica 
Pica is nearby.  Note that along the paved national highway (that runs north from Medellín, 
Antioquia to Montería, Córdoba), just west of the Cauca River and the river town of Caucasia, is 
a town called „La Apartada.‟  Appropriately, the name means remote or isolated.  Further 
isolated to the west from La Apartada is Montelibano, which is the county seat of the county in 
which Pica Pica is a remote part.  Montelibano County has a long odd shape that curves around, 
following the course of the San Jorge River.  Road communication with Pica Pica is from the 
north via Campobello.  The 2009 departmental map (IGAC 2009) shows a road from Pica Pica 
up through Nueva Esperanza (New Hope) and down to Puerto Libertador on the San Pedro 
River. 
How the Pica Pica townspeople felt about the Colombian central government or its 
police, their level of material prosperity, the sustainability of their interaction with their 
environment, or any measure of their resistance to or solidarity with the established system of 
economics may have influenced EPL leaders to target Pica Pica.  Those factors may have 
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influenced the reaction of the townspeople to the attempt.  It seems, however, that the physical 
location of Pica Pica, along a possibly useful contraband route and near escape terrain, was a far 
more important condition to Pica Pica‟s being the location of guerrilla violence. 
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Figure 75: Pica Pica, Córdoba. (Black arrow points to Pica Pica) (Oficina para la Coordinación de Asuntos 
Humanitarios 2006)  Note the location of Apartadó, Antioquia to the far west on the map. (Dark red arrow) On the 
western approach to the Paramillo mountains, Apartadó has been a recurrently suffering community sitting along 
a contraband corridor. 
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Figure 76: Pica Pica Nuevo on Colombian Road Map. (IGAC 2006)  North is to the right of the image. 
 
Yumbo 
On August 11, 1984 Carlos Pizzaro Leongómez led a toma/mass kidnapping by the M19 
in the town of Yumbo that left 21 persons dead.  Yumbo is located north of the city of Cali only 
twenty minutes by good highway.  It is in no sense remote from Colombian government military 
force, being the headquarters of the Army‟s Third Division and home of an air force training 
center.  Other major military units are within an hour‟s driving distance.  The M19 was 
successful and popular at least in part because it was flamboyant and audacious.  The same 
characteristics belong among the reasons for its demise.  Taking the embassy of the Dominican 
Republic worked in 1980, but it was a different sort of gamble.  After taking the embassy and a 
224 
 
number of diplomats, the M19 was able to negotiate an escape to Cuba, the airplane paid for by 
the government.  Taking Yumbo was the more revealing and consequential action.  The 
guerrillas had to make their escape on the ground, and carry hostages with them to sanctuary 
from which they might then post their demands for ransom.  They did not plan the escape nearly 
as well as the action itself.  They had not prepared for the run in hit-and-run. 
They chose Yumbo as their objective for understandable reasons.  Yumbo was an 
industrial city with workers who fit the stereotype that would attract an anarcho-syndicalist or 
communist guerrilla.  Many residents of Yumbo chaffed under poor working conditions and 
suffered from worse environmental stewardship.  (Riascos, 2012)  Yumbo, however, was not the 
direct object of the M19‟s toma.  The intended audience was the larger, national and perhaps 
international one.  The M19 was not attempting to subdue the population of Yumbo itself, and it 
is probably for this reason that Yumbo falls outside the geographic target standard for guerrilla 
tomas -- remote mountainside villages.  Yumbo was not chosen as the locus of a presence 
operation because it itself lay along a needed escape route.  Rather, the M19 chose it as a 
sufficiently sympathetic venue from and with which to communicate to a larger audience.  
However well or poorly the M19 calculated its greater propaganda, it did not correctly plan 
physical escape to the mountains.  When the trucks had to stop on the way uphill, and the crowd 
of hostages had to dismount and walk, the pursuers caught up quickly.  The hostages were freed, 
the toma fouled, and many of the perpetrators captured.  The failed toma at Yumbo was a minor 
contributor to its dissipation compared to the toma of the Supreme Court building the following 
year.  The Yumbo incident was but one of many complicators of an ongoing „peace process.‟  
The M19, along with the EPL, signed a cease-fire with the government at the end of the same 
month, but it did not last long. (Villamizar 1997, p. 101). 
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Palacio de Justicia 
On November 6, 1985 a unit of the of M19 tried another spectacular toma, entering the 
Colombian Supreme Court building in Bogotá on the federal plaza kitty-corner from the Casa de 
Nariño (Colombia‟s White House) and across from the national congress.  The M19 had made a 
peace agreement with the government in mid-1984 (Villamizar 1997, p. 99), but there had been 
no demand that the M19 surrender its weapons, and the M19 leaders had achieved no consensus 
within the guerrilla group (or they had, but not for peace).  Pablo Escobar had grown powerful as 
a drug lord by that time, and helped fund the operation in order to destroy some bothersome legal 
files and express displeasure with an extradition law under review by the court. 
Still inspired by their success at the Dominican Republic embassy in 1980, the guerrillas 
expected to negotiate an escape route.  According to the plans, a massive demonstration was to 
form outside the building in the huge central square.  The crowd would prevent any effective 
military response.  Unfortunately for the occupiers, a unit of the army arrived almost 
immediately, before a crowd had formed.  It wasted no time retaking the building.  In the 
process, a fire started, or was set.  All of the M19 guerrillas were killed, and so were eleven 
Supreme Court justices.  Many at the time saw the event as the death knell of the M19 
(Mackenzie 2007, p. 414).   The geographic phenomena this research identifies as being 
favorable to the fugitive (and for that reason correlative with places Colombians most often cite 
as the foci of the conflict) were not present in this seminal event.  The perpetrators did not 
escape. 
El Espino 
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 From about 1989 to 2003, El Espino, Boyacá Department, suffered at least five FARC 
tomas.  On June 9, 1999 the FARC destroyed the municipal building, the police station and 
twenty-two houses around the central plaza.  The guerrillas were doing a presence operation, 
leaving behind a lesson of dominance and silence. (Mendoza, September, 2009)  Evident 
geographic factors contribute to the violence and destruction suffered in this remote rural town.  
It is located on the slopes leading to and from a large national park and an indigenous reservation 
near the international border with Venezuela.  It is a place near and around which smuggling has 
probably been commonplace for centuries.  Politics, ideology, socio-economic performance, land 
tenure, race, nor religion explains the suffering of the population of El Espino.  It is reasonable, 
however, to assign El Espino‟s status as recurrent victim of organized violence to its simple 
location along a natural smuggling route, combined with the violent competitive purposes of the 
guerrillas and the paramilitaries.  El Espino suffers because it is in a location where a fugitive 
force can best create and exploit advantages in risk distance relative to its pursuers. 
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Figure 77: El Espino, Boyacá.  El Espino sits on the escape slope toward a remote area in which extend a national 
park and a large indigenous reservation near the Venezuelan border.  Green vertical striping is national park. 
Purple horizontal stiping is indigenous reservation.  The road network is in Tourmaline green. 
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Manhunts 
 Some of the fiercest fighting in recent years has taken place in the context of enormous 
manhunts for leaders of the FARC.  Some of these unfolded in what can be described in terms of 
points, lines and spaces (or polygons).  Special operations forces were sent to assault high value 
targets (FARC leaders) when distances, assets and surprise warranted (point operations).  
Regular units maneuvered to fix, attrite, and flank FARC units deployed to protect its leadership 
(line operations).  In the meantime, the government designated various counties and 
communities, mostly rural, as consolidation zones wherein long-term developmental and 
propaganda work was to change the balance of anonymity to dry up FARC support along lines of 
communication on which their leaders depended for survival (area operations).  The 
government‟s decapitation strategy toward the FARC had been proving itself, but it had never 
been imagined as a simple matter of killing the insurgent boss and watching the organization 
wither away.  The FARC had a systematic leader preparation and replacement strategy that had 
been in place for a long time.  The government targeted the FARC leaders because they were, by 
police reasoning, the authors of the organized violence, and by military reasoning because to put 
the FARC leaders to flight meant denying them the initiative.  Whomever the FARC leader was 
at a given moment, he was consubstantial with the physical location of the FARC‟s headquarters, 
which meant the location of the organization‟s personnel, contract, and inventory files, as well as 
keys to the principal communications means.  To go after the leaders also meant going into the 
most significant terrain and after the greatest intelligence treasures.  Finally, to kill the FARC 
leadership seemed the ultimate „propaganda of the deed‟ when it came to public perceptions.  
Killing FARC leaders would place the FARC in a weaker bargaining position in the event of 
some return to negotiations.  In every case, the dynamic included a guerrilla who was absolutely 
229 
 
aware of the nature of the military operations and their purpose, who used the human and 
physical geography to the extent possible for maintaining impunity.  The Colombian army was 
likewise increasingly experienced in measuring the equation of culminating points, and 
constantly improved technologically to rebalance that equation.  The cover of (now President) 
Juan Manuel Santos‟ Jaque al Terror (Check on Terror) shows photographic portraits of ten 
guerrilla leaders, eight of whom had been neutralized by the time of the book‟s publication in 
2009.  The book cover depicts the remaining two, Mono Jojoy and Alfonso Cano, in gun sights.  
Both were killed since Jaque al Terror‟s publication, and are two of the individuals discussed 
below.  There are dozens of other reported manhunt stories of lesser guerrilla leaders, and in the 
majority of the cases their demise occurred in one of the named priority zones.  Other manhunts, 
conducted by and among the non-government guerrillas, have gone all but unreported.  In these 
lesser manhunts and in all ten to which the Jaque al Terror book cover alludes, Colombia‟s 
geography, especially its mountains, jungle rivers and international borders favored the prey. The 
government overcame that disadvantage by expensive application of technology, increasing 
numbers of foot soldiers and by creating other ways to extend their own risk distances while 
closing those of the hunted. 
 
Gustavo Rueda Díaz 
Better known by his nom de guerre Martín Caballero, Mr. Rueda was born in 
Barrancabermeja, Santander in 1962 and died in an isolated part of Carmen de Bolívar County in 
the Montes de Maria area.  When the Colombian Army finally killed him on October 24, 2007, 
he was commander of the 37th FARC Front, a unit of the Caribbean Block and a senior member 
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of the FARC‟s general staff.  The location and subsequent penetration of Mr. Rueda‟s Montes de 
María hideout is emblematic of the slow deterioration of that area as a geography of impunity. 
 
Luis Devia 
Luis Devia was a senior FARC leader who used the nom de guerre Raul Reyes.  The Colombian 
Army killed Mr. Devia on March 1, 2008 about one mile inside Ecuador.  Born in La Plata, 
Huila in 1948, Mr. Devia joined the Communist Party in Florencia, Caquetá when he was a 
sixteen-year-old high schooler, and joined the FARC in Casa Verde, La Uribe County, Meta 
Department in 1975. (Pérez 2008, p. 58).  His father, a shopkeeper, had been a Liberal and 
member of Eliécer Gaitán‟s short-lived political party.  Mr. Devia kept with him numerous large 
personnel and logistical files on portable computers and storage devices.  The Colombian raid 
into Ecuador caused an international diplomatic row, but also gained for the Colombian 
government a trove of intelligence information that was in those electronic files.  Mr. Devia had 
placed confidence in an invisible international border.  That border had been sufficient to shorten 
the risk distance of his pursuers.  On that one occasion it did not work. 
 
Pedro Antonio Marín 
Also known as Manuel Marulanda and more popularly as Tirofijo (Sureshot), Pedro 
Marín was one of the FARC‟s founders and its leader for decades until his death in late March, 
2008, which was not publicly reported until May 24, 2008.  Mr. Marín was born in Quindío 
Province, west of Tolima.  His admirers liken the flight of the proto-FARC guerrillas led by Mr. 
Marín to Mao‟s Long March in China.  Mr. Marín‟s march was in any case considered an epic 
display of resolve and resourcefulness.  During the retreat, Mr. Marín established several 
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hideouts that would remain hidden for years.  The chase to capture him began no later than 1962, 
after he killed a judge in Planadas, Tolima.  Popular belief has it that he died of natural causes, of 
heart failure.  He may have been hounded if not wounded by aerial bombings, and perhaps he 
was too far from or unable to travel to a hospital where his life might have been prolonged.  He 
was buried secretly, and his remains have not yet been found. 
  
Victor Suárez 
Known by his nom de guerre Jorge Suárez Briceño, El Mono Jojoyas, or „Mono Jojoy‟ (of 
interest to this research, the nickname is apparently related to an admiration on the part of his 
troops for his ability to elude his pursuers).  Mr. Suárez was a few years younger than Luis Devia 
was, but also joined the FARC in 1975.  His birthplace, like his earliest names, is the subject of 
some speculation, but apparently he was born in Cabrera, Cundinamarca, another mountainside 
town notorious as a redoubt of smugglers and guerrillas.  The Colombian Army killed Mr. 
Suárez close to La Uribe, Meta (outside of the Macarena hideout that Mr. Suárez called El 
Santuario) on the 22nd or 23rd of December, 2010.  At the time, he was the FARC‟s military 
leader. 
 
Guillermo Sáenz 
On November 4, 2011, in Popayán, Colombia, orderlies wrapped the corpse of Guillermo 
Sáenz in plastic after some forensic work to confirm his identify and satisfy the public.  Sáenz, 
who used the nom de guerre Alfonso Cano, had been the overall commander of the FARC since 
late May, 2008, but had spent most of the time evading capture, rarely able to regain his footing 
or take military initiative. (Bedoya Lima November 2011)  On news of his death, Colombian 
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officials and commentators immediately pronounced the opening of possibilities for another 
round of peace negotiations with the FARC.  The remaining senior FARC leadership would be 
harder to hunt; most were in foreign lands, probably Venezuela.  Killing Sáenz was nevertheless 
a significant military and political achievement, accomplished at cost.  In a celebrity interview 
(Aranguren Molina, Mauricio, 2001), chief of the anti-communist AUC guerrilla, Carlos 
Castaño, had been asked in 2001who the most important man in the FARC was.  Mr. Castaño 
replied, “In the irregular world without a doubt Alfonso Cano.”  Mr. Sáenz‟ last chase is 
especially apropos to this research in that the FARC chief, remaining inside Colombia, sought 
and felt most comfortable in the same territory in remote southern Tolima and northern Cauca in 
which are found legendary birthplaces of the FARC from four decades earlier.  There he was 
able to escape over two years of energetic pursuit by the Colombian Army.  In part because of 
some personal whims (like chocolate truffles and a companion dog), his location was discovered, 
and the Euclidean distances closed. 
 The hunt itself unfolded in and between several national parks (Nevado del Huila, Las 
Hermosas, Puracé, Munchique, Farrallones de Cali, and Serranía de Los Picachos), but 
especially in the drainage of Nevado del Huila in the counties around where the departments of 
Cauca, Tolima, Valle del Cauca, and Huila approach each other.  (figures 8, 58, 78and 108).  At 
high elevations, obeying headwaters and isolated mountain passes, the FARC‟s central military 
preoccupation became keeping Saenz alive, and in service to that concern, the guerrilla planners 
counted on making their enemy‟s pursuit efforts confusing and costly. 
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Figure 78: The last escape run (red line) of Guillermo Saenz, adapted from journalist report. (Bedoya Lima 
November 2011) “El último recorrido” might translate to,”The last trajectory,” or perhaps, “The last go-around.”  
Compare this map to those in figures 8 and 58.  Sáenz apparently preferred (or defaulted to) the original FARC 
sanctuary areas.  He moved from the Las Hermosas Park area in the north through the Nevado del Huila area in the 
center.  Government forces killed him soon after they flushed him out of them. 
 Saenz‟ protective troops were organized in three rings, the innermost composed of about 
a dozen highly trusted and experienced guerrillas, and the outermost with as many as three to 
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four hundred.  Figure 121 shows twelve counties that make up most of the geographic extent in 
which Sáenz‟ final failure to escape took place.  The highest point is the volcanic peak Nevado 
del Huila (17, 600 ft.).  The Saldaña River and many of its key tributaries gather on its 
northeastern slopes and flow in Tolima Department northeast headed for the Magdalena River.  
The Páez River rises on the southwestern slopes of the volcano then flows south-southeast into 
the Magdalena in Huila Department.  On the other side of the mountain crests just west of 
Tolima‟s border, the rivers flow toward the Cauca River in either Cauca or Valle del Cauca 
departments.  Abundant streams, slope, vegetation, altitude, few roads, and few people mark the 
area as simultaneously remote and a transportation hub -- if one is on the run.  Curious but 
understandable, descriptions of the area made by residents and officials of all political types 
extol the region as a communications hub from which one can go east to the jungles and plains of 
Meta and Caquetá, north toward the nation‟s capital, west to the Pacific port of Buenaventura, or 
south passing out of the Colombian Massif to Ecuador.  Southeast of the Nevado del Huila 
volcano, we find Páez County, sometimes called Belacázar, the first name taken from a 
predominant local indigenous identity and the second from a conquistador.  Toward the eastern 
border of the county is the small town of Riochiquito, famous in Colombia as a place according 
to guerrilla legend where the FARC was named, if not birthed, in the 1960s.  At that time, the 
Colombian army first started chasing Pedro Marín, who had immediately preceded Sáenz as 
FARC commander.  Five decades in, the FARC still counted on the same geography for escape 
to sanctuary further east.  Mr. Sáenz tried to get to Nátaga, in Huila Department, but his route 
was blocked. 
 It was never just a matter of the topography.  The psychological makeups of the local 
populations are one with their surroundings.  It is said they are predisposed to self-reliance, 
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distrust of government, and physical durability.  The FARC, even after the bulk of its leaders 
hailed from elsewhere in Colombia, engaged the local cultural predispositions.  Ethnicity in the 
region, while it presumably has some correlation to attitudes of resistance, is a varied and 
complex matter.  There is a considerable black community in Páez, for instance, and township-
by township self-identification as indigenous or mestizo seems to vary considerably.  The area 
around Riochiquito, geographic center of FARC lore, has a higher degree of private property 
land ownership than many of the surrounding zones.  How much of that can be ascribed to 
autochthonous intentions and how much to programs imposed by the central government is a 
debate, but relationships between the locals and the FARC are spotty at best.  According to some 
who might know, there has existed a changing patchwork of sympathy, enthrallment, fear, 
indifference, and rejection.  The place offers, in short, rough terrain. 
 The hunt for Sáenz began in earnest in early February, 2008 when the Colombian Army 
launched a major operation to go dig him out of the Cañon de Las Hemosas area in Tolima 
Department where informants claimed he was holed-up at over 11,000 feet.  Although the Army 
did not find Sáenz, it did considerable damage to his security rings.  By October, intelligence had 
again fixed his approximate whereabouts to the Barragán Páramo in Roncesvalles County.  
During 2009, the army‟s intelligence apparatus slowly improved its networks, but in spite of an 
otherwise successful bombing of a FARC headquarters camp in October, Sáenz continued to 
evade successfully.  In February and March of 2010, the FARC security rings absorbed 
additional loses in attacks against encampments in the Las Hermosas area.  In early 2011, Sáenz 
apparently moved toward the headwaters of the Atá River (near Marquetalia), and by late June 
the trail led back to Páez, Cauca, near the border with Huila Department, northwest of 
Riochiquito.  Around July 3, 2011, the Army almost caught Sáenz in La Honda Township, still in 
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Páez.  In late September, news came that the 6
th
 FARC Front was protecting his movement back 
toward Planadas County, Tolima. There, the FARC‟s Jacobo Arenas column was to accompany 
him back south toward the Pacific coast.  The fabric of the protective circles had been badly rent, 
however, and so the nucleus made a desperate decision to break out of the encirclement and head 
for the Munchique National Park area east of the Panamerican Highway toward the coast.  The 
fugitives made it to Munchique, but the little hut in which Sáenz briefly lodged was observed 
from other local dwellings.  On November 4, 2011, government special operations and police 
killed Sáenz near Honduras Township, Morales County, and then transported his corpse to the 
departmental capital, Popayán. 
 The fact of shrinking sanctuary doomed Sáenz‟ use of the central cordillera.  In late 
October, his security rings falling apart, he was hustled out of the bubble toward the Munchique 
National Park area.  Although a likely choice for escape for some of the aforementioned reasons, 
Munchique is a smaller reserve, and the surrounding population not well prepared 
psychologically to host a FARC leader.  Morales County, for instance, had a Conservative Party 
voting history.  Although it has established smuggling routes to the coast, it was not good 
sanctuary.  The Colombian military literally ran Mr. Sáenz to death. 
 The overall geography of the FARC has a necessary relationship to life events of a 
handful of men.  As with the other leaders, Sáenz‟ location, wherever he was, was also the 
headquarters of the organization.  The place where the government killed him was by definition 
not sanctuary.  The FARC‟s origin myth, as it gains a consensus in historical understanding 
among Colombians, follows a set of biographic facts of its older members and leaders, Guillermo 
Sáenz among them.  Those biographic facts have a strikingly strong relationship to the 
geographies of impunity -- where rebels could get away with what they were getting away with. 
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Battles 
 
Marquetalia 
 Marquetalia is a township in Planadas County in southern Tolima, but it is unlikely the 
right placement of the Marquetalia of FARC guerrilla legend, where the early commune of 
followers of Pedro Marín, Jacobo Arenas and their comrades established themselves in the late 
1950‟s.  It is locatable in Planadas County, perhaps in what is now the Corregimiento of Gaitania 
(named after Eliécer Gaitán, assassinated leftist populist), depicted on the north side of the 
uppermost reaches of the Atá River valley toward headwaters of the San Miguel River.  (Figure 
79, 80)Marquetalia has also become the popularized name for a 1964 Colombian Army operation 
to dislodge Pedro Marín and his band of guerrillas (perhaps 30-40 armed members).   The name 
is for some critics also a synonym for a strategic mistake that started or allowed the continuation 
of a long internal struggle.  On May 17, 1964, the Colombian Army deployed what was a 
considerable portion of its disposable strength, perhaps as many as 2,500 personnel, to conduct 
an encirclement and occupation, along with a number of diversionary patrols and movements.  
Before the operation, the Army also did civic action work in the Riochiquito area of northeastern 
Cauca, knowing that it was another area of likely guerrilla implant.  In any case, the military 
action was entirely successful in taking Marquetalia and dislodging Pedro Marín‟s guerrillas.  
Because it was not able successfully to pursue and capture or kill Marín, it was not effective in 
ending Marín‟s guerrilla enterprise or intention.  In that light, Marquetalia was not decisive as a 
counterinsurgent event, and that is the way many Colombians have taken the event historically -- 
not as a tactical military failure, but perhaps as a strategic one.  Some will argue that it was a 
failure and even a stupidity because it sparked the insurgent war against the communist 
guerrillas.  I think such an argument requires a stretch of logic, if it is not a simple falsehood.  
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The government had responded to public fear about an outlaw group that for all appearances 
seemed intent on refueling a bitter internal violence that most of the Colombian public had tasted 
fully and of which it wanted no more.  The Colombian Army‟s attitude initially was to leave the 
Communists alone in their isolated places; that they were not a threat to national security; that 
the society would eventually absorb them and ameliorate their disaffection. (Valencia 1979) 
There is little debate, however, since the guerrillas were not caught or beaten, but instead  
escaped the Army onslaught, that the guerrillas turned Marquetalia into a propagandistic and 
internal morale-building historical icon.  The physical geography of Marquetalia is pertinent 
here.  The place was remote by any standards.  For government forces to reach Marquetalia 
meant a costly movement at the point of which the government‟s coercive strength would be 
diminished.  The technologies that might have given or preserved government advantage were 
more limited in their effectiveness by the physical geography than would be the case forty years 
later.  The helicopters‟ range was greatly restricted by the altitude, and landing places were 
difficult to find or prepare.  The use of aerial bombs was extremely imprecise.  The Army‟s field 
artillery, while competent, depended on informed and accurate spotting, which it did not have.  
Although the Army could move troops by truck most of the way, the last several miles could be 
covered only by foot.  The Army was hardly inexperienced in mountain or guerrilla warfare, and 
knew to prepare deception patrols in order to absorb some ineffectual guerrilla ambushes, but the 
advantage on which the army ultimately had to depend was in numbers – being able to arrive 
with more foot soldiers than the fifty or so guerrillas could handle.  Pedro Marín knew this well, 
anticipated events and prepared routes of escape.  Put in perspective, Marquetalia (and associated 
operations against the other „repúbliquetas‟ on the east slope of the central cordillera) forced the 
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leftist pre-FARC guerrillas to seek better sanctuary east of the eastern cordillera in the Macarena-
Guaviare region. 
 Marquetalia is best considered a place holder or shorthand not for just one place, but for a 
group of four original guerrilla redoubts -- Marquetalia, Riochiquito, El Pato, and Guayabero -- 
together sometimes referred to as the „repúbliquetas independientes‟ or little independent 
republics.  (Valencia, 1997, 65)  The sobriquet can be sourced etymologically at least back to a 
political harangue given by a Colombian congressman in 1961. (Valencia, 1997, 68). 
“After the last of the violent bandit organizations from the Violencia had been 
dismantled, the four areas were known of, but the government leadership felt they 
would be absorbed into society and that it was simply not worth the cost to move 
on them.  Alvaro Gomez Hurtado in September 1961 sensationally labeled the 
four places repúbliquetas independientes.” (my translation). 
The four little republics were little indeed, and as independent as remote survival experiments 
might be.  They had been in the making for a decade as a spin-off of the sectarian political 
violence of the 1950s.  Any impurity in their communist ideological flavor was partly the result 
of a schism between groups like Marquetalia (of which Pedro Marín became leader) and remnant 
Liberal guerrilla groups (from the concluded war of the 50s) with whom a handful of communist 
leaders had made common cause.  The groups and the locations of their refuges became 
synonymous and grew in the national imagination for a variety of reasons.  One reason was a 
fresh and awful memory of the violence that the country seemed just to have overcome.  Another 
was demagoguery, and the third was actual activities of the communists outside their hideouts.  
These activities were in part simply parasitical -- to take needed provisions.  The groups might 
have taken on an ideological tone and even vision, but the leadership, including and especially 
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Pedro Marín, had long experience as pirates.  The groups were enthused of Fidel Castro‟s 
success, however, and were directly visited, supported and joined by the Communist Party.  
Violent actions in nearby counties outside their mountain sanctuaries might have had an 
ideological flavor.  When the ELN launched its decidedly ideological coercive presence at 
Simacota in January 1965, the pre-FARC repúbliquetas felt a new impetus of internal 
revolutionary competition.  In any case, on a 1:600,000 scale map a person can cover with their 
thumb the locations of all four repúbiquetas.  They are all at altitude, at headwaters and 
ridgelines.  They are universally in places that give advantage to the escape, and where, in the 
context of armed pursuit, a fugitive can, using ambushes, traps, snipers and diversions, radically 
shorten the risk distances faced by a pursuer.  The costs of successful pursuit are often simply not 
worth the prize.  However, in 1964, under orders of a new President responding to public outcry 
in fear of a new round of internal war, the Colombian Army chased the guerrillas out of all the 
repúbliquetas.  Better said: the army chased the repúbliquetas out of where they had been.  The 
repúbliquetas escaped.  The highlands where they had been taking refuge were remote and 
therefore expensive for the government forces not only to reach but in which to remain.  The 
government eventually abandoned them.  Not long afterward, the now coagulating and self-
confident FARC reoccupied and refitted them as transit sanctuaries, with better sanctuaries 
further to the east.  Today, a few of the peasant reservation zones, which many supporters of the 
current peace process are anxious to solidify, are coincident spatially with the legendary 
repúbliquetas. (Figures 79 and 80). 
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Figure 79: Spatial reminiscences of the location of Marquetalia from two persons who might have been there. (Fals 
Borda 1982, p. 141; Molano 1999, p. 153)  The guerrilla areas shown on the two maps are from the memories of 
author Fals Borda and from ‘Melisa’ (the narrator of a chaper in Molano’s Trochas y Fusiles [Trenches and Rifles]), 
respectively.  Both individuals claim to have been guerrillas of the FARC and to have frequented Marquetalia. 
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Figure 80: Central Colombia showing the approximate locations of the centers of the repúbliquetas 
independientes.  (SIGOT and various sources). 
 
Casa Verde? 
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Casa Verde 
 On 9 December 1990 the Colombian military launched a coordinated attack on Casa 
Verde, the well established headquarters of the FARC located in Uribe county in Meta 
Department (Figure 80) near the upper reaches of the Duda River, which flows south to the 
Guayabero which flows south and east past the Macarena mountains.  The encampment at Uribe 
had been the popularly recognized capital of the FARC since 1984 when the FARC leaders and 
then President Belisario Betancur signed a peace agreement called the Acuerdo de Uribe.  The 
Army reached its objective against some resistance, and within days destroyed all of the 
facilities, but without capturing or killing any of the members of the FARC high command or 
secretariat.  Exactly which way they went is still speculation, but, apprised of and attentive to 
information warning of the attack, and in any case anticipating the attack, given the deteriorated 
conditions of the peace negotiations, the FARC leaders made a timely escape along prepared 
routes to sanctuary.  The Colombian government had caused little if any damage to the FARC 
command structure or military capacity.  While the Colombian Army claimed a tactical success, 
having achieved the geographic objective as ordered, the event presented itself to the public as 
the paradigmatic empty victory against a wary guerrilla.  That paradigm is one in which the 
fugitive plans his escape in advance of the necessity.  It begins with the selection and preparation 
of advantageous geography, advantageous in that it presents short risk distances to pursuers and 
provides the fugitive with secure escape options.  Advantageous geography, in turn, is both 
physical and human.  The former is generally found, while the latter is generally prepared. 
 
Las Delicias 
 On the night of August 30, 1996, the FARC attacked a Colombian Army outpost at Las 
Delicias on the Caquetá River.  (Figure 81)  The attack was careful timed to begin shortly after 
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the base of three infantry platoons had been relieved, at a moment when part of the unit was 
receiving supplies from a river launch, and in view of incoming weather that would deny 
government air support to the base.  The FARC had not planned the attack as an harassment nor 
did it intend to retreat.  The base was attacked, overrun, and more than sixty prisoners taken.  
The FARC sacked the base, leaving only the more than fifty dead soldiers, including the base 
commander, behind.  The Colombian high command was unable even to find out what had 
happened until well after the FARC began issuing communiqués.  Negotiations for the release of 
the Las Delicias prisoners unfolded partly in public.  For instance, in an open letter the mothers 
of the soldiers captured at Las Delicias asked the FARC and the government to complete the 
transfer. (Ríos 1998, p. 223)  Cartagena del Chairá County was abandoned by the Colombian 
military and the county openly occupied by the FARC.  As agreed in return, on June 14, 1997, 
with a brief ceremony in the town of Cartagena del Chairá, the FARC released the seventy 
prisoners it had taken at Las Delicias.  Pedro Marín issued a communiqué in which he set the 
parameters for the next round.  He finished a list of aspirations with a territorial condition for the 
furtherance of peace negotiations -- that the government give up some more counties. (Ríos, Ibid, 
p. 230).  The attack on Las Delicias had worked.  The FARC had seized military initiative and 
could translate it into land. 
 Defeat of the government garrison at Las Delicias owed to a concert of factors, not just 
distances.  Nevertheless, the simple fact of Euclidean distance from centers of population and 
from major military bases made Las Delicias a precarious position.  Cost distances for supplying 
the unit and for supporting Las Delicias with reinforcements were great during the best weather.  
The costs were almost insurmountable during poor weather.  For any government units 
proceeding to the base, the risk distance were short.  They could expect ambush.  The risk 
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distances faced by patrols sallying out from the base were also short.  For the FARC units in the 
area, conversely, the risk distances to and from the base were far shorter.  The FARC had 
established clandestine bases nearby, were unlikely to be ambushed by government units enroute 
to Las Delicias, and had prepared routes of escape in case things did not go well.  Most of the 
bad decisions made by the Army, as well as the correct decisions made by the FARC, can be 
graded as such in light of how the leaders recognized, measured, and addressed risk distance. 
 
 
Figure 81: Las Delicias. (Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center 1992c). 
 
 
NEAR FLORESTA 
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El Billar 
 El Billar is located on the Caguán River in Caquetá southeast of Cartagena del Chairá and 
northeast of Las Delicias. (Figure 82)  On March 2, 1998 a well-trained company-sized unit of 
the Colombian Army moved to disperse what it identified as a concentration of FARC guerrillas.  
That concentration proved to be three times the size of the Colombian Army unit, and was 
waiting in ambush.  Former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo refers to the results as the FARC‟s 
best moment. (Pardo 2004, p. 538)  The title to a history of US support to the Colombian 
government‟s war effort produced at Ft. Leavenworth is, From Billar to Operations Fénix and 
Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998-2008 (Ramsey 2009).  Ramsey 
describes the aftermath as one of recriminations, deflections and evaluations.  Those evaluations 
indicated a Colombian government and army that might not be able to “reverse the erosion of 
government control in outlying departments.” (Ramsey Ibid. p. 30)  At Las Delicias, as before, 
even the larger FARC attacks were carefully executed against fixed bases with weak garrisons.  
At El Billar, the FARC took on a sizeable unit in the open and badly defeated it.  The Army unit 
suffered over sixty-five dead and forty-five taken prisoner.  Forty-seven survived.  Fortunes for 
the Army had not reached bottom, however.  In mid August, the FARC would effectively engage 
a pair of Army battalions near Riosucio, Chocó, killing forty soldiers in a three-day battle 
(Ramsey, Ibid, p. 44). 
247 
 
 
Figure 82: El Billar. (Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center 1991). 
 
Miraflores 
 Miraflores is a county and county seat in Guaviare Department.  The county covers a 
little less than five thousand square miles with the county seat along the Guaviare River east of 
San José del Guaviare. (Figure 83)  Between 2005 and 2012, the population apparently dropped 
in the county from around 6,700 to 5,400, while the county seat‟s population dropped from a 
little under 1,600 to a little over 1,200. (Miraflores 2013)  The county seat was built along the 
banks of the Vaupes River, which runs through the middle of the county toward the east.  The 
principle geographic feature of the town is the airfield.  Only a few miles of local unpaved roads 
extend from the town, so almost all commercial or administrative access is by river or air. 
248 
 
 On August 3, 1998, the FARC launched an attack on a large Colombian national police 
counternarcotics base in the town of Miraflores.  One of the few battles in the war to be heavily 
reported in the United States (Brooks August 1998; Johnson August 1998), the attack was highly 
successful for the FARC. 
 
“„What we know is that the offensive was a complete disaster from the military 
point of view‟, a U.S. official said.  „The army got its butt kicked again.‟...A State 
Department official said the Miraflores attack would have a „negligible‟ effect on 
drug-fighting efforts. „I don't want to downplay the devastation... there, but we 
will be able to carry on with our counter-narcotics programs‟, she said....Rangel, 
the security analyst, said the rebel success at Miraflores was especially striking 
because the guerrillas announced three months ago that the base was a 
target....Some officials here called the fighting a rebel „farewell‟ to President 
Ernesto Samper, who leaves office on Friday.  Analysts interpreted the offensive 
as a warning to President-elect Andres Pastrana that the rebels are in a position of 
strength for any talks aimed at ending the conflict.” (Brooks August 1998) 
 
“Stunned politicians urged Colombians not to give up hope that President-elect 
Andres Pastrana may still begin peace talks with guerrillas after he comes to 
office Friday.  But the offensive underscored that any talks may occur amid the 
heat of battle....„We need help because I think they are exhausted at the 
hospital‟,...„The weather was terrible yesterday.  Planes flew over but they 
couldn't land.  It's too dangerous to land....The strip is full of guerrillas,‟ said the 
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Rev. Belarmino Correa, bishop in San Jose de Guaviare, the state capital....The 
offensive prompted some Colombian peace supporters to suggest that greater 
violence always precedes the onset of negotiations.” (Johnson August 1998)  
 
 The FARC leaders did not intend or execute it as a local guerrilla hit-and-run „presence‟ 
event.  They had marshaled over four thousand of their fighters and coordinated a sustained 
attack that overpowered the garrison, killing at least 16 and taking 139 prisoners.  The base was 
ruined operationally and the government would not reestablish its full use for six years.  The 
timing of the attack just after the presidential elections and shortly before the inauguration of 
Andrés Pastrana seemed to be a punctuation mark regarding the entering negotiating positions.  
The Miraflores attack was in part a propagandistic or strategic extortion event, following the 
attack at Billar and the attack on Las Delicias at what seemed to have become a regular FARC 
tempo for major operations.  The FARC mounted a large series of harassments in Cundinamarca 
at almost the same moment, around August 3.  These Cundinamarca attacks lend themselves to 
the idea that the overall FARC objective was one of disheartening the national mood and 
enforcing the proper negotiating attitude on the new president.  They also support a more 
military theory of simple distraction or diversion to keep the Colombian senior commanders 
from deciding and acting quickly enough in support of the Miraflores garrison.  The two 
objectives (strategic psychological and operational diversionary) were compatible.  A look at the 
locations of the preceding battles at Las Delicias and Billar, and of the next large FARC effort 
after Miraflores, at Mitú, urges an hypothesis that the FARC leaders were combining a strategic 
political statement, with a more pragmatic and directly territorial campaign.  They were moving 
to secure military control of routes out of the country to the Orinoco, the Amazon, and to 
250 
 
Ecuador.  To secure these logistic lines of communication, the FARC intended to make the risk 
distances for the government intolerable.  It was that intolerability that the FARC leaders felt 
would give them leverage at any negotiations. 
 A disaster for the Colombian police (which in Colombia belongs to the Ministry of 
Defense as does the Army), the outcome of the Miraflores battle resulted from the balance of 
military errors on the part of Colombian government leaders and competent decisions on the part 
of the FARC leaders.  Predominant among the government errors was having placed the 
Miraflores base beyond the risk distance.  Given the cost distances for support and resupply, and 
the meteorological conditions that restrict aircraft to playing only an intermittently significant 
role, the base at Miraflores was beyond the government‟s culminating point ab initio.  The 
Colombian government, in light of the experiences of Las Delicias and Billar, could easily have 
calculated that given enough time (six months should have seemed enough), the FARC could 
marshal a significantly, sufficiently more powerful force than what had been stationed at the 
garrison.  A number of tactical, intelligence and security errors played into the mix, but at the 
heart of the disaster sat the fact that the Colombian armed forces had still not respected the 
FARC capacity to marshal, manage and lead a large-scale operation in an area that challenged 
the government‟s logistical capacity.  The battle at Mitú in November 1998 was highly 
predictable -- at least in hindsight. 
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Figure 83: Miraflores on the Vaupes River. (Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center 1992b). 
 
Mitú 
 Early on the morning of November 1, 1998, three months after the FARC victory at 
Miraflores, a coordinated FARC attack on the police garrison at Mitú, Vaupes, cleared the 
departmental capital and its airport of all government forces.  Analysts consider the capture of 
Mitú to be the high water mark of FARC military power.  It may have been the point at which 
FARC overall strategic concept of the war changed from one of constant hit-and-run planning 
that featured tomas to a more territorially patent strategy that would thenceforth feature the 
actual taking of key terrain with the intent to stay and defend it against counterattack.  The nature 
of the FARC military effort had always been to build logistic strength in order to marshal larger 
and larger forces in order to be able to attack larger and larger targets at an accelerating tempo.  
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Economists Michael Spagat and Jorge Restrepo demonstrated using economic statistical methods 
that the violent events in Colombia followed what is in some social science parlance known as 
the „power law.‟ (Johnson, Neil F., et al. 2006)  In almost linear correlation, the larger the force 
the FARC was able to muster, the larger the number of victims in the attacks it made.  The 
FARC would attempt to take and hold terrain when they were able, or would yield it, retreat and 
disperse if such were necessary.  That had been the FARC way of warfare since Marquetalia.  By 
the late 1990s, the FARC leaders felt they could amass enough mobile strength and position 
enough small units in neurologically significant points eventually to be able to strangle one or 
more of the major Colombian cities and make increasingly effective extortionary demands on a 
strategic scale.  To say that with the taking of Mitú the FARC had jumped qualitatively from 
guerrilla to mobile warfare, however, would be misleading.   FARC guerrilla warfare was and 
had been mobile.  If Mitú was to have been different, it was in the intention to stay -- to not be 
mobile. 
 The FARC stayed in Mitú for two days.  The government of Colombia, sensing not so 
much some change in FARC strategy, but the fact that the FARC had reached a targeting 
moment in which it chose a Departmental capital, committed exceptional economic, military and 
diplomatic resources to retake Mitú.  Moving as many troops as fast as possible, and using an 
airfield in Brazil to stage the counterattack, the Colombian military cleared Mitú of FARC 
elements on August 3.  The Colombian military had not made a timely response at Miraflores, so 
the actual scope of the Colombian military necessities was not revealed by that earlier defeat.  In 
re-taking Mitú, however, the Colombian Army faced the logistic realities.  Boulding‟s Loss of 
Power Gradient is imperative and ruthless.  The FARC withdrew without suffering an inordinate 
number of casualties.  They did not expect the effective reaction on the part of the government 
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but neither were they without an effective retreat plan.  The Colombian Army, although it had 
risen to the occasion and had exercised the full range of its operational capacity to implement a 
timely definitive response, also had no remaining strength with which to make an effective 
pursuit of the FARC forces into the jungle. 
 The FARC command clearly did not give up on the idea of marshaling large formations 
to attack significant targets.  In mid-November of the following year, the FARC mounted a 
major attack on Inírida at the confluence of the Guaviare Atabapo and Orinoco rivers.  By that 
time the preparations of the defenders were much greater, and the assault a failure.  Soon, other 
pressures including from the AUC in a variety of zones, and perhaps of most importance the 
effectiveness of Colombian army operations to clear FARC units out of Cundinamarca around 
the national capital, changed the general panorama of possibilities.  If the FARC did not meet its 
high water mark at Mitú, FARC leaders did not yet realize it.  Within a year or two, that high 
water mark had been passed. 
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Figure 84: Mitú area. (Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center 1992a)  Mitu is located along the Vaupes River 
to the southwest.  The Colombian-Brazilian border is in the center of the sheet.  As is evident from this map, Mitú 
is a relatively isolated departmental capital. 
 
Gato Negro 
After the Colombian government had confirming intelligence, and had marshaled enough 
force, a Colombian joint military unit assaulted a large cocaine processing facility at 
Barrancominas, Guaviare on February 5, 2001.  Operation Gato Negro moved 3,000 Colombian 
soldiers, who found 60 cocaine labs, 22 landing strips, 13,000 hectares of coca, 16 encampments, 
and more than 20 bars, bordellos and billiard parlors. (MacKenzie 448; Guzmán, 95)  The 
operation against Tranquilandia in 1984 had proven to anyone who was paying attention that the 
cocaine trade had changed the scale of the military challenge for the government.  Operation 
Gato Negro began to bring that point home to the Colombian public. 
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 I do not know the source of the data, or the nature of the methodology supporting the 
maps in Figure 85.  The sequence purports to show the changing balance of strength between the 
principal contenders in the Colombian war from the early 1990s to 2011.  The darkest green is 
advantage to the Colombian military and the darkest red to the FARC.  It appears to show that in 
the context of an increasing number of contested counties, the Colombian Armed Forces 
increasingly held or gained advantage over the FARC in almost every county until perhaps 2011, 
when the FARC may have gained back initiative in some counties.  It appears the FARC 
regained advantage in border counties according to this interpretation. 
 
Figure 85: Sequence suggesting the balance of military advantage, county-by-county, between the Colombian 
armed forces and the FARC. (Fundación Ideas para la Paz 2013). The darkest green is advantage to the Colombian 
military and the darkest red to the FARC. 
As an aside, geographic forensics has taken a central role in Colombian human rights 
enforcement practices.  With the passing of time, „order of battle‟ information has become 
increasingly transparent and public, to the extent that the names of most units and subunits of all 
the armed groups are quickly tagged to the places of their violent actions; likewise the names of 
the units‟ leaders. Figure 86 shows part of a rough „order of battle‟ map from about 2004. 
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Figure 86: Typical ‘order of battle’ map overlay and legend, circa 2004 (Order of battle... 2004). 
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Zones 
Figure 87 shows the wall map in Figure 4 with my selection of eleven areas or zones.  I 
derive the eleven zones from the Colombian spatial expressions regarding the location of the war 
(as in the subsection titled “Where is the War?” on pages 121-158).  Figure 87 synthesizes the 
Colombian interpretations regarding the most significant loci of the conflict.  However, I omit 
five of the conflict zones noted in Figure 56. These five are the Tumaco area in the southwest 
Pacific coastal region; the Buenaventura area farther north along the Pacific coast west of Cali, 
the Urabá-Atraco River area in the northwest (south of the Panama border), Eastern Antioquia, 
and the Colombian Massif to the south.  I make this omission for efficiency and clarity.  Their 
human and physical geographic conditions do not add to the examination of the dissertation‟s 
theory either with supportive or negative evidence.  Three of the omitted zones fall in the Pacific 
lowlands and feature Afrodecendiente communal lands, but this ethnic specificity does not 
appear to add to or subtract anything from the analysis.  I do not leave the five omitted areas 
completely unconsidered, however, as a few of the massacres, tomas and disputed smuggling 
routes mentioned elsewhere in this text occurred within the five omitted zones.  The eleven zones 
selected for discussion below are notorious among Colombians.  Colombian scholars attempt to 
place the spatial concentrations of organized violence into an overall national context.  I believe, 
in spite of sincere efforts of notable violentólogos (violentologists) that no one has satisfactorily 
explained that context.  As a small contribution to a more satisfactory explanation, I offer the 
coincidence of geographic phenomena that improve a fugitive armed group‟s likelihood of 
achieving impunity (getting away with whatever they are trying to get away with).  The eleven 
zones do not share all of the relevant geographic phenomena, but the common denominator is a 
like effect on risk distances during armed pursuits. 
258 
 
 
Figure 87: Selected conflict zones in order of discussion.  This is not a depiction of all of the conflictive areas in 
Colombia.  Notably excluded are the Tumaco, Buenaventura, Urabá-Atraco and Eastern Antioquia areas. 
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Santa Marta 
 The Pacific port city of Santa Marta sits at the base of the Nevado de Santa Marta 
national park where Simon Bolivar peak rises to 18,700 feet in less than thirty miles from the 
coast. (Figures 88 and 89)  Aracataca, Gabriel García Márquez‟ boyhood home, and the apparent 
inspiration for the fictional county of Maconda, is located about 40 miles to the south.  The 
banana workers‟ strike at Ciénaga in 1928 (between Santa Marta and Maconda, or Aracataca) 
gives the area prominent space in the Colombian activist imaginary.  That action did not cause 
the building of an effective guerrilla in that generation, but its location serves to help describe a 
long existent quantity of latent support for resistance movements.  In other words, the relevant 
human geography that might be conducive or favorable to a guerrilla, while not displayed by the 
digital elevation model, is at least reflected by some of the place names.  The outlines of 
organized action, as described hagiographically by the Colombian left, draw on historical 
moments and place identities.  They prove the existence and shape of early, organized efforts to 
rebalance power, and are undeniable arguments for a strain of motivations that I find hard to 
deny as a causal factor in Colombia‟s conflict.  The Santa Marta region is one of several 
excellent examples.  In the overall dynamic of what has made Santa Mata a violent region in 
recent decades, however, the region‟s geography, highly favorable to the fugitive and smuggler, 
is a far more important ingredient. 
 Also in the Santa Marta area and easily discernible from the maps, is an abrupt proximity 
of phenomena that would favor anyone who was trying to get away with illicit activity and found 
themselves on the run.  The rugged slopes of the Nevado de Santa Marta are close to the city and 
close to the sea.  They are also not far from the Serranía de Perijá and the Venezuelan border.  
Several indigenous tribes, which have a tradition of autonomy and resistance of their own, form 
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part of the landscape in which a fugitive can make his whereabouts unknowable.  In addition to 
the convergence of phenomena favorable to the escape, a guerrilla organization that thrives by 
economic parasitism will find coal trains, oil pipelines, drug cultivations, and burghers.  Because 
Santa Marta has a pair of constricted access options along the coast north of the Santa Marta 
range or to the southwest past Ciénaga, it has been relatively easy for highwaymen to selectively 
restrict economic traffic for the purpose of targeting extortions at Santa Marta businesses.  Santa 
Marta suffered widespread revolutionary taxation for some time.  While a quantity of sympathy 
for the resistance has existed in the Santa Marta area for decades, perhaps almost a century now, 
the combined geographic facts of nearby commodities and contraband geography have allowed 
the guerrilla organizations to survive in the Santa Marta area. 
 In recent government priority documents (Centro de Coordinación de Acción Integral 
2010), the Santa Marta area has been downgraded, the city enjoying some respite as the FARC 
and the ELN have been disabled in recent years.  The reasons relate to greater and more efficient 
military effort against the guerrillas, and I believe to an erosion of the sympathy toward the 
FARC and the ELN.  The geography, too, has changed, with the urban and lowland areas 
becoming more and more densely developed.  However, a paragraph from a 1993 geographic 
analysis of Cesar Department is perfectly applicable twenty years later: 
“In spite of its location bordering the Republic of Venezuela, commercial exchange with the 
neighboring country is not economically determinant in the department, given the important 
limitation imposed by the relief of the Serranía de Perijá.  Nevertheless, the volume of 
merchandise that enters the department illegally is important.” (Barney 1993, p. 17) (my 
translation) 
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Note from the maps in figures 88 and 89 that almost every county in the region is partly 
mountainous and partly lowland plain.  Almost all the counties have major commodity transport 
infrastructure moving through them.  Urban areas are in close proximity to remote areas, and 
most of the counties border on the sea or Venezuela.  The images in Figure 90 are from 
Colombian military briefings.  They show the locations of guerrilla presence as understood by 
the Colombian army.  They all have a similar relationship to the foothill approaches to uphill 
sanctuary. 
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Figure 88: The Santa Marta area.  White lines are county boundaries. (data from SIGOT 2013). 
National Parks 
Indigenous Reservations 
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Figure 89: The Santa Marta area.  Yellow lines are roads, white lines are counties. (data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 90: Two renderings of guerrilla presence from Colombian police or military briefings.  The slide to the left is 
titled, “FARC Expansion Nuclei in the mid 1980’s.” (FMSO 2013). 
 
Figure 91: Coal focus.  This map of the region relates one impression of the coal industry in relation to the conflict 
and to indigenous reservation lands (in purple). (Geoactivism.org 2013). 
 
Montes de María 
The Montes de María area is one of the most examined academically and propagandized 
internationally.  Entering Montes de María into an Internet search engine will return more hits 
than anyone could digest.  We can assume that the area‟s competitive value drives this broad 
interest as much as poignancy of the suffering of the people there.  Figure 92 shows the montes 
(hills) in Montes de María.  A 2003 government pamphlet titled Panorama actual de la región 
de Montes de María y su entorno (Current panorama of the region of Montes de Maria and its 
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environs) (Observatorio...2003) includes a total of thirty-six counties as part of the general area, 
most of which were at that time included in the government‟s „rehabilitation and consolidation 
zone‟.  The geographic concept is expansive, but if a woman were a native of El Carmen de 
Bolívar, she most certainly would be from the Montes de María, and if woman were a native of 
Guaranda to the south, that woman‟s argument for being from the Montes might seem to the 
woman from El Carmen de Bolívar as a bit tenuous.  Today, the government‟s number of 
„Montes‟ priority counties is much reduced.  Regardless, the reason for the area‟s celebrity is its 
close-in remoteness.  It is near and between major seaports while offering the kind of rugged 
topography that favors contraband movement.  It is not as far away in Euclidean terms from 
government base areas, but chasing armed groups has been dangerous.  The distribution of armed 
actions, homicides, kidnappings, and the culpable presence of communist and anti-communist 
guerrillas centers on El Carmen de Bolívar County.  Although the major road network passes 
through the county seat, the most remote area in terms of contraband transportation is to the 
northwest within El Carmen de Bolívar and the eastern part of San Onofre County.  The next-
over counties -- Córdoba to the west-southwest, Ovejas to the south, and San Juan de 
Nepomuceno to the north are the next most to suffer.  Not only has the area long provided at 
least temporary sanctuary for units of the various guerrilla and paramilitary groups, it also 
presents targets for parasitism and basic provisioning. 
 However, partly as a result (paradoxical perhaps) of the symbolic, propagandistic 
importance it has been given as a zone of resistance, the Montes de María area was targeted for 
inordinate government attention, to include land restitution, road building and the promotion of 
large industrial agricultural enterprises.  The government no longer considers the Montes de 
María area quite the conflictive hot spot that it once did, not because the people have leapt up in 
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human developmental or socio-economic performance indices, but because the FARC and ELM 
are finding it more difficult to survive there.  A „Transversal de Montes de María‟ road project, 
slowly taking form from Chivulito in Sucre past Macayepo toward El Carmen de Bolívar, will 
cover little more than thirty miles and is expensive considering the numbers of persons it will 
serve.  However, it will cut travel times for some rural residents by a factor of ten.  That factor is 
enough to lengthen the risk distances of government troops who will be more able to cut off the 
escape of some escaping guerrilla or smuggler. 
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Figure 92: The area of the Serranía de San Juacinto, more commonly known as the ‘Montes de Maria.’ (data from 
SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 93: Montes de María area highlighting several geographic factors that favor impunity. (data from SIGOT 
2013). 
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Figure 94: Most violent areas in the Montes de Maria. (Observatorio.2003)  The title translates to, “Counties where 
armed actors committed murders and massacres.”  Darker is more intense. 
 
 
Catatumbo 
 The Catatumbo has long been an area of political contention and violence.  It is of 
particular interest in mid 2013 because it is the scene of FARC-inspired social and political mass 
actions (marches, strikes, roadblocks) in support of the FARC negotiating positions at peace 
talks the government and the FARC are conducting in Havana, Cuba.  The area is unique within 
Colombia‟s national borders given that it features lowlands that belong to the Maracaibo 
drainage basin.  The international demarcation is not, in other words, along the crest of the 
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Andes (as it is farther north along the Serranía de Perijá separating the south-flowing waters of 
Vaupes River from waters flowing east-northeast in Venezuela.  The lowland areas of the 
Catatumbo are oil-producing areas also suitable for the cultivation of coca, much like the Middle 
Magdalena.  On the Venezuelan side of the border, a gallon of gasoline might easily cost $.25 
while the average price in Colombia runs closer to $4.00 per gallon (Romero and Ramírez March 
2011). 
Family demographics in the region are such that it would be exceptional to find a family 
with any generational roots in the area that did not have members of both Venezuelan and 
Colombian citizenship admixed along the border.  Catatumbo is a favorable region for sustained 
contraband.  Parents will not deny a son 25-cent gas, especially when one of their in-laws is the 
local police commander, who would hardly be able to come to the family dinner that Sunday 
after having arrested a relative.  The smuggling routes, rules and relationships have been in place 
for centuries.  New perhaps is an ideological differential almost as great as that of the price of 
gasoline.  The Bolivarian Socialism of the 21
st
 Century welcomes FARC revolutionaries, which 
for more than a decade have found passage and sanctuary at a much lower price than had 
previously been the case in Venezuela. 
 Who chases whom?  The uphill-favors-the-fugitive rule might seem belied in the 
Catatumbo area, given that it is downhill from the Serrania to the Venezuelan border.  In 
practice, however, at operative scales, the uphill rule has remained operant.  The Colombian 
government response to lawlessness and loss of sovereign control has understandably included 
placing more ground troops and police in the region.  The activity of these detachments has 
included the building of professional relationships with counterparts across the border, manning 
border crossing points more effectively, and attempting to improve the image of the Colombian 
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government among the locals.  Stopping the contraband of cheap fuel runs counter to that last 
notion, however.  All along the border there are informal concessions to smuggling.  For 
instance, gasoline is sold in plastic gallon jugs after having been decanted from oversized 
automobile gasoline tanks that have been fitted to old sedans, all this in spite of there being a 
major oil refinery near Tibú.  It is no wonder that the FARC is insistently promoting the 
establishment of a zona de reserva campesina, which would apparently, at first, have a 
patchworked territorial demarcation in various townships of all the principal Catatumbo counties. 
Opportunities for parasitic behavior in the zone are substantial.  The counties receive 
significant royalties (regalias) from the central government on the basis of local hydrocarbon 
production, and these remittances have been a traditional attraction for bribes and extortions.  
The management of county resources and the locally produced rules for political representation 
are, as elsewhere in Colombia, a motivator for any of the illegal armed organizations to attempt 
to gain county-level political power by whatever means seems most effective. 
A look at the Departmental map (Norte de Santander 1:400, 000) shows the wholly 
artificial nature of the international boundary as contrasted to the remoteness provided in the 
north by the Catatumbo-Bari National Park area and in the west by the Cordillera Oriental 
(Eastern Range).  The national scale maps (for instance, figures 26, p. 118 or48, p. 126) reveal 
the relationship that the Catatumbo smuggling zone has to other old smuggling routes within 
Colombia and to the most violently contested areas in recent decades, including the Magdalena 
Medio/Sierra San Lucas area, Paramillo and Urabá-Atraco, or the Santa Marta area.  It makes 
good business as well as security sense for an armed smuggling organization to establish national 
and international reach to weave routes and refuges across regional space on a strategic scale. 
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Figure 95: The Catatumbo. (data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 96: Coca cultivation ‘blobology’ (government jargon for the methodology for determining illicit cultivation 
extents and their depiction) circa 2000 for Catatumbo and Serranía San de Lucas areas. (Instituto Geográfico 
Agustín Codazzi 2006). 
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Paramillo 
 The ‘peripheral’ counties of Antioquia, among them the counties of Dabeiba, Pequé, 
Ituango, Segovia, Remedios and Turbo, for instance, (Figure 99) are notorious as foci for armed 
competition (whether massacres, tomas, or firefights and ambushes) between the army and 
illegal armed groups, or among the latter.  Of the violence of the 1950’s, Professor Mary Roldan 
asserts that “it proved most severe in Antioquia’s peripheral zones where land tenure, 
production, labor, and the state’s authority were markedly different from the dominant 
paradigm in Antioquia’s centrally settled municipalities.” (Roldan 2002, p. 7; Figure 99)  That 
geographic pattern did not change since the period of the Violencia.  Roldan’s is a common 
note about the absence of state authority.  The authority to which Roldan and others allude is 
indeed related to distance as proposed herein. The cost distances that state authorities face in 
reaching or remaining in peripheral communities is relatively great.  However, I would note that 
the impunity accorded to or extracted by armed elements is not due so much to the locations’ 
status as peripheral to the economic ‘center’ (Medellín).  I believe the recurrent violence 
suffered in places like Pequé Debeiba, or Apartadó is more closely related to their being 
peripheral to an even more remote area, in this case the Paramillo.  Like the Nevado del Huila, 
the Paramillo (national park at its center) is all but inaccessible.  The Paramillo is nonetheless a 
transportation hub.  It is a hub for clandestine transportation because it affords a fugitive 
element a best chance to distance itself from pursuers.  Going both east and west, to and from 
the Panamanian border or the Caribbean coast, a guerrilla can make intolerable the distances 
to culminating points (the risk distances) faced by a pursuing force. 
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Figure 97: Antoquia roads circa 1950. (Augustín Codazzi Geographic Institute collection photographed by author). 
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Figure 98: Antioquia roads circa 2006. (Instituto Nacional de Vias 2009).  There appears to have been little change 
in the overall shape and reach of the road network since the late 1940s. 
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Figure 99: Mary Roldan assertion regarding peripheral (and violent) communities in the 1950s. (Roldan 2002, p.7). 
 
Figure 100: Asessment of FARC order of battle circa 2004. Note the concentration of FARC units around the 
Paramillo high ground.  Towns like Debeiba, Peque, Ituango are vunerable regardless of which war.  See figure 86 
for the legend. 
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Arauca 
Arauca has been an intermittently contested zone.  The Arauca River provides the natural 
thalweg boundary with Venezuela for over 130 miles, the departmental capital of Arauca along 
the river in the middle of the department.  Arauca department has only seven counties, and has a 
developed road network owing to its oil fields.  As can be seen in figures 35 (p. 128) and 39 (p. 
133) Arauca has been a relatively violent department.  I ascribe this partly to an international 
border that has a marked differential in prices of commodities, particularly gasoline and 
kerosene.  An ideological differential has also existed between Colombia and Venezuela for the 
last decade and a half.  In a 1993 book, Arauca, the Colombian Section of the Andean Jurists 
Commission (A regional NGO) asserted the causal nub of Arauca‟s violence as follows: 
 
“In synthesis, the phenomenon of political violence in Arauca has been 
determined in great measure by the struggle for appropriation of oil rents.  
Disputes by local and departmental administrations and other types of conflicts 
are also written into the struggle for the control for local political power that 
carries with it power over the regional economy and thus over the resources 
derived from petroleum royalties.” (Marín 1994 p. 47) (my translation) 
 
The Jurists Commission was right to highlight oil as a material object of power struggle 
in the department.  Oil is an obvious focal phenomenon.  There is oil infrastructure in the 
Catatumbo where there is also a great deal of violence; likewise Medio Magdalena.  But 
Casanare Department produces twice as much oil as Arauca and does not suffer nearly as much 
violence.  Meta Department produces far more oil still, and while there is violence in Meta, it 
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does not correlate to the oil facilities sufficiently to support the argument.  In 1993, coca 
production in Arauca was minimal, but by 2000 was well established and expanding.  Expansion 
of coca cultivation in Meta and Casanare departments was far less.  There is no doubt that for the 
pirate having commodities at hand is a convenience.  What Arauca offers is the imperative – a 
geography of impunity.  From Arauca a person or group that must move under duress is likely to 
outdistance pursuers.  Legal travel by ground from economic centers within Colombia is 
difficult, whereas contraband distances to and from Venezuela are short.   If an ELN or FARC 
unit were to cross over into Venezuela, Colombian government forces have rarely followed.  
Even the AUC would find further pursuit too risky. 
Control of local and departmental governments would be a significant aid in maintaining a 
favorable balance of risk distances.  Part of the argument against the creation of zonas de reserva 
campesina is that they may be no more than an electoral Trojan horse.  In a constant redefining 
of place identities and collective representation, promoters of the Zonas may be seeking to build 
local electoral majorities in order to gain control of the county administrations. 
Arauca, along with Montes de Maria was one of the first areas selected for specific 
regional developmental attention by the Álvaro Uribe administration after assuming the 
presidency in 2002. (Figure 46, p. 142)   Included as part of these plans (at first called Peace 
Laboratories) were concessions to major agricultural corporations to help put agriculture on an 
industrial footing in the area, as well as to increase protection for the hydrocarbon infrastructure.  
Like the Catatumbo, Arauca‟s civilian population includes thousands of intermixed families of 
both Colombian and Venezuelan nationality.  Like the Catatumbo, the area features a large 
national park, El Cocuy.  The international boundary, combined with the rugged terrain helps 
provide fugitives with the needed differential in risk distances during escapes.  Helpful, too, are 
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the ancient social dynamics associated with smuggling and more recently with organizational 
energies aimed at conditioning democratic processes. 
 
Figure 101: The Arauca conflictive zone.  (base data from SIGOT 2013) The red dots are county seats.  The red lines 
are county boundaries in Arauca Department, all north of the Casanare River.  This map does not show the road 
network, but it is well-developed in the lowland, as is seen in figures 23 and 25. 
281 
 
 
Figure 102: Spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in Arauca Department. (Presidencia de la República 2013)  
Tame county is to the southwest.  The lowland is mostly savanna rather than jungle, and the area enjoys a 
relatively dense network of passable roads.  Although the landmine pattern in Tame County follows the upslope 
tendency observed in many others of the conflictive areas, note that the landmine phenomena are frequent and 
spatially dispersed in Arauca.  The mines probably reflect how highly contested the area is, the proximity of the 
international border, and the expansion of coca cultivations.  The coca cultivation in Arauca Department is more 
recent than that in Putumayo by at least a decade.  Prior to the election of Hugo Chavez in 1999, Venezuela had 
not been nearly as hospitable for the FARC.  After 1999, Venezuela increasingly served as sanctuary, and 
Colombian military and counternarcotics analysts universally judge the growth of both coca and landmine 
cultivation to the change of political circumstances across the international border.  Arauca was one of the first 
priorities for more intensive government activity to challenge the FARC after the assumption of the Colombian 
Presidency by Alvaro Uribe in 2002. 
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Figure 103: Tame County in Arauca Department. (Alcaldía de Tame-Arauca 2007) Tame County, is currently one of 
the most conflictive in the country.  Not as elongated as Miranda County, Cauca (Figure 60, p. 170), Tame similarly 
has mountain, piedmont and lowland terrain.  It borders on a large national park and is close to the international 
border with Venezuela.  It is close to lucrative economic targets for illegal predation and enterprise (oil and coca).  
Miranda County and Tame County share most elements in the suite of geographic phenomena that seem to signal 
a high likelihood that they will be venues of organized violence. 
 
Figure 104: “Route of the Liberators” Highway.  Army Engineer map showing cross-Arauca road improvement 
project circa 2005. (Comando Operativo BR18  2005) The modern  highway, like the route of the 19th century 
Liberators, skirts the Andean high ground where Cocuy National Park is located. 
283 
 
 
Figure 105: Projected Peasant Reservation Zones in Arauca Department. (Asociación Campesina de Arauca 2013) 
The county to the far southwest is Tame County. (Figure 103) The large  fuscia colored area in Tame County 
corresponds to part of Cucuy National Park.  The pastels in the background of the department map distinguish the 
various veredas (townships), while the first five brighter colors in the legend relate to the various proposed 
boundaries of five peasant reservation zones.  Notably, the boundaries of the proposed zones do not necessarily 
concord with county or township boundaries. 
 
Comuna 13, Medellín 
The spatial experience of violence in Colombia (according to numerous Colombian 
assertions regarding displacement of persons, locations of landmines, etc.) points to certain areas 
which are the loci of the war.  These loci are, for the most part, remote (as approximately defined 
by ground travel times) and often rural, although this latter term presents more definitional 
challenges.  Observable patterns and variations exist among the physical geography of the loci.   
These remote, rural areas include international borders with Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.  
They are often contiguous with National Parks and ecological preservation areas.  Some are 
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close to urban areas and some are not.  Many are mountainous, but not all.  The fundamental 
hypothesis, however, does not rest upon or define remoteness or ruralness, or any physical 
geography, but rather on a concept of distance that looks beyond both Euclidian distances and 
cost distances, imagining distance in terms of risk.  Of particular impact is the differential in risk 
distances that an armed force confronts when it attempts to impose its will on a (probably 
weaker) fugitive force.  This dynamic of risk distances unfolds in urban areas as well.  Some of 
the same issues of remoteness, the unequal effect of sloping terrain, and of territorial borders 
seem to apply.  Medellín, a modern metropolitan area of over three million people, provides a 
studied example.  While I could as easily have placed the anecdote (around which this exposition 
is built) in the earlier section on battles, it serves here to represent various urban territories within 
Colombia, and perhaps elsewhere. 
 Not many urban battles have occurred in the long Colombian war.  The cities have not 
been kind to the guerrilla movements.  There have been brief exceptions to this pattern, and 
because FARC and ELN leaders longed to surpass their rural identity and possess the cities, they 
contested some urban and suburban areas.  Additionally, while the leftist guerrilla organizations 
have not long thrived in urban terrain, gangsters have.  The major cartels of the eighties and early 
nineties were the Medellín Cartel and the Cali Cartel.  Comuna 13, also called San Javier, is a 
peripheral borough in Medellín.  It was the scene in 2002 of Colombia‟s most publicly followed 
urban battle, often called Operación Orión (Operation Orion).  It is the outstanding example of 
urban conflict from Colombia and serves, to a degree, as an example in miniature for the 
complexities of the larger war. 
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Figure 106: Antioquia map from the National Byways Ministry, (Instituto Nacional de Vias circa 2009); Medellín on 
elevation model with road network. (Comuna 13 in red; The Cauca River to the west). 
 
Figure 107: Part of Medellín looking northwest toward the north end of San Javier (Comuna 13). (Alcaldía de 
Medellín 2013). 
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Figure 108: Medellín showing the Comunas and outlying counties governed as part of the metropolitan area.  
Comuna 13 is in grey to the middle-left.  (Alcaldía de Medellín 2007). 
Comuna 13 has an area of over seven square kilometers and a population of around a 
hundred thirty thousand people.  Over the years, the borough earned notoriety as an outlaw 
sanctuary and zone from which criminal and insurgent elements launched predatory raids down 
into the central thoroughfares of the city.  It is only one of several uphill, peripheral boroughs of 
the greater city and one of, but not the most, violent of these.  The Borough sits, however, near or 
along the western routes into the city, routes that lead to the Gulf of Urabá.  The shape of 
Antioquia Department bespeaks the travel constriction. (Figure 98, p. 265)  It is toward Urabá 
via Santa Fe de Antioquia, Dabeiba, Mutatá, and Chigorodó that Comuna 13 orients (or, in this 
case, occidents).  The last three of the towns just named are sites of multiple massacres or battles.  
Although the Antioqueños are slowly developing the land route to Urabá as a major line of licit 
287 
 
commercial communication, it has long been a highway for contraband.  (Antioquia conceded 
the high ground of the Paramillo to Córdoba Department, hence the salient in the political map of 
Antioquia.  Into that highland, smugglers and guerrillas have sought to escape pursuers and 
establish more secure smuggling routes.)  Medellín can be both a destination and bottleneck 
along the contraband routes, and Comuna 13 is one of the principal gateways.  Several illegal 
organized groups valued territorial control of the borough as a competitive advantage. 
On May 30, 2002, Medellín‟s mayor, Luis Pérez Gutiérrez and various members of his 
municipal staff, along with a group of newspersons, determined to take a bus tour of the western 
hillside borough.  A series of police operations had been ineffective in returning the borough to 
any semblance of control by the city government, a government that in earlier years had ignored 
the challenge, perhaps considering San Javier peripheral in all ways.  A police sweep into the 
borough a week earlier had left bitterness and bad publicity.  The mayor decided to visit the 
borough, take a sounding, and to show more interest.  As they arrived, an unidentified group of 
armed men immobilized the lead car with gunfire, blocking the way.  The adrenalined bus driver 
managed to back up to safety from the bullet storm.  The reports in resident complaints had been 
understated.  For Mayor Pérez it was a frightening experience, but it was also degrading and 
embarrassing to realize, finally, that an entire sector of his city was completely outside the 
constituted government‟s civil authority.  Comuna 13 had fallen outside the de facto territorial 
limits of government control.  Outlaws, rebels and gangsters had gained a zone of complete 
impunity from government authority.  For several years, they had been fighting for dominance, 
mostly among themselves.  The population of the zone, many with few economic options, had 
become terrorized by that fight, effectively enslaved by the various violent groups.  Figures 105 
through 115 help tell the history, the first several of the map images offered for spatial 
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orientation.  In Figure 110, the pink area to the east was „owned‟ by the Comandos Armados del 
Pueblo, CAP, which was a „rogue‟ derivative of the FARC.  South of the CAP territory was a 
small area that local gangs had been able to defend against the larger organizations. (Angarita 
Cañas 2008, p. 291) The large green area to the west had been taken by the AUC, a fact that 
probably aided government forces in taking back the borough, and also probably allowed AUC 
leaders to maintain influence afterwards. 
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Figure 109: Comuna 13 with its barrios labeld.  The base map is of unknown age.  The red buildings were 
constructed after the map was produced and before 2004. The red lines are walking streets, examples of which are 
shown in Figure 115, p. 286. (GEOSCIRE 2008). 
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Figure 110: Overlay of Comuna 13 showing territories of illegal armed groups before Operation Orion in 2002.  
(GEOSCIRE  2007)  The green area was dominated by the AUC paramilitaries; the purple in the north part of the 
borough was dominated by the FARC; the pink  area to the east was dominated by the CAP (Armed Command of 
the People, a FARC splinter); the salmon colored area in the south-center by the ELN; the light-blue to the 
southeast by local criminal gangs; and the dark red/maroon area in the center/center-east was an area in dispute. 
 The month before the mayor‟s bus ride, the Colombian president, Andrés Pastrana, had 
ordered the Colombian Army to retake the Despeje.  Pastrana had run for election on a campaign 
of seeking a negotiated settlement with the insurgents, and he had fulfilled his promise through a 
series of demarches and concessions.  After what seemed to the public and government to be a 
long, violent series of insincerities on the part of the FARC, President Pastrana reversed course, 
and ordered the military to retake the Despeje. 
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 The end of the peace process led to a changed security dynamic in Medellín.  During the 
years of efforts to maintain cease-fires with the rebel groups, the Pastrana administration had 
been loath to authorize substantial offensive operations.  During the peace process period, the 
FARC planted units outside Medellín and attempted to create a presence within the city or at 
least within a few of its peripheral zones, Comuna 13 in particular.  The FARC took active 
measures during the peace process to improve its geographic positioning, exploiting the 
depressed pace of government military initiative.  When the peace process finally collapsed, the 
Medellín government sought more aggressive counterinsurgent operations within and around 
Medellín.  Attention and resources from Bogotá, however, were first aimed at retaking the 
Despeje, then to addressing the presence of FARC units nearer to the capital, and toward the 
upcoming presidential elections.  Also, the scale of urban insurgency in Medellin may not have 
been correctly measured in Bogotá, or even seen as an integral part of larger insurgent strategies.  
At any rate, Mayor Pérez would not find a responsive ear in Bogotá until after the inauguration 
of Álvaro Uribe, a fellow Antioqueño. 
 On May 21st, 2002, that is, a week before Mayor Pérez‟ rejected attempt to visit the 
borough, about seven hundred police officers and soldiers implemented a last assault that was 
part of what was called Operation Mariscal, descending more or less simultaneously (ascending, 
actually, since the borough is almost all hillside) on residential addresses in the borough.  The 
objective was to issue outstanding warrants to members of the various armed groups and to 
interdict what government intelligence warned might be an organized attempt to disrupt the 
presidential elections scheduled for May 26.  Operation Mariscal met organized resistance, 
indicating to the public forces how thoroughly infested the borough had become.  It also exposed 
some weakness in government operational practices.  Three children were killed and 31 other 
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civilians wounded.  The operation had little effect on territorial control of the borough, much less 
on living conditions within it.   
 Álvaro Uribe Vélez won the May 26 presidential elections by a large margin.  He had 
campaigned on a platform of toughness against the various insurgent enemies of the State, 
especially the FARC.  Colombian voters not only rejected the failed Pastrana „peace process,‟ 
they were attracted to the idea of beating the FARC definitively.  Uribe‟s inauguration in early 
August marked not only a sharp turn in national military strategy, but also a change of fortunes 
for Comuna 13. 
 Medellín as a whole was returning to hyper-violence.  During some days as many as 
twenty-five murders occurred.  (Figure 112)  The city suffered over two thousand murders in the 
first half of 2002. (GEOCIRE 2008)  The violence actually never deteriorated to the levels 
suffered during the early 1990s, before Pablo Escobar was killed, but the people of Medellín had 
every reason to fear it might. 
 On October 14, during a spike in inter-gang violence in Comuna 13, a stray bullet entered 
an apartment in an adjacent sector of the city, killing the beautiful only daughter of one of the 
mayor‟s friends, a prominent doctor.  At the wake, the mayor was not only moved by the total 
deflation of his friend, but by the parallel depression of a third man, whose college-age son had 
suffered the same fate.  The war had reached the heart of an otherwise oblivious elite.  
Calculating correctly that the city itself did not have the resources to deal with the problem at the 
appropriate scale, Mayor Pérez called the new president on the phone, and asked for help with 
Comuna 13.  President Uribe ordered the head of the chief of the armed forces to take back the 
borough. 
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Figure 111: View from Comuna 13 to the North. 
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Figure 112: Murders in Medellín 2001, 2002. Some dots are multiple murder locations.  Linear dot patterns seen in 
some areas owe to street-corner geo-referencing of bodies found on that block. The police classified the red dots 
as murders associated with terrorism, which might mean that the police confirmed those deaths as attributable to 
the FARC or ELN. (GEOSCIRE 2007)  The black lines are major thoroughfares.  Comuna 13 is also called San Javier, 
located to the middle-left.  La Candelaria is a relatively prosperous part of town.  The concentration of murders in 
Candelaria and Aranjuez reflects predation (mostly armed robbery and kidnapping attempts).  The deaths in Doce 
de Octubre, Catilla, and Santa Cruz and San Javier boroughs to the north are more likely associated with gang-on-
gang confrontations. 
 
 
San Javier is Comuna 13 
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Figure 113: Operation Orion: routes of approach into Comuna 13 (red = Army, blue = Police; captures are in black, 
red are killed policemen, and purple are killed civilians. (GEOSCIRE 2007). 
 
 On October 16, 2002, a joint force of Colombian army, national police, Medellín police 
and other government agencies surrounded and entered the borough to serve arrest warrants.  
This „Operation Orion,‟ the shooting part of which lasted only twenty-four hours, resulted in 
about four hundred detentions.  The police could not serve all the warrants, the government 
forces suffered several casualties, and more civilians were killed.  It did not bring economic 
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prosperity or eliminate desperation in the lives of many of the borough‟s residents.  It was a 
successful counterinsurgent event nonetheless.  On Tuesday, October 21, Mayor Pérez again 
loaded up his cabinet and a bunch of media people and headed for Comuna 13.  This time he 
went to the middle of the borough, led a public prayer, raised the national flag, and took a long 
march up and down the borough‟s labyrinth of stairway streets.  The crowds cheered, flew flags, 
did no shooting - there was no mistaking that a change had occurred. 
 Operation Orion was different from its predecessors.  Previous operations had failed to 
create a permanent government presence.  Government units went in to serve warrants based on 
good information about suspects, but not about the overall operational options of the enemies 
they faced.  They approached the problem as police, without visualizing the flow of movement in 
and out of the borough, nor had they planned to address the relationship between the enemy and 
the population.  They had not assembled sufficient resources to remain with sufficient power to 
address that relationship -- especially to change the nature of the competition for information.  
Although the authorities had always hoped to enter and stay, they had never assigned enough 
personnel even to protect the police officers themselves.  The police were never as present as the 
guerillas and gangsters.  In fact, before Operation Orion, almost all of a policeman‟s energies 
inside Comuna 13 were consumed trying to stay alive.  The various illegal groups had 
Balkanized the borough, and in a patchwork of tiny sovereignties had created a geography of 
impunity.  For an agent of the state, just entering the borough meant exceeding the risk distance. 
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Figure 114: Police Station built in Comuna 13 after Operation Orion in 2002. 
 
Figure 115: “Walking Streets” in Comuna 13 Medellín circa 2008. 
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 The various assaults launched as Operation Mariscal revealed themselves as iterations of 
a failing method.  In each assault into the borough, the police would chase their foe uphill and 
into the countryside, but fail to pursue.  They could not, for lack of resources.  Finally, an army 
sergeant with an integral view of the problem laid out to the senior leaders what to do.  The 
authorities had to seal off the zone, make arrests, and then stay with sufficient force that they 
could take a careful inventory and create conditions in which the residents were confident that 
they could talk to the police.  It would then be easier to determine who was out-of-place and who 
was a resident.  The city started a number of significant infrastructure projects, erected police 
stations and military posts inside the borough, and invested in methods of community 
organization.  They had to overcome not just the physical presence of the illegal armed groups, 
but their incorporeal presence as well.  The city government set up ways to assure anonymity to 
informants, especially women.  Operation Orion did not eliminate organized crime in the 
borough.  It may even have opened space to allow one of the illegal armed groups to take over 
most of the illicit trade.  Nevertheless, the city‟s leadership had listened to a modest individual 
who understood two general categories of life – that of poor citizens in a peripheral community, 
and that of fugitives.  On October 16, 2002, a one one-day operation changed the geography of 
impunity in an urban borough in what was one of the most violent cities in the world. 
Magdalena Medio 
 Barrancabermeja is a city of over 300,000 people in Santander Department along the 
middle reaches of the Magdalena River.  Colombians refer to the entire area by the name of this 
prominent city, by its mountain range as the Serranía de San Lucas, or after the river as the 
Middle Magdalena. (figures 118 and 119)  An an early ferry location between Antioquia and the 
eastern departments of Santander, Santander del Norte and the country of Venezuela, 
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Barrancabermeja became the location of the country‟s first oil refinery, built as a concession 
requirement in the early 1920s by the Tropical Oil Company.  Over time, it became the 
crossroads of oil pipelines, the national highway, railway and the river.  If one were asked to 
select a single spot on the map of Colombia that might be considered strategically most 
important as to transportation and national economic well-being, Barrancabermeja would offer 
an excellent argument.  From the official Yondó county website we learn the following:  “Yondó 
will shine nationally as the axis county of regional development along the west bank of the 
Magdalena River; efficient in its use of natural resources and with an optimal distribution of 
land-use, achieving a sustainable development.”  It does not appear to be a far-fetched aspiration.  
As far as licit transport is concerned, the region is as much a natural geographic hub as exists in 
Colombia.  In that sense it is exactly not the Nevado del Huila.  But Barrancabermeja is not just a 
hub of licit economic activity.  What in the first decade of the twentieth century had been just 
another crossing spot on the Magdalena River became the center of competition over both 
clandestine traffic and several forms of licit wealth. 
“In the Middle Magdalena a world at the margins of the State was constructed. 
...in this forgotten place, of fortune tellers, woodsmen, fishermen, and quinine 
pickers, one day they woke up to the news that the dirt they walked upon carried 
inside it a great fortune that would become the economic engine of the country. 
...Barrancabermeja did not hesitate to convert itself into a key petroleum 
economic center and; soon seeing itself wrapped up in processes of urbanization, 
a wave of immigarants from the rest of the country arrived to give a new face to 
the old port of Santander. ...Due to its strategic location, which includes direct 
access to the most important river in the country, it was the first city under the 
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absolute dominion of subversives, from whom (the armed left of the FARC, ELN 
and EPL; the sindicalists and social organizations) the self-defense forces (AUC) 
wrested the military, political, and social pulse. ... As several authors have 
written, it was, moreover, the first place in our territory where an urban war 
between guerrillas and self defense forces was unleashed.” (González and 
Jiménez 2008, pp. 48, 49) 
Figure 116 shows the nearby coca crop, and the Serrania de San Lucas is a source for mineral 
commodities, many of which are exploited illegally.  Mountains on either side of the Magdalena 
valley offer close-by contraband-friendly geography.  In 2000, the ELN asserted that President 
Pastrana had agreed to give that guerrilla group control over an area of national territory, (similar 
in purpose to the Despeje, given to the FARC) as a goodwill gesture and compromise for the 
furtherance of peace talks. (Corporación Observatorio Para la Paz 2001, p. 235)  The ELN 
outlined what they considered to be a suitable area contiguous with the counties of Cantagallo, 
Bolivar; San Pablo in Bolivar Department; and part of Yondó, Antioquia (Figure 120).  Those 
three counties form the west bank of the Magdalena River.  Militarily, control of those counties 
would greatly facilitate predation against various lines of licit communication and almost all licit 
economic movement through the area.  President Pastrana personally favored the idea.  But for 
intervening events, he would have conceded those counties to the ELN.  The AUC, however, 
probably with the acquiescence if not active support of part of the Colombian Army, clashed 
frontally with the ELN, including directly in the city of Barrancabermeja.  One of the more 
famous massacres in Colombia occurred in May of 1998, when the AUC killed at least thirty-
five young men to demonstrate their presence. (González 2008)  The AUC was also able to 
organize peasant strikes and demonstrations against the concession of the area to the ELN, a 
301 
 
phenomenon that took both the ELN and the Pastrana administration by surprise.  While the 
AUC confronted the ELN, government negotiations with the FARC soured.  Álvaro Uribe‟s 
election in 2002 seemed to cease all possibility that the government would make a territorial 
concession to the guerrillas.  Still, as Figures 119 and 120 attest, the guerrillas may yet win at 
least a partial victory in the form of the zona de reserva campesina. 
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Figure 116: Coca cultivation ‘blobology’  (government jargon for the methodology for determining illicit cultivation 
extents and their depiction) for the area of southern Boliver Department. 
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Figure 117: Magdalena Medio.  (Middle Reaches of the Magdalena River) Yellow lines are county boundaries. 
(using ArcGIS with base data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 118: The Magdalena Medio. (Middle Reaches of the Magdalena River) Yellow lines are county boundaries. 
(using ArcGIS with base data from SIGOT 2013). 
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Figure 119: Planning for peasant reservation zones. (Molina, Andrés Leonardo 2011). 
 
Figure 120: Planning for peasant reservation zones. (Subgerencia de tierras rurales 2012). 
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Figure 121: Nevado del Huila area highlighting Yumbo, Inzá, Tacueyó, and Jamundí. 
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Figure 122: Spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in the Nevado del Huila area. (Presidencia de la República 
2013)  From this juxtaposition of the Departmental landmine maps one can discern the strong correlation of 
landmine phenomena to upslopes.  Note, for instance, the concentrations of landmine phenomena in 
southeastern Valle del Cauca Department (upper left) and in southeastern Tolima Department (upper right).  
Almost all of these mines were left behind by FARC guerrillas when being pursued uphill by government units. 
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Nevado del Huila 
“Last Sunday Eighth of November history changed and the FARC finally was 
able to re-take El Davis ranch, which almost thirty-two years ago was the home of 
the Campesina Self Defense, which would later give rise to the FARC, which also 
left some years later for El Pato, Guayabero and Río Chiquito....” (El Tiempo, 
November, 1998) (my translation) 
 Of the zones discussed, the region distinguished by the volcanic peak Nevado del Huila is 
most revealing regarding the nature of Colombia‟s warring and for the theoretical proposition of 
this dissertation.  The home of the precursors to and birthplace of the FARC, it was the scenario 
of the manhunt against FARC leader Luis Devia in late 2011.  The Colombian Geographic 
Institute, responding to inter-institutional priorities, chose Cauca as a regional study pilot for its 
public GIS website. (SIGOT 2013)  If one were asked to put their finger on a place on the map of 
Colombia that represented the center of contraband transportation and the economic well-being 
of illicit enterprises, the Nevado del Huila volcano would offer an excellent argument, even 
while there are many others within Colombia.  The Nevado de Huila, where the departments of 
Huila, Cauca, Valle del Cauca and Tolima meet, is the rightful center of Colombian contraband 
and, logically, the birthplace of the FARC.  Two places, Barrancabermeja and Nevado del Huila, 
serve well as a proxies evidencing the idea that the geographies of licit transportation and of 
contraband are, while not diametrically opposite, significantly distinct. 
Many of the maps already discussed are of this region, including the remoteness maps of 
figures 23-28 on pages 115-120, and the map in Figure 78 showing the route of the Alfonso 
Cano manhunt.  The remote highlands of Tolima ceased to be a primary sanctuary for the FARC 
early in the history of its contest with the government.  The FARC was obliged to establish its 
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retreats further east in the yet more remote eastern slopes of the eastern cordillera, in the 
Macarena mountain area and the Guayabero/Guaviare and Caguán river basins.  Southern 
Tolima and northern Cauca remained significant if not critical to FARC survival, however.  
Movement uphill toward the headwaters of the Huila del Nevado and the long north-south 
mountain ridgeline that it crowns served to create the necessary distance marking the eastern 
boundary of the Cauca river basin, and to a lesser degree the ridges forming the eastern boundary 
of Tolima Department, a link to the Pacific coast. 
 It seems that the FARC had long since demoted the area around Nevado del Huila as a 
sanctuary, knowing it could only provide temporary refuge and could not serve as a base in 
which to recruit, recover or rearm.  There are too many dangerous bugs, animals, plants and 
temperatures; human population is sparse, radio signals weak; and repeated movements invite 
the enemy to reverse ambush tactics.  Still, FARC units could escape hot pursuit, and columns 
carrying weapons, supplies or contraband could rest briefly on the way to and from safer areas in 
Meta or Caquetá.  It is from the internally remote high ground that FARC units descended on the 
communities between the parks to enforce silence about the movement of their columns, attack 
annoying police posts, make payments to collaborators, and receive ransoms, prisoners, or 
portions of other parasitic schemes.  By 2011, however, surveillance technology and an increased 
government resource base extended the distances to police and army culminating points during 
the pursuit.  General economic progress in Colombia also shortened the practical service 
distances from remote civilian populations.  People with an affinity to the government who were 
indisposed toward the FARC could get everywhere faster and with less risk.  At the same time, 
more and more information and government propaganda arrived in the most remote areas to 
convince some of the independently minded to think more independently of the FARC. 
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Cundinamarca 
 Cundinamarca Department surrounds the federal district of Bogotá, which in Colombia is 
the antithesis of a remote region.  It is the center, and is included in this discussion of remote 
areas just as the Palace of Justice is included in tomas section.  Bogotá is the seat of political 
power, the geographic center of the established system, and as such was the coveted geographic 
object of leftist guerrilla strategy, particularly of the FARC, and particularly of the FARC‟s long-
term commander, Pedro Marín.  Informed Colombians vary in their opinions regarding the 
turning point of the war between the government and the FARC, some highlighting the battle of 
Mitú, others all of 2008, and others the killing of senior FARC leaders.  This section on 
Cundinamarca could have been placed in the battles section since the section‟s narrative turns on 
what amounted to a siege attempt by the FARC and the breaking of that siege by the Colombian 
military.  It also might have been put in the manhunts section, given that the FARC‟s prospects 
of continuing its siege of the capital were all but neutralized once the FARC commander of the 
siege, Marco Buendía, was killed.  Following is a quote from an interview of a prominent 
Colombian war correspondent: 
 
“How many battles have you covered? ask my foreign friends.  The truth, none.  
The Colombian armed conflict is not about big battles.  It is more of a war of 
deceptions and traps.  „This is a war of cat and mouse.  What is difficult is finding 
the guerrillas in order to obligate them to fight.  It is like seeking a needle in a 
haystack‟, I was explained by General Reynaldo Castellanos, commander of the 
5
th
 Army Division, when I met him for the first time in early 2003.  He was 
euphoric: his soldiers had just taken down „Marco Aurelio Buendía‟, chief of the 
311 
 
FARC in Cundinamarca, the largest victory -- some say the only truly strategic 
victory -- against the guerrilla up to that time.” (León, 2004; 2005, 245). 
Some Colombians say the turning point of the war was the election of Álvaro Uribe as 
president, citing his resolve to deal with the FARC physically.  His having arrived at the 
presidency shortly after the attack on the World Trade Center in New York also radically shifted 
the dynamic of international attitudes.  The Colombian military mounted operations labeled 
Libertad I and Libertad II to disable pieces of a siege that FARC leaders had been preparing for 
some time.   The Colombian military implemented Libertad I shortly after the government‟s 
decision to discontinue the peace negotiations with the FARC in 2002 and to reoccupy the rural 
Despeje.  Residents of the capital had been increasingly unable to venture safely out of the city.  
Their risk distances for trips into rural Colombia, whether to vacation, visit friends and relatives, 
or to conduct business in person, had been systematically reduced by FARC guerrilla roadblocks 
and kidnappings. 
 FARC leaders must have been aware of the urbanizing demographics occurring in the 
decades since the FARC‟s inception.  They nevertheless understood the advantages of rural 
domination, not simply as a question of escape possibilities for tactical level units, or for the 
consequences of advantageous presence in remote civilian communities.  The FARC leadership 
also sensed a vulnerability of Colombian cities, which, inland and uphill, were supplied by a 
fairly tenuous and relative small number of lines of communication.  The licit economic supply 
lines were capable of far greater throughput than the tedious lines of contraband supply, but they 
passed through many of the same mountain ranges, perhaps within areas where the FARC could 
generate strength advantages vis-vis the military.  If the FARC could develop the right map 
algebra, that is, determine or construct those places where the Colombian military would not be 
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able to overcome risk distance, but where the FARC would be able to hold civilian transportation 
at risk, the FARC might be able to extract major concessions. 
 With the success of military operations Libertad I and its follow-on Libertad II (and 
smaller parallel operations carried out in Medellín and other cities), the Colombian Army had 
definitively dissipated FARC prospects for gaining power through the barrel of a gun.  There was 
no longer any possibility that the guerrillas could choke the big cities into some level of 
submission.  Arguments favoring the battle of Mitú as the turning point of the war rest on the 
idea that the FARC afterwards had to regress to using more hit-and-run tactics, and abandon the 
war of positions toward which the FARC had presumed.  The argument holding Libertad I and II 
as the war‟s turning point rests on the idea that those two operations checked the FARC strategy 
of surrounding the cities from their rural geographic advantage.  I prefer the Libertad argument 
as to the turning point of the war.  Guerrilla warfare is maneuver warfare.  The FARC had grown 
able to marshal and conduct operations with larger and larger numbers of infantry, reaching 
numbers into the thousands of fighters, which allowed the FARC to attack, then to attack and 
take, larger and larger targets.  The leftist guerrillas had briefly grown strong enough to dominate 
the city of Barrancabermeja in the Medio Magdalena, or to take the departmental capital Mitú for 
a pair of days.  The FARC became strong enough to maintain the impunity of its leaders within a 
set of perhaps twenty to thirty rural counties over a span of years.  During brief periods, the 
government stopped even contesting some of that geography of impunity.  After about 1998, 
however, the Colombian government has been reducing the geography of guerrilla impunity 
within Colombia.  In 2013, the sanctuaries for FARC and ELN leaders are, for the most part, 
outside Colombian territory. 
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Figure 123: Peasant Reservation Zone projected for the Cabrera County area. (Subgerencia de tierras rurales 
dirección técnica… 2012)Cabrera County is located at the far south end of Cundinamarca Department.  The 
intention of organizers is apparently to make a peasant reservation zone of the whole county.  If controlled by the 
FARC, the governance model could prove highly valuable for providing greater impunity for contraband activities. 
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Figure 124: Landmine phenomena spatial distribution in Cundinamarca Department. (Presidencia de la República 
2013) Cabrera County is the salient jutting toward Huila Department to the south.  Landmine activity there is 
associated with guerrilla movement uphill toward the east. 
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Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare 
 “There is no denying that there has been an evolution, a substantial change in this region, 
bygone sanctuary of the FARC, because here is where the conflict will be determined.” 
(Univision, 2008)  Joint Task Force Omega, a government military organization, which launched 
operations in March 2004, was intended to deny FARC sanctuary in Meta, Guaviare and Caquetá 
departments.  The operation had to be extended and re-extended behind its originally hoped-for 
timeline.  The distances, terrain and FARC combat capability proved more than hoped if not 
expected.  The task force grew to over twenty thousand personnel, and although not yet 
completely successful at the time of this writing, there is no doubt that the FARC has been 
attrited and on the defensive.  The FARC apparently agrees that, within Colombia, this vast 
jungle zone will indeed be where the outcome of the war will be defined.  The rest of the battle 
areas are evolving toward the margins of the country, to Arauca and the Catatumbo especially.  
In those border areas the question of successful retreat -- the construction of a favorable balance 
of risk distances in relation to force the government might send in pursuit -- is subject to a 
FARC-friendly foreign sovereign. 
President Andrés Pastrana authorized the Despeje, sometimes refered to as the Zona de 
Distension (relaxation of tension zone) by way of a presidential resolution on 14 October 1998 
after having held secret discussions with the head of the FARC, Pedro Marín.  The officially 
authorized zone included the counties of La Uribe, Mesetas, La Macarena and Vista Hermosa in 
Meta Department; and the county of San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá Department.  The 
combined size of these counties was about 42,000 square kilometers (a little over 16,000 square 
miles or about the size of Switzerland or 10 eastern Kansas counties).  The area included, 
overlapped or bordered on the national parks Serranía de la Macarena, Tinigua, Cordillera de 
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los Picachos, Sumapaz and Serranía de Chribiquete.  The county of Cartagena de Chairá to the 
south of San Vicente del Caguán along the Caguán River had already been effectively ceded to 
the FARC in 1997 in exchange for some 60 prisoner soldiers whom the FARC had captured at 
Las Delicias in 1996.  President Pastrana further ordered his armed forces to withdraw from an 
additional ten-mile band around the outside of the five counties.  The territory over which the 
FARC had uncontested coercive control was actually over 50,000 square kilometers, and yet the 
government initiated several programs to extend and augment public services within the Despeje.  
For the time that the Despeje was legally extant, which was just over three years, FARC units 
inside the Despeje (or able to escape to it) enjoyed complete impunity.  The FARC had achieved 
a country-sized sanctuary, and many felt they were on their way to establishing an internationally 
recognized autonomous if not independent area. 
 Also inside the Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare zone is the location of the abandoned FARC 
headquarters „Casa Verde‟ in Uribe County, as well as early refuges of Liberal guerillas-cum-
FARC along the Guayabero and Ariari rivers (which combine to form the Guaviare river, which 
flows east and north to the Orinoco).  An area of the upper Duda River, north of San Vicente del 
Caguán had essentially been demilitarized (by the government) during the cease-fire between the 
FARC and the government of Belisario Betancur. (Pardo 2004)  Often known as El Pato, it, too, 
had been one of the early proto-FARC refuges.  Today the FARC is disputing ownership the El 
Pato area through the mechanism of the peasant reservation zone. (figures 127, p. 274; 128, p. 
306) 
 The counties comprising the former Despeje are also contiguous with much of the Área 
de Manejo Especial de la Macarena (Macarena Special Handling Area), which was one of the 
earliest of the formally established nature preserves. (Cormacarena 2010)  National land use laws 
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pertaining to forest reserves or protection areas covered almost the entire Macarena area to one 
degree or another.  Because the Despeje officialized the heartland of FARC remote sanctuaries, it 
loomed as a de-facto and de-jure geographic argument for recognition of the FARC as a 
belligerent under international law.  While FARC leaders may or may not have been indifferent 
to environmental protection and preservation, their preoccupation with and dependence on coca 
production (as a bloodflow for their war making strength) had to push environmental sensitivity 
to the back of its priorities.  The regimen of Colombian government environmental protection 
laws, while never enjoying better than weak enforcement, were mooted by FARC territorial 
control. That the FARC leadership was greatly responsible for an explosion of industrial coca 
cultivation in the middle of the most often identified if not most important natural preserve areas 
in the country did not speak well for the FARC among the most ecologically minded. 
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Figure 125: Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare showing roads, priority counties and parks.  The large park in the center is 
Chiribiquete Park, shown before it was recently doubled in size. 
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Figure 126: Macarena/Caguán/Guaviare showing priority counties, road network, parks and counties where the 
FARC and others are promoting the development of peasant reservation zones.  This map’s extent is shifted slightly 
to the west to include Asis County in Putumayo Department along the border.  Note the perfectly vertical 
boundary just inside the left neat line.  I discuss the significance of that portion of the boundary in the text. 
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Figure 127: Peasant Reservation Zone projected for the Guayabal area. (Subgerencia de tierras rurales dirección 
técnica…2012). 
 
Figure 128: Peasant reservation zone projected for the El Retorno area. (Subgerencia de tierras rurales dirección 
técnica 2012). 
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Figure 129: Spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in Meta and Guaviare departments. (Presidencia de la 
República 2013). 
Putumayo 
 Colombian and United States planners selected Putumayo Department as an area of 
priority attention when Plan Colombia accelerated in the late 1990s.  At the time, it was United 
States government policy to avoid counterinsurgency and only to assist in counternarcotics.  A 
presidential decision directive in August 2000 stated in pertinent part, 
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As a matter of Administration policy, we will not support Colombian 
counterinsurgency efforts.…This Administration remains convinced that the 
ultimate solution to Colombia‟s longstanding civil conflict is through a successful 
peace process, not a decisive military victory, and believes that counterdrug 
progress will contribute to progress towards peace. (Clinton 2000) 
 
The policy language reflects political sentiments within the United States and perhaps a belief 
among foreign professionals that the resolution of Colombia‟s hyper violence was necessarily 
through negotiations with the FARC.  After all, in having chosen Andrés Pastrana as their 
president the Colombian electorate had clearly chosen to go down that path.  The policy did not 
square with facts that were evident on the ground.  An obvious spatial correlation existed 
between FARC-dominated counties and coca leaf.  Operation Gato Negro (which exposed the 
scale of the FARC coca agroindustry) in Barrancominas, Guainía would not occur for another six 
months, at the end of December 1998 (Guzmán, et al 2004, p. 81).  It is possible that the 
Colombian military gave Gato Negro the priority it did because of the incongruous United States 
policy.  Gato Negro verified the dual nature of the FARC as an insurgent revolutionary guerrilla 
and international cocaine industrialist.  Many foreign diplomats received the facts presented by 
the operation as an inconvenience for relationships -- either between themselves and the 
Colombian government or between themselves and activists in their home countries.  The latter, 
along with a spread of non-governmental organizations, focused on government human rights 
abuses, abuses by the paramilitaries, and any collusion between those two actors.  The US policy 
of distinguishing counternarcotics from counterinsurgency would stay in place for a few more 
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years, but the term narcoguerrilla was also in place.  Putumayo rose to strategic prominence 
because there the geography itself reconciled policy. 
 Figure 136 summarize most of the reasoning for choosing Putumayo as the initial focal 
zone for Plan Colombia.  The spatial distribution of the coca cultivation, as drawn, created a few 
ineffable questions, ineffable because the concentration patterns undermined programs that were 
favored by one influential group or another.  For instance, between the Putumayo River and the 
San Miguel (or Sucumbios) River, part of the international border is not the common thalweg, 
but a straight north-south line at about 76 degrees 25 minutes north longitude, forming a triangle 
of land between the rivers. (Figure 132)  For several years, as the density of coca crop 
concentration in Putumayo accelerated on the west side of the invisible border, the eastern 
Ecuadoran side remained coca-free.  Since almost every aspect of geography is the same on one 
side of the line as on the other, it seemed to a number of observers that the explanation had to be 
political. 
 The most likely hypothesis was that FARC leaders had made some kind of an agreement 
with Ecuadoran authorities, local or national.  The prospect of chasing that hypothesis to ground 
was an uncomfortable prospect for many people.  Just asserting the underlying geographic facts 
in public promised not only to exacerbate international frictions, but also to undermine a favored 
alternative counternarcotics theory and strategy -- that of alternative crop development.  If 
surveys show no illicit cultivation on one side of an imaginary line, and dense cultivation on the 
other, that fact alone belies the notion that campesino family economic decisions drive the 
location or scale of the cultivation.  Much more plausible is that someone able to make strategic 
deals and enforce their compliance made the determinations.  If what was most plausible had 
been highlighted and proffered as the factual basis for counternarcotics policy, alternative crop 
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programs for campesinos would have fared worse than they did in program budget arguments.  
Cocaine industrialists recruited or attracted a large number of coca agriculturalists (mostly 
pickers and cocaine processers) into an area that the government had previously considered 
unsuitable for commercial agriculture.  The area had been viewed instead as appropriate for 
ecological preservation as jungle.  Now the government would be asked to build medical clinics 
and teach peasants to grow yam in those areas. 
 A less irritating observation about the evident geography of Colombian coca, but one still 
pertinent to this dissertation, concerns the shape of the coca crop blobs in Putumayo and the 
Departments just to the north.  The blobs in Figure 136 show concentrations that dissipate as one 
moves downstream to the east.  A professional agricultural geographer assured the author that 
the shape of the crop distribution meant that the movement of the crop was to the west, over the 
cordilleras to Pacific embarkation points.  He based his confidence on the fact that the 
concentrations were greater toward the west.  I think he was wrong about the commodity flow, 
although it makes sense that agricultural inputs and precursor chemicals would come from the 
west.  Such movement would explain the shape of the blobs, but the resulting product is not a 
normal agricultural crop.  The cocaine has very little mass compared to corn or cattle, coffee or 
the precursor chemicals.  Because it is an illicit crop, the preferred routes are often going to 
follow smuggling geographies.  They will move through areas that are not transportation friendly 
to licit commerce.  The dense road network of the Cauca and Magdalena valleys would normally 
elicit a quick confidence from the agricultural geographer that therein and nearby was the 
concentration of agricultural production, and indeed the geographer would be correct.  The 
transportation hub for contraband, however, is where the road is not.  Likewise, in Putumayo, the 
transportation geography of illicit product takes a different shape than the licit transportation.  
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The agricultural inputs might move west to east, but much of the product could still move west to 
further east.  Since the 2000 blobology, almost all aspects of the spatial distribution of illicit 
drugs have become more complex.  Spraying of the herbicide glyphosphate caused the coca 
industry to take a number of countermeasures, including dispersion of the crops. 
Destruction of whole units of the FARC, and more effective remote intelligence 
technologies caused shifts in spatial distribution.  Attitudes favoring the legalization of the drug 
as well as effective instances of corruption and collusion have made an imprint.  Defeat of FARC 
elements within the country has opened competitive space for smaller organizations capable only 
to enforce their presence within smaller geographic extents.  The international borders provide 
the best and closest smuggling filter, and can offer excellent sanctuary to FARC units.  A look at 
the agricultural geography in terms of risk distances suggests that it is in the border zones 
(Putumayo, the Catatumbo, and Arauca) that the FARC will most hotly defend its coca business, 
and it is there that the blobs will likely show greatest longevity. 
 Looking again at the Putumayo area, some of the reasoning for making it a focus of Plan 
Colombia attention drew on recognition that the FARC had developed a rear support area in the 
Nueva Loja (or Lago Agrio) area across the border in Sucumbios, Ecuador (Figure 135).  The 
FARC‟s southern units sent sick and wounded in that direction for care and return to duty.  It 
also used Ecuadoran territory for the movement of a portion of materiel.  Some out-movement of 
drug product also passed through the Sucumbios area.  The Ecuadoran border area had become a 
relatively safe staging location for numerous FARC units. (Figure 133)  As the manhunt for Luis 
Devia bespeaks, on one occasion the FARC trusted in or pushed the Colombian government‟s 
respect for the international border too far. (Figure 134) 
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 The Colombia government and the FARC are promoting a peasant reservation zone in the 
Putumayo region. (Figure 135)  Still under debate are the exact definition of rights and duties 
within the zone, exactly which peasants will live there, and who exactly will represent them.  
The currently proposed zone is in Puerto Asís County at Bajo Cuembí- Comandante, across the 
international border from where Luis Devia was killed, at the edge of the coca growing 
concentration, just where large oil and gas concessions are about to be exercised.  On the surface, 
it looks like a good area for smugglers.  As an observational aside, what the maps used to label 
as Puerto Alegre (Happy Port) they now call 
Comandante.
 
Figure 130: Spatial distribution of landmine phenomena in Putumayo Department. (Presidencia de la República 
2013). 
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Figure 131: Southern Colombia showing the Putumayo area across the international border from Ecuador where 
the Colombian military killed Luis Devia (using ArcGIS and base data from SIGOT 2013). 
Indigenous Reservations 
National Parks 
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Figure 132: Land-use planning map, Puerto Asís County, Putumayo Department. (Corpoamazonia 2008) The beige 
areas are indigenous reservations.  The hatched area (most of the map) is a composite of hydrocarbon exploration 
blocks that have been licensed by the government to one or another oil exploration company.  The purple lines 
represent areas under one of the forestry land use laws or regulations (also almost everywhere).  The map 
indicates that legal mechanisms of formalized land use are being applied toward the east, but are not yet 
everywhere applicable. 
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Figure 133: Ecuadoran journalist rendering of FARC presence on Ecuadoran side of the border.  Highlighted is 
Angostura, location of Luis Devia’s death. (Hoy.com.ec August 2009) The title translates to “Guerrilla bases located 
and destroyed.” The sub-title translates to, “Between 2004 and 2008, by the Army in the northern border.”  It is 
referring to the Ecuadoran Army, not the Colombian Army. 
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Figure 134: Journalist rendering of where the Colombian government forces killed Luis Devia. The title translates to 
“Location.” (Olmos August, 2009)  This event was hugely significant as to the progress of the war, perhaps mostly 
because of the intelligence gained by the Colombian government from Devia’s computers and external drives.  The 
event provides specific location evidence of a cross-border foreign sanctuary.  The international diplomatic row 
following the event bespeaks the risks that chief executives face in contemplating military pursuits that cross 
international boundaries. 
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Figure 135: Sucumbios Department, Ecuador. (Codeso 2007) The blue ovals are areas of intense migration.  Given 
the sparse population and the coca-oriented contest of the border economy, it is logical to associate the migration 
with actions of the various armed actors. 
 
Figure 136: Overlay with illicit drug  cultivation for the southern Colombia.  Data is circa 1999 (IGAC 2006) The 
green is coca cultivation concentrations.  The red is heroin poppy. 
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Figure 137: Location of proposed zona de reserva campesina (peasant reservation zone) in Putumayo. (Zona de 
Reserva Campesina Bajo Cuembí-Comandante January, 2012). 
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Section 5. Restatement and Conclusion 
There exists a phenomenon in human activity that we can appropriately call risk distance.  
It is the distance to that point in time and space beyond which it would be severely imprudent to 
continue doing whatever one is doing.  The risk distance has a more-or-less inverse correlation to 
cost-distances.  While applicable to many human activities, it is an especially useful concept for 
understanding prospects and outcomes in armed conflict.  The spaces that lie beyond the risk 
distances of one rival generally form the sanctuary of the other rival.  Risk distances are sensitive 
to a variety of geographic factors and are therefore subject to depiction in cartographically 
recognizable form.  In other words, risk distances can be mapped. 
In armed conflict, a fugitive entity (trying to escape) often enjoys (or at least seeks) an 
advantage in risk distances relative to the force that is in pursuit.  In the presence of certain 
geographic phenomena, a pursuing entity will have shorter risk distances than the fleeing entity, 
and if the risk distances of the pursuers never extend beyond the location of the fugitives, the 
fugitives successfully escape.  This differential in risk distances is especially significant in 
guerrilla (hit-and-run) warfare, run being as much an imperative as hit.  Space beyond the 
pursuer‟s risk distances is the guerrilla‟s (or bandit‟s, etc.) sanctuary.  The competitive activities 
and costs of the long internal war in Colombia offer a compelling set of spatial evidence and 
facilitate argument for the recognition of risk distance and for its useful application in 
understanding internal armed struggles. 
I insist very little regarding the root causes of Colombia‟s internal warfare.  In a 
concluding paragraph in his book on the Colombian FARC, Gary Leech opines, “government 
after government has refused to address effectively the root causes of the conflict, with the tragic 
consequences being a continuation of the violence into the twenty-first century.” (Leech 2011, p. 
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153)  As to the reasons why any given armed group might succeed or fail over time, why the 
conflict is seemingly interminable, or why the warfare might impose its costs on some 
communities more than on others, there appears to be a dominant condition.  Regardless of 
motives, morality or moral argument, economic performance, or ideological reasoning of any 
sort, if the members of an organization are incapable of timely reaching physical sanctuary when 
being pursued by their rivals, that organization will not thrive, if it survives at all. 
In Colombia, the success of a variety of armed groups in escaping to sanctuary (and 
especially the success of the FARC and ELN in so doing) has exposed certain regions that are by 
the nature of their geography especially favorable for accessing sanctuary.  Routes to sanctuary, 
however, do not just lead to sanctuary.  They lead from somewhere as well, and that somewhere 
is often the source location or transportation infrastructure of a marketable commodity.  In 
Colombia, an illegal armed group might engage directly in the extraction, cultivation or 
movement of the commodity, or the group might apply some indirect predatory technique such 
as taxation or extortion. 
Communities located along the path from the illegal group‟s economic target to the 
groups‟ sanctuary have been subjected disproportionately to the costs of the war.  Factors such as 
the relative socio-economic performance of remote communities, or the political autonomy of 
those communities, are of little consequence.  Who outdistances whom during pursuit and escape 
is a more significant question for outcomes, including the safety and prosperity of the 
communities most affected by the war. 
Among the geographic phenomena that seem to have great impact on the relative risk 
distances faced by pursuer and pursued are mountain slopes, jungle expanses, and international 
borders.  Remoteness alone is not as favorable to the fugitive as is remoteness combined with 
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escape route options.  It benefits predatory organizations if economic targets are not dangerously 
distant from escape geography.  It benefits smugglers if distances to ports or to locations where 
money can be laundered (and illegal items fenced) is not dangerously great.  With three 
mountain ranges, jungle expanses, five international borders, two ocean coastlines, several large 
cities, and dozens of marketable commodities, Colombia provides multiple combinations of all 
these advantages. 
The research perhaps suggests that countries or regions not offering geography 
advantageous to the fugitive need not long suffer insurgencies or organized criminal activity.  
The Colombian experience is one in which geographic phenomena have played a critical role in 
the long-term survival of outlaw and insurgent groups.  Rather than a notion of geographic 
predeterminism, however, the observation is of human planning and resolve continuously un-
determined, that is, constrained or delimited by geography.  The findings might at least serve to 
force a re-examination of arguments that stress other determinants of outlaw or insurgent 
survival, or of the suffering of civilian populations caught in internal conflicts.  The physical 
sanctuaries of illegal armed groups constitute a geography of impunity. 
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